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Public infrastructure provides the services that allow societies to function and economies to
thrive. Economic research has been very useful at identifying the social returns to investing
in public infrastructure, once projects are completed and in use. Yet, we know little about
what made these infrastructure projects successful in improving living standards in the first
place. A key policy question moving forward is not “how much” but “how well” we invest in
public infrastructure. In thinking about the “how well”, we need to look at both supply and
demand side factors during infrastructure development. This thesis explores these separate,
but interlinked, research agendas in the form of three papers. The specific focus is on the
sanitation market and its link to public health in low- and middle-income countries.
In the first paper, “Can White Elephants Kill? Unintended Consequences of Infrastruc-
ture Development in Peru”, I analyse the consequences of a common inefficiency in the
supply of public infrastructure: unfinished projects. I specifically evaluate the effect of un-
finished sewerage projects on early-life mortality —the outcome this intervention aimed at
improving— in Peru. I use an instrumental variable strategy, exploiting geographic charac-
teristics and partisan alignment. The large variation in the number of unfinished projects is
generated by the high prevalence of mid-construction abandonment and delays. I find that
unfinished infrastructure —the so called “white elephants”— can cause high social costs: it
can kill children. The mechanisms behind these non-trivial effects are: i) water cuts force
the population to rely on unsafe sources of water and jeopardise their sanitation practices,
(ii) open ditches filled with stagnant water become pools of infection, and together these
cause (i) increased deaths due to water-borne diseases; and (iii) construction works increases
deaths due to accidents. Finally, the results suggest that the social benefits of completed
sewerage projects may not fully manifest due to less than universal connectivity rates.
A natural question arising from the first paper is how to promote the use of public san-
itation infrastructure once it is completed. In the second paper, “Challenges to Promoting
Demand for Shared Infrastructure: Experimental Evidence from Slums in India”, I explore
the demand-side of the sanitation market. In this co-authored chapter (with B. Augsburg
and A. Armand), I specifically study the market of community toilets, which suffer from
rampant free-riding and a remarkably low valuation and usage. We use a randomised field
experiment to test the effectiveness of two interventions aimed at breaking the vicious cycle
of low quality public health infrastructure and low willingness to pay: (i) a “supply push” that
rehabilitates the infrastructure and promotes cleanliness; and (ii) a complementary campaign
aimed at generating awareness of the importance of payment and the negative externalities
resulting from unsafe sanitation behaviour. We find that externally funding public infrastruc-
ture rehabilitation backfires. The “supply push” reduces willingness to pay at a time when
households appreciate improvements in infrastructure; and attitudes towards paying a user
fee deteriorate further with time. In addition, the “supply push” shifts the demand for public
iii
intervention away from other pressing issues in the community towards the maintenance of
community toilets. Altogether, these findings provide evidence that external funds crowd-out
private contributions in our study context.
The third paper titled "Running the Last Mile: Sewerage Connectivity Density and Child
Height" provides a comprehensive picture of the sanitation market at the point at which
supply meets demand for infrastructure. Even in “equilibrium”, achieving safe sanitation
environments depends on three key factors: the local adoption level, the population density
and the quality of the sanitation solution. In this paper, I aim to bring together these three
factors by exploring the relationship between child health and the local connectivity density
of sewerage —i.e. the interaction between the share of neighbouring households connected
to sewerage and the population density. I specifically focus on height because it has been
widely recognized as an important measure of human capital with long-lasting consequences.
I present three complementary analyses: (i) a cross-country analysis among LMICs; (ii) a
within-country analysis focusing specifically on Latin American countries; (iii) a within-
country analysis in Peru aimed at improving the internal validity of the association of interest
using an instrumental variable strategy. I find that sewerage connectivity density increases
child height. Interestingly, the increase goes beyond the sewerage connectivity of the child’s
household, which serves as evidence of a positive externality. I document two mechanisms
behind the results: improvements in the disease environment and malnutrition. The results
also reveal that sewerage connectivity density decreases the mortality of children under the
age of five.
Altogether, the thesis suggests that while barriers to adequate supply and demand for
sanitation infrastructure can pose threats to public health, once these are released, this infras-
tructure protects early life survival and promotes human capital accumulation.
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1.1 Public Infrastructure and Development
Public infrastructure provides the services that allow societies to function and economies
to thrive, from water and sanitation networks, to transport and electricity systems. Public
infrastructure has long been acknowledged to be a driver of economic development. Among
other development drivers, public infrastructure is said to enable growth, poverty alleviation
and social inclusion (Bhattacharya et al., 2015).
Beginning in the early 2000s, a strong focus on infrastructure took place to achieve the
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Child and maternal mortality, the
burden of malnutrition and infectious diseases and extreme poverty fell dramatically (United
Nations, 2015). Accompanying this, the percentage of the population using safely managed
sanitation services has almost doubled since the beginning of the new millennium —going
from only 28 per cent in 2000 to 45 per cent in 2017 (World Bank, 2020). In 2015, the global
commitment was renewed through the Sustainable Development Goals, which set out a new
roadmap to achieve improvements in living standards by 2030, with public infrastructure at
the heart of these achievements.
For almost a century, different actors have worked together to invest large amounts of re-
sources to close investment gaps in public infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs). Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have long provided financial support to
LMIC governments’ provision of infrastructure. Currently, MDB lending for public infras-
tructure projects ranges between USD 30 and 40 billion per year, in the water, sanitation,
transportation, energy and telecommunication sectors (Bhattacharya et al., 2015). East Asia
and the Pacific countries spend as much as 7.7 per cent of their GDP on public and private
infrastructure, while South Asia spends 5 per cent and Latin America and the Caribbean 2.8
per cent (Fay et al., 2017).
Yet, there is still a long way to go. Even with all of the money currently spent on in-
frastructure across LMICs, billions of people worldwide do not have access to or have not
adopted essential goods, like safe water, sanitation and handwashing facilities, schools and
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health technologies. The World Bank has estimated an investment gap in public infrastruc-
ture equivalent to USD 1.3 trillion per year if we are to achieve the SDGs by 2030 (World
Bank, 2020). A key issue moving forward is not “how much” but “how well” we invest in
public infrastructure. Reflecting on our approaches allows us to assess what has worked and
where the opportunities for improvement lie.
Economic research has been very useful at identifying the social returns on investing in
public infrastructure, but once it is completed and in use. We have learnt that water and san-
itation systems can improve public health (Alsan and Goldin, 2019), irrigation dams can en-
able agricultural productivity and decrease poverty (Duflo and Pande, 2007), electricity can
advance manufacturing productivity and employment (Dinkelman, 2011; Lipscomb et al.,
2013; Rud, 2012), communication technologies can make markets more efficient (Jensen
and Miller, 2018) and roads and railroads can promote trade, increase income and welfare
and promote growth (Banerjee et al., 2020; Donaldson, 2018). Yet, there is limited evidence
about what made these infrastructure projects successful, in the first place, in improving
living standards.
In thinking about the “how well”, we need to look at both supply and demand side factors
during infrastructure development. On the supply-side, governments face the challenge of
ensuring that resources are well targeted and used efficiently during the implementation of
projects, especially in LMICs, where public resources are scarce. Evidence suggests that the
economic return of public infrastructure projects depends on the initial level of regional in-
come and the policy environment, which is defined as “good governance” (Isham and Kauf-
mann, 1999; Costa-I-Font and Rodriguez, 2005). Alas, in most LMICs, inequality is high
and the policy environment and overall institutional quality are particularly weak; corruption
and clientelism are rampant (Costa-I-Font et al., 2003). For instance, in Latin America, in-
efficient public expenditure is estimated to account for 4.4 per cent of the GDP in the entire
region —enough to provide social protection to the extreme poor (Izquierdo et al., 2018).
A common type of public expenditure inefficiency in LMICs is the mid-construction aban-
donment of public infrastructure projects. New evidence suggests that over one third of the
public infrastructure projects started are not completed (Rasul and Rogger, 2018; Williams,
2017). This inefficiency is typically ascribed to principal-agent and commitment problems,
steaming from unstable political dynamics, which delay and prevent physical completion.
Yet, we know very little about the consequences of this wasteful use of public resources. To
date, the literature has ignored the effects of unfinished projects, despite their implications
for conducting a sound cost-effectiveness analysis of public infrastructure.
On the demand-side, we see additional problems. Governments often assume that the
supply of public infrastructure will meet an existing demand. Yet, the adoption of public
infrastructure by citizens and firms depends on a number of factors, including valuation,
market failures, peer effects, distance and even corruption (Besley and Case, 1993; Kremer
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et al., 2011; Sequeira and Djankov, 2014). Given the high burden of infectious diseases
in LMICs, it is particularly puzzling that the marginal willingness to pay for public infras-
tructure that affects environmental quality is very low (Dupas, 2011). Greenstone and Jack
(2015) proposes four potential explanations for this: (1) due to low income levels, individuals
value increases in income more than marginal improvements in environmental quality; (2)
the marginal costs of environmental quality improvements are high; (3) political economy
factors undermine efficient policymaking; and (4) classic market failures (e.g. externalities),
as well as those typical of LMICs (e.g. weak enforcement of property rights) distort willing-
ness to pay. The so-called “envirodevonomics” agenda raises the need for further empirical
research estimating the willingness to pay for public goods affecting environmental quality
and exploring its determinants in LMICs. It also states the importance of investigating the
costs and benefits of different policies, such as analysing whether providing information can
change attitudes and behaviour, as well as the extent to which external funds can crowd-out
investments.
Assuming that one can overcome bottlenecks in the supply of infrastructure and release
the constraints to demand, the next step is to analyse the effectiveness of public infrastruc-
ture in improving living standards. Particularly relevant for this dissertation is the potential
of public infrastructure to improve early-life human capital accumulation. Beginning with
the work of Grossman (2014), economists have long envisioned health as a form of human
capital that is a function of an inherited initial health stock that can be increased with invest-
ment (e.g. parental time and market goods), as well as certain “environmental” variables. It
is through this latter input that public infrastructure enters the production function of human
capital. While there is ample empirical evidence of the role of genetics (Thompson, 2014;
Costa-i-Font, 2015) and parental investment (Currie, 2000; Cunha et al., 2010; Maluccio
et al., 2009; Gertler et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2014), little is known about the role of
public health infrastructure.
This dissertation explores these three separate, but interlinked, research agendas in the
form of three papers. The first paper evaluates supply-side failures —i.e. unfinished infras-
tructure projects — and their effects on early-life mortality in Peru through a nationwide
study. The second paper analyses the constraints to demand for public infrastructure and the
challenges to release them in urban slums of India. The third paper investigates the effec-
tiveness of the local adoption of public infrastructure to improve child height, a key factor of
the human capital production function in LMICs. By moving along the external and internal
validity scale, in this last paper I start the analysis with all LMICs, narrowing it down to the
Latin American region and lastly to Peru.
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1.2 Sanitation Infrastructure and Early Life Health
Each year nearly 1.1 million early-life deaths could be prevented by improvements in the
sanitation environment, representing 1.5 per cent of the global disease burden (Prüss-Ustün
et al., 2014). Epidemiological research has long established a clear link between chronic
environmental exposure to faecal germs and the prevalence of infectious diseases (Esrey and
Habicht, 1986; Esrey et al., 1991; Burger and Esrey, 1995). A primary barrier consisting
of the safe disposal of faeces through adequate sanitation facilities prevents the transmis-
sion of pathogens to the host via fluids, fields, flies and fingers (Wagner and Lanoix, 1958).
Faecal pathogens are the main cause of water-borne diseases, which may be life-threatening
to young children with impaired immunity. These diseases may also have negative conse-
quences for surviving children because they limit the absorption of nutrients needed by the
essential organs for growth and development (Ngure et al., 2014). Child stunting —i.e. when
children do not achieve their height potential — has long-lasting consequences because it im-
pairs cognitive ability and reduces educational attainment and adult productivity, as well as
increasing the risk of adult chronical health impediments (Case et al., 2002; Case and Pax-
son, 2010; Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007; Currie and Vogl, 2013). Therefore, sanitation
is a key factor in the human capital production function in LMICs.
Poor sanitation also costs LMICs billions, amounting to the equivalent of 6.3 per cent
of GDP in Bangladesh (2007), 6.4 per cent of GDP in India (2006), 7.2 per cent of GDP in
Cambodia (2005), 2.4 per cent of GDP in Niger (2012), and 3.9 per cent of GDP in Pakistan
(2006). These economic losses are mainly driven by premature deaths, the cost of health
care treatment, and lost time and productivity due to seeking treatment and seeking access to
sanitation facilities (World Bank, 2018).
A poor sanitation environment is a characteristic of LMICs, where six in every ten indi-
viduals do not use safely managed sanitation services. South Asia, although a richer region
than Sub-Saharan Africa, ranks almost as badly as the latter in terms of access to improved
sanitation, with around 40 per cent of the population lacking access (Fay et al., 2017). The
situation is particularly bad in India, where open defecation is still practised by 25 per cent
of the population, both in rural and overcrowded urban areas (World Bank, 2017). The Latin
American region also performs badly compared to countries of the same income level. While
83 per cent of the Latin American population has access to some form of improved sanita-
tion, only 30 per cent of the region’s wastewater is treated —with significant implications
for public health and environmental sustainability. This average masks significant variations
within and across countries. Peru stands out, with access in the bottom rural quintile at 40
per cent, while everybody in the top urban quintile has access to, and uses safe sanitation
facilities. Likewise, while Chile treats 100 per cent of its wastewater, Costa Rica treats only
4 per cent and Peru and Colombia only 30 per cent (Fay et al., 2017).
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The global challenge of expanding the coverage and promoting the adoption of sanitation
facilities due to their relevance for well-being has not gone unnoticed. The SDGs have intro-
duced a specific goal of “Ensuring Availability and Sustainable Management of Water and
Sanitation for All by 2030” (SDG6) (United Nations, 2016). This goal has been recognised
as the most interconnected one of the SDGs because improving sanitation aids education
(SDG4), economic growth (SDG8), poverty reduction (SDG1), health (SDG3) and equality
(SDG10) amongst many others (Water Aid, 2015). Bill Gates talks of “reinventing the toilet”
and the great attention that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has paid to this effort is
evidence of the global trend (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2011).
The protective role of sanitation is not a given because the technological quality of san-
itation solutions varies greatly in the LMICs and not all of them ensure a safe environment.
Most of the evidence available focuses on the effect of exposure to open defecation and im-
provements in access to, and the adoption of rudimentary latrines (see for example Duflo
et al. (2015); Geruso and Spears (2018)). Rural areas have commonly relied on these on-site
sanitation solutions, which have to be emptied to remain functional and pose health risks
otherwise (Bancalari and Martinez, 2018). This thesis will focus on the higher end of the
sanitation rung. During recent decades, access to sewerage has increased substantially in
urban and peri-urban areas of the LMICs. In this sanitation system, wastewater from flush
toilets is piped out of residential areas for disposal elsewhere. Sewerage has been classi-
fied by the WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program as the safest sanitation solution
when the sludge is properly disposed of (Joint Monitoring Program WHO-UNICEF, 2017).
Despite the global increase in access to sewerage during recent decades, rapid population
growth in urban areas is straining the sanitation infrastructure beyond capacity. This chal-
lenge is leaving an important proportion of the urban population without access to in-house
toilets and at risk of open defecation. To alleviate this problem, community toilets, connected
to either septic tanks or sewers have been introduced in slums of Africa and South Asia.
Expanding access to and promoting widespread adoption of sanitation facilities is not
a trivial task. The sanitation market has several characteristics that pose challenges. On
the supply-side, the high fixed costs and economies of scale associated with the sanitation
infrastructure make its provision a natural monopoly. Moreover, due to the long average
asset life of treatment plants, dynamic competition is deterred. It is for these reasons that,
historically, governments have supplied sanitation services with monopolistic power. The
problem lies in the fact that, in the absence of competition, public firms have weak efficiency
incentives, which can result in undesirable quality deterioration during the implementation
phase (Galiani et al., 2005). Furthermore, public provision of sanitation infrastructure is
vulnerable to political pressure to keep costs and prices low, preventing the use of advanced
technologies and the promotion of innovation(Kessides, 2004). Given how disruptive the
construction of sanitation systems can be, overlooking quality in the implementation phase
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can pose hazards to the population.
On the demand-side, there are several constraints to the adoption of sanitation infrastruc-
ture. It has been estimated that willingness to pay for water (Kremer et al., 2011; Devoto
et al., 2012; Ashraf et al., 2010; Berry et al., 2020) and private (or in-house) sanitation
services (Ben Yishay et al., 2017) is low in LMICs, reflecting the low valuation of these
services. Market failures are key determinants of such low willingness to pay. The mar-
ket failure that characterises the sanitation market is externalities. With open defecation as
a natural alternative, sanitation entails large externalities (Geruso and Spears, 2018). The
problem lies in the fact that, for the social benefits to fully manifest, there must be univer-
sal adoption of safe sanitation solutions. Because the social benefits of using the sanitation
infrastructure exceed the private marginal willingness to pay for adopting the infrastructure,
households underinvest (i.e. lower private contribution) (Ashraf et al., 2016). Negative exter-
nalities may be more pervasive in LMICs than in advanced economies because the former are
characterised by weak institutions that make enforcement difficult to implement and suscep-
tible to distortions (Greenstone and Jack, 2015). Therefore, coordination problems are more
salient and free-riding is rampant. Non-payment for using public infrastructure can lower
effective prices below the marginal cost of operation and maintenance, ultimately leading to
low-quality services, reinforcing the already low WTP (Burgess et al., 2020; Coville et al.,
2020).
Another of these market failures is information asymmetry—i.e. unknown benefits of
the adoption of sanitation infrastructure (Dupas, 2011; Dupas and Miguel, 2016). A big
challenge to updating priors is the fact that the benefits of safe sanitation, as with many
other preventive health technologies, are uncertain and unknown in the future. In LMICs,
in particular, misinformation is more persistent given the lower levels of literacy and lack of
liability rules around the provision of health information.
Once the supply- and demand-side constraints to the adoption of sanitation infrastructure
have been overcome, different factors moderate the effectiveness of sanitation solutions to
improve public health and human capital. Given the externalities associated with sanitation,
the social benefits fully manifest only if individuals internalise the externalities. Key factors
are thus the level of adoption of neighbours and how close people live to each other. Although
the literature has mainly focused on individual adoption of sanitation infrastructure, the role
of local adoption has recently attracted attention (Augsburg and Rodríguez-Lesmes, 2018;
Cameron et al., 2019), as well as its interaction with population density (Hathi et al., 2017;
Spears, 2020). However, there is still a need to bridge different studies in order to achieve
greater external validity and understand the mechanisms well.
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1.3 Thesis Outline and Contributions
This thesis is composed of three independent papers presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4. In
each chapter, I explore the relationship between public infrastructure and living standards
in the context of the sanitation market: (i) from the supply-side; (ii) from the demand-side;
and (iii) in “equilibrium”. Overall, the thesis informs the debate on how to provide public
infrastructure in an efficient and effective manner.
In all three chapters, I employ applied micro-econometric tools, which are used to address
causal questions. In Chapters 2 and 4, I rely on an instrumental variable strategy (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009; Greene, 2019). In Chapter 3, I use field experiments, in particular, a clustered-
randomised control trial (cRCT) and incentive-compatible elicitation methods (Duflo et al.,
2007).
In Chapter 2, I study the supply-side of public infrastructure. Specifically, I analyse the
consequences of a common inefficiency in government expenditure in public infrastructure:
unfinished projects. I evaluate the effect of unfinished sewerage projects on the mortality of
children under the age of five —the outcome this intervention aimed at improving— in Peru.
The diffusion of sewerage in Peru is an excellent case to study because the scale of this public
intervention was national, allowing for considerable spatial variation in its implementation.
The Government of Peru invested USD 3 billion to start more than 6,000 sewerage projects
between 2005 and 2015.
I construct district-level panel data by combining several sources of novel administrative
data and grid-cell level spatial data. I rely on the variation in the number of unfinished
projects generated by the high prevalence of mid-construction abandonment and delays. In
other to deal with the endogenous implementation of projects, I use an instrumental variable
methodology exploiting geographic characteristics and partisan alignment.
I find that unfinished infrastructure can cause high social costs: it can kill children. With
every additional unfinished sewerage project, infant and under-five mortality increases, as
opposed to not starting a project. The mechanisms behind these non-trivial effects are: i)
water cuts force the population to rely on unsafe sources of water and jeopardise their san-
itation practices, (ii) open ditches filled with stagnant water become pools of infection, and
together these cause (i) increased deaths due to water-borne diseases; and (iii) construction
works increases deaths due to accidents.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, the paper broadens the literature on
public goods provision by moving beyond assessing inefficiencies to encompass social costs
(Besley and Burgess, 2002; Bandiera et al., 2009; Rasul and Rogger, 2018; Williams, 2017).
Second, this paper is the first in the literature on public infrastructure effectiveness to focus
on the potential risks generated by projects that are still in progress or have been abandoned
(Dinkelman, 2011; Rud, 2012; Dinkelman, 2011; Lipscomb et al., 2013; Duflo and Pande,
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2007; Mettetal, 2019; Cesur et al., 2017; Gupta and Spears, 2017). Finally, this study informs
the literature on public health, which has focused mainly on water technologies (Cutler and
Miller, 2005; Bhalotra et al., 2018), by exploring the effects of sanitation infrastructure at
scale in a contemporary setting (Watson, 2006; Alsan and Goldin, 2019; Kesztenbaum and
Rosenthal, 2017) and on a high rung of the sanitation ladder (Duflo et al., 2015; Geruso and
Spears, 2018).
A natural question arising from Chapter 2 is how to promote demand for public sanitation
infrastructure once it is completed. In Chapter 3, I explore the demand-side of the sanitation
market in urban slums of India. Shared infrastructure can help improve living standards in
urban slums, where insufficient public goods provision has led to extremely poor health and
low levels of human capital. However, poor quality infrastructure, generated partially by low
valuation and payment, can hamper environmental quality even further. In this co-authored
chapter (with B. Augsburg and A. Armand), I study how to break this vicious cycle in the
context of community toilets in Uttar Pradesh, India. While considered an important public
health solution for the foreseeable future in slums, our data reveals rampant free-riding and a
remarkably low valuation for CTs. In line with this, the CTs are of very poor quality, which
is reflected in the measures taken by the state in regard to the infrastructure, the observed
dirtiness, and the presence of harmful bacteria. Interestingly, we find a hypothetical WTP
for the CTs of the highest standard that is more than double the actual WTP. The worse the
observed dirtiness, the higher the rate of open defecation.
We use a randomised field experiment to test the effectiveness of two interventions aimed
at breaking the vicious cycle of low quality public health infrastructure and low WTP: (i) a
“supply push” that rehabilitates the infrastructure and promotes cleanliness; and (ii) a com-
plementary campaign aimed at generating awareness of the importance of payment and the
negative externalities resulting from unsafe sanitation behaviour. Building on five rounds of
data on the 110 study CTs and three waves of a household panel of more than 1,500 house-
holds living in the CT catchment areas, we find that externally funding public infrastructure
rehabilitation backfires. The “supply push” reduces WTP at a time when households ap-
preciate CT improvements; and attitudes towards paying a user fee deteriorate further with
time. In addition, the “supply push” shifts the demand for public intervention away from
other pressing issues in the community towards the maintenance of CTs. Altogether, these
findings provide evidence that external funds crowd-out private contributions in our study
context.
Importantly, we find that the campaign is ineffective in counteracting any of these effects,
despite having a lasting impression on households. The only exception is an attenuation in
the reduction in the number of users, which accompanies the lower WTP. Over time, the
interventions increases the percentage of users that paid. Although diminishing free-riding
might be desirable, it is questionable if it comes at the expense of safe sanitation behaviour.
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This study contributes to three literature streams. First, it contributes to the growing sub-
field of “envirodevonomics”, which explores why environmental quality is so poor in LMICs.
In particular, this chapter adds to studies exploring the determinants of low willingness-to-
pay for environmental improvements (Kremer et al., 2011; Dupas, 2011; Devoto et al., 2012;
Ashraf et al., 2010; Greenstone and Jack, 2015; Ben Yishay et al., 2017; Berry et al., 2020)
by focusing on an infrastructure where coordination problems are very salient and in an
understudied setting: urban slums. Second, this study is connected to the literature stream
exploring the costs and benefits of policies to adopt health goods (e.g. toilets, vaccines,
bednets), in particular the provision of subsidies and information (Jalan and Somanathan,
2008; Luoto et al., 2011; Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Ashraf et al., 2010; Dupas, 2014; Ashraf
et al., 2013; Guiteras et al., 2015). It adds to this by exploring the effectiveness of a direct
intervention in infrastructure supply to promote demand. Finally, this study joins Mcrae
(2015); Burgess et al. (2020); Coville et al. (2020) in showing that non-payment affects
infrastructure quality. We add to this stream by providing evidence that the distortions also
affect the demand for public infrastructure.
Chapter 4 completes the study by providing a comprehensive picture of the sanitation
market at the point at which supply meets demand for infrastructure. Even in “equilibrium”,
achieving safe sanitation environments in LMICs depends on three key factors: the local
adoption level, the population density and the quality of the sanitation solution. In this
paper, I aim to bring together these three factors by exploring the relationship between child
health and the local connectivity density of sewerage: the interaction between the share of
neighbouring households connected to sewerage and the population density.
From Chapter 1 we learn that the construction of sewerage systems can increase under-
five mortality. The aim of this chapter lies in understanding the effect of sanitation infras-
tructure on the health of survivor children and those born after projects are completed, con-
ditional on connectivity rates. I focus specifically on height because it has been widely
recognised as an important measure of human capital with long-lasting consequences.
I present three complementary analyses. The first is a cross-country analysis that estab-
lishes the broad importance of sewerage connectivity density for predicting child height in
LMICs. The second provides further evidence of this relationship by focusing specifically
on Latin American countries because: (i) they have lower levels of connectivity relative to
other countries with a similar income level, so this region is a special case in which economic
development is not accompanied by an improvement in diseases environment; and (ii) there
is significant variation within countries in both child height and connectivity. Finally, the
third analysis supports the internal validity of the association of interest. For this I focus on
Peru, one of the special cases in Latin America where the recent economic development has
not been followed by greater adoption of sewerage and has left a large per cent of children
under the age of five stunted. In this analysis, I attempt to improve identification by using
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an instrumental variable strategy. I use as an instrument for connectivity density the average
two-year lag connectivity density of adjacent districts.
Using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), complemented by census and spatial
data, the three separate analyses represent different points in a trade-off between external
and internal validity. I find that sewerage connectivity density increases child height. Inter-
estingly, the increase goes beyond the sewerage connectivity of the child’s household, which
serves as evidence of a positive externality. I also find that the effect is driven by the oldest
group of children aged 25 to 59 months —those more likely to be exposed to outdoor hazards.
I document two mechanisms behind the results: improvements in the disease environment
and malnutrition. The results also reveal that sewerage connectivity density decreases the
mortality of children under the age of five.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on economics, human capital,
and health. First, it contributes to the literature exploring the drivers of international height
disparities in human capital, specifically height (Deaton, 2007; Bozzoli et al., 2009; Deaton
and Drèze, 2009; Spears, 2020). Second, it contributes to the literature focused on early-life
human capital accumulation (Cunha et al., 2010; Gertler et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2014;
Maluccio et al., 2009) by providing evidence of the determinants of child height. Third, by
advancing evidence on the importance of sanitation adoption on a higher-rung of the sanita-
tion ladder and population density in LMICs, this paper contributes to the active and growing
literature on sanitation and child health (Dickinson et al., 2015; Augsburg and Rodríguez-
Lesmes, 2018; Cameron et al., 2019; Spears, 2020; Hathi et al., 2017).
The final thesis chapter summarises the findings of the three empirical chapters and dis-
cusses the broad contribution of this thesis to the literature. Additionally, it discusses the
main policy implications of this thesis.
Overall, the thesis makes three broad contributions. First, it amplifies our empirical
knowledge of where public infrastructure projects may go wrong, by analysing the imple-
mentation phase and placing emphasis on the efficient use of resources. Next, it provides
useful guidance for overcoming behavioural obstacles to the adoption of public infrastruc-
ture. Finally, through its detailed analysis of infrastructure and public health, the thesis also
provides a more nuanced understanding of the human capital production function in LMICs.
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It is widely accepted that investing in public infrastructure promotes economic devel-
opment. However, there is little awareness of the prevalence of unfinished infrastructure
projects and their consequences. In this paper, I study the effect of unfinished sewerage in-
frastructure on early-life mortality in Peru. I compile several sources of administrative panel
data for 1,400 districts spanning 2005–2015, and I rely on the budgetary plans and timing of
expenditure for 6,000 projects to measure unfinished projects and those completed in a given
district. I document that mid-construction abandonment and delays are highly prevalent. I
exploit geographical features and partisan alignment to instrument for project implemen-
tation. Surprisingly, I find that unfinished sewerage projects increased early-life mortality,
driven by lack of water availability, water-borne diseases and accidents. I also show that
while unfinished projects pose hazards to the population, completed sewerage projects de-
crease early-life mortality, in line with public health studies in advanced economies during
the previous centuries.




It is widely accepted that investing in large infrastructure promotes economic growth and
development (Aschauer, 1989; Isham and Kaufmann, 1999). In fact, the World Bank directs
40 per cent of its lending portfolio to the development of large infrastructure in the water and
sanitation, transportation and energy sectors as a means to alleviate poverty (World Bank,
2017).
However, to date, much more emphasis has been placed on the volume of infrastructure
expenditure, rather than the quality of that expenditure (Besley and Ghatak, 2006). Re-
cent evidence suggests that over one-third of the infrastructure projects started in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) are not completed (Williams, 2017; Rasul and Rogger,
2018). Unfinished infrastructure projects are, however, not an exclusive problem of LMICs,
as roads without tarmac and bridges to nowhere, for example, are commonly seen in ad-
vanced economies. Economic research has been very useful at identifying the effectiveness
of infrastructure projects (e.g. sewerage, dams, roads and electricity networks) once they are
completed and in use (Duflo and Pande, 2007; Dinkelman, 2011; Rud, 2012; Lipscomb et al.,
2013; Alsan and Goldin, 2019; Donaldson, 2018; Banerjee et al., 2020). It is less clear what
the consequences of such projects are while they are still unfinished (i.e. underway, delayed
or abandoned half-way). It is regrettable that the literature has ignored the effects of unfin-
ished infrastructure projects, given the important implications for a sound cost-effectiveness
analysis.
In this paper, I seek to fill this gap in the literature. In particular, I study the effect
of unfinished sewerage projects on the mortality rate of infants and children under the age
of five (hereafter under-five) in Peru. This is the outcome that sewerage infrastructure has
improved in advanced economies during the previous centuries (Watson, 2006; Alsan and
Goldin, 2019). The diffusion of sewerage in Peru is an excellent case to study because the
scale of this public intervention was national, allowing for considerable spatial variation in
implementation. The Government of Peru invested three billion US dollars (USD) to start
more than 6,000 sewerage projects.
I construct a district-level panel of 1,400 districts for every year between 2005 and 2015
by combining several sources of novel administrative data, and spatial data at a grid-cell
level. Specifically, I rely on detailed data on budgetary plans and the timing of expenditures
to identify the number of unfinished projects and those completed in a given district. I
exploit variation in unfinished projects generated by the high prevalence of mid-construction
abandonment and delays in project completion. 60 per cent of the projects started between
2005 and 2015 were abandoned for at least one year and up to the whole decade of study.
Moreover, I find large variation in project duration, with projects lasting for up to eight years,
mostly because of cost overruns. Thus, districts have a combination of unfinished projects
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that have been abandoned (temporarily or indefinitely) and that are still underway (in time
or delayed).
In order to deal with project placement bias, as richer districts with different mortality
trends started and completed more projects, I rely on an instrumental variable strategy that
exploits Peru’s natural geographic variation. I use as an instrument a prediction of how the
diffusion of sewerage would have evolved over time had project placement been based solely
on cost considerations. I rely on the fact that a combination of geographic characteristics
(i.e. land slope, elevation and river density) affects a district’s technical suitability for low-
cost sewerage projects. A time-variant project allocation is predicted with an algorithmic
approach, subject to a nationwide budget constraint and maximum threshold allocation. The
instrument predicts that a central planner would have allocated more projects to “cheaper”
districts in terms of developing sewerage, and would have done so earlier in the period of
study.
The identification assumption is that no other factors affecting mortality rates (e.g. a
citizen’s preference for preventive health care and other infrastructure and policies) changed
over time along the same spatial lines as the predicted allocation of projects. The panel
dimension of the data allows the inclusion of district and year fixed effects that control for
time-invariant effects of geography on health and common shocks, respectively. A number
of tests support the validity of my identification. I find that my instrument is not correlated
with mortality before the start of projects. Furthermore, the results are not driven by other
types of infrastructure development, geography-specific mortality trends or sorting.
I find that unfinished infrastructure projects — the so-called “white elephants” — can
cause high social costs: they can kill children. With every additional unfinished sewerage
project, infant mortality increased by 5 per cent and under-five mortality by 6 per cent, over
the initial average mortality rate.
The mechanisms behind these non-trivial effects are threefold. First, water cuts are
needed during the installation of sewerage lines. I find evidence that water and sanitation
practices deteriorated as a result. While there is no effect on the connectivity to piped water,
I find that an additional unfinished project increased the percentage of households relying on
unsafe sources of water by 4 per cent over the initial averages. The limited access to safe
water resulted in a decrease of the share of households relying on latrines and an increase in
those practising open defecation, both by 10 per cent over the initial averages. Second, in or-
der to install public sewers, extensive excavations are required, which leave open ditches that
become filled with stagnant water and become pools of infections. Third, sewerage works
pose hazards to the population. This entails large building sites that, for instance, divert traf-
fic chaotically into previously quiet residential areas where children roam freely. In line with
these mechanisms, I find that every additional unfinished project increased the infant and
under-five mortality caused by water-borne diseases by 11 and 9.8 per cent from the initial
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rate, respectively. An additional unfinished project also increased the under-five mortality
caused by accidents by 7.2 per cent from the initial rate. The results are consistent with the
fact that older and more mobile children are more exposed to outdoor risks. Notably, I find
no effects of unfinished projects on the mortality caused by other diseases and complications
unrelated to infections or external hazards.
In order to get a full picture of project implementation and to understand better the coun-
terfactual scenario, I also estimate the effect of completed projects. For a just-identified
specification, I use as an additional instrument the interaction between a district’s geograph-
ical suitability for low-cost sewerage projects and the partisan alignment between the district
mayor and central government. Mayors politically connected to the Parliament are better
able to secure funds to complete projects, conditional on starting them because of the dis-
trict’s geographic characteristics.
I find that early-life mortality increased with unfinished projects and decreased with com-
pleted projects, compared with no projects started. The estimated effect of unfinished infras-
tructure on mortality remains robust even after including project completion. Furthermore,
infant and under-five mortality decreased with every additional completed project by 33 and
25 per cent over the initial averages, respectively.
Finally, I document that providing access to public sewers does not ensure a universal
connectivity rate or sludge treatment, at least in the short run. This finding serves as evidence
of the “last-mile” problem — the inability of governments to connect costly infrastructure
to the final user (Ashraf et al., 2016) — and suggests that the social benefits from sewerage
systems take time to be fully manifested.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, the paper broadens the literature on
public goods by moving beyond assessing inefficiencies to encompass social costs. Influen-
tial papers have identified the determinants of waste in government spending and misalloca-
tion, highlighting the role of democratic institutions, political dynamics, governance struc-
tures and local managerial practices (Bandiera et al., 2009; Burgess et al., 2015; Williams,
2017; Rasul and Rogger, 2018). However, there is a need to gain a better understanding of
how inefficiencies in the provision of public goods jeopardise economic development and
well-being. For example, Burgess et al. (2015) acknowledge this need in the context of a
misallocation of public resources in Kenyan road building, where they quantify the extent
of ethnic favouritism and document how it disappears during periods of democracy, stating
that: “linking [our] findings to aggregate economic outcomes represents a key priority for
future research".
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on large public infrastructure effectiveness
by extending the scope of analysis to the potential risks generated by projects that are still
in progress or abandoned. There is growing evidence in this literature on the effectiveness
of electrification and large dams in improving labour and productivity (Dinkelman, 2011;
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Rud, 2012), and decreasing poverty (Duflo and Pande, 2007; Dinkelman, 2011; Lipscomb
et al., 2013). The literature also provides evidence that transport infrastructure increases
productivity, inter-regional trade and welfare (Donaldson, 2018; Banerjee et al., 2020). More
closely related papers find that environmental hazards from large infrastructure affect early-
life mortality (Cesur et al., 2017; Gupta and Spears, 2017; Mettetal, 2019).
Finally, this study informs the literature on public health, which has mainly focused
on water technologies (Cutler and Miller, 2005; Bhalotra et al., 2018), by exploring the
effects of sewerage at scale in a contemporary setting (Watson, 2006; Kesztenbaum and
Rosenthal, 2017; Alsan and Goldin, 2019). Recent studies in LMICs have mainly focused
on the effectiveness of private sanitation infrastructure (Geruso and Spears, 2018) or have
provided evidence from experimental studies with a limited time-horizon and geographical
setting (Duflo et al., 2015). My study, by contrast, focuses on a nationwide setting and a
longer temporal focus.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide the context. I explain
the data and present descriptive statistics in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, I provide details of
the instrumental variable strategy. In Sections 2.5 and 2.6, I present the results of the effect
of unfinished and completed projects, respectively. In each of these sections I describe the
mechanisms driving the results. I conclude in Section 2.7 by discussing the significance of
the study for a wider body of literature as well as potential extensions to other institutional
contexts and other types of infrastructure.
2.2 Sewerage diffusion in Peru
Half of Peru’s households lacked sewerage connectivity in 2005 (World Bank, 2020). To
remedy this, the National Sanitation Plan 2006–2015 set the goal of increasing access to
sewerage in urban areas, representing the first nationwide effort towards sewerage diffusion
in Peru. In this period, the Government of Peru invested more than USD 3 billion to start
6,090 sewerage projects1 in 80 per cent of the districts.2
The roll-out of sewerage projects across districts was not random. The starting of sew-
erage projects depended on two crucial factors: (i) the willingness and capabilities of the
implementing agent; and (ii) the allocation of funds.
Between 2005 and 2015, most projects were implemented by local municipalities: more
than 56 were implemented by district municipalities and almost 30 per cent by province mu-
nicipalities (see Figure 2.7). District municipalities can implement sewerage projects if they
are incorporated into the National System of Public Investment (SNIP, Spanish acronym),
1Out of these, 4,783 were construction and expansion of new systems and 1,307 were improvement of
existing lines (see Figure 2.16 in the Appendix).
2According to the 2005 Peruvian Census, Peru had 1,830 districts belonging to 196 provinces and 25 re-
gions. An average district had a population density of 642 people per km2.
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which requires the following: (i) access to the Internet; (ii) approval from the municipal
council to receive technical assistance in formulation and implementation of investment
projects from the Central government; and (iii) an annual budget above one million soles
(approximately 200,000 sterling pounds). In line with these criteria, richer municipalities
with a revenue above the median and with access to the Internet by 2005 started a greater
number of sewerage projects (see Figures 2.8 and 2.9).
For the portfolio of projects implemented by the Ministry of Sanitation, the National San-
itation Plan 2006–2015 states that previously unattended and poor areas should be prioritised
when expanding access to sewerage. This was not the case as more sewerage projects were
started in districts with a lower percentage of the population with unmet basic needs and with
a higher sewerage connectivity by 2005 (see Figures 2.10 and 2.11).
In addition, sewerage diffusion depends on the cost of implementing a given project.
The National Sanitation Plan 2006–2015 states that projects must achieve economic and
technical viability to be implemented, which depends crucially on project costs. Projects
using cheaper technologies are more likely to be declared viable. This criterium is crucial
for the instrumental variable strategy, explained in the next section.
Sewerage diffusion, and more specifically the completion of projects, depends on funds
allocation. The largest sources of funding were transfers from the central government: 40
per cent of sewerage projects were funded by royalties and 30 per cent by direct transfers
(see Figure 2.12). District municipalities do not have full discretion over the use of these
funds. In the case of royalties, for instance, funds can only be used in social infrastructure.
Only 22 per cent of started projects were funded by local tax revenue, and municipalities
have more discretion over the use of this revenue.
The allocation of funds to projects is conducted by an annual budgeting process in which
agents with different incentives interact. Understanding these interactions is important for
the instrumental variable strategy used in Section 2.6. For projects financed by the central
government (executed directly by the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation or
through transfers to local municipalities), funds are allocated through an annual budgeting
process approved by the Parliament. For projects financed by local revenues, funds are
allocated from the budgeting process done by Municipal Councils, which are chaired by the
mayor and council members. Given that most sewerage projects are implemented by the
local municipality, but financed by the central government, partisan alignment between local
majors and members of the Parliament makes it easier to attract funds to complete projects.
Once projects are selected for funds, the government agency that formulates the project
starts the procurement process to hire private contractors to develop the works. During the
construction phase, the Enterprises of Provision of Sanitation Services (EPS) are in charge
of supervising and evaluating the technical quality of sanitation works in urban areas. Once
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public sewers are installed, it is compulsory for landlords to connect the dwelling’s waste-
water pipes to the public sewerage lines. The EPS are in charge of regulating and supervising
the connectivity of dwellings to the public sewerage lines. Understanding the limitations of
the work conducted by the EPS will be crucial to understand the mechanisms behind the
results of this paper. These limitations are discussed in Section 2.6.1.
2.3 Data and descriptives
2.3.1 Data
I construct a district-level panel data set of more than 1,400 districts in Peru from 2005 to
2015 by combining data from several novel sources. I compute infant and under-five mortal-
ity using vital statistics registries and population forecasts. For the core data set measuring
sewerage diffusion, I compile and combine project-level data from viability studies and an-
nual budget reports, which allows me to identify unfinished projects and those completed.
To construct the instrumental variable, I use spatial data at grid-cell level, including eleva-
tion (from which I compute gradient), river flow and district boundaries. In addition, I draw
on population forecasts to control for time-variant population density and district population
size. The final data set is an unbalanced panel of 1,408 districts spanning 2005–2015, with a
total of 10,494 district–year observations.
The outcome variables are constructed using vital records provided by the Ministry of
Health and population forecasts built by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics
(INEI, Spanish acronym) for every calendar year between 2005 and 2015 at the district level.
The vital records provide the number of infants born alive and the number of deaths of infants
(under one year old) and children under five years old. The mortality data are disaggregated
by cause of death following the International Classification of Diseases – ICD10. The popu-
lation forecast provides data on the number of children under five years old. I construct the
infant mortality rate (IMR) and the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) for each district d and
year t, using as the denominator the population at risk, as described by Preston et al. (2001):
IMRdt =
Deaths of infants aged 0–11 monthsdt
Population aged 0–59 months/5dt
× 1, 000;
U5MRdt =
Deaths of children aged 0–59 monthsdt
Population aged 0–59 monthsdt
× 1, 000.
The IMR is generally computed as the ratio of infant deaths over live births. However,
because of the incompleteness of birth registries in Peru, where the coverage was 93 per cent
by 2005 (UNICEF, 2005), I use an alternative approach. I use as a denominator the total
Chapter 2. Can White Elephants Kill? Unintended Consequences of Infrastructure
Development in Peru
19
population of children aged between 0 and 5, divided by 5 (assuming that the distribution
across ages is similar).
To alleviate concerns linked to the quality of the vital registers in Peru, I compare na-
tionwide mortality trends using the vital statistics data versus data from several nationally
representative surveys. I find that vital statistics generate mortality rates that are slightly
lower in level, but the trends do not differ greatly (see Figures 2.14 and 2.15).
To measure sewerage diffusion, I use raw data from viability studies registered in the
SNIP and budget reports from the Integrated System of Financial Administration (SIAF,
Spanish acronym) of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. These sources provide informa-
tion on the number of sewerage projects declared viable between 2005 and 2015 in a given
district and detailed project-level data on the budgeted investment and accrued investment
by years. Using this information, I set as the starting year the year in which a given project
receives the first disbursement. Because the Ministry of Sanitation does not keep a record of
project completion, I follow their advice to set the year of completion as the one in which
the budgeted investment — including cost updates — is accrued by at least 90 per cent. The
Ministry claims that, at this level, construction works are completed (i.e. excavation works
finished and open ditches closed) and the last leg consists of paperwork. I set the years in
which projects are unfinished as the years between start and completion. Projects without
a completion year but with a start year are defined as unfinished until the end of the study
period.
I construct three alternative indicators of sewerage diffusion at the district level to iden-
tify effects not only once the infrastructure is completed, but also during its construction
phase: (i) the cumulative number of sewerage projects started; (ii) the number of unfinished
sewerage projects; (iii) the cumulative number of sewerage projects completed. Indicators
(i) and (iii) are constructed as cumulative given that sewerage infrastructure is a long-lasting
investment whose access persists across years, entailing complementarities across systems.
An important limitation is that sanitation projects are formulated in a sub-area of districts
(the smallest jurisdictional level in Peru), but this is not easily identifiable (i.e. no address
or geo-codes) and there are no early-life mortality data at the same level. For projects for-
mulated at a higher governmental level that lacks data on the number of projects per district,
I assign one project to each district within the corresponding province or region. This ap-
proach does not capture the intensity of sewerage diffusion within each of the districts, but it
is done in only 3.7 per cent of the districts that ever implemented projects.
I use spatial data provided by the Ministry of Environment to compute geographic char-
acteristics influencing the cost of sewerage development. I rely on these data to construct an
instrumental variable. The spatial data include information on surface elevation for multiple
cells (1 × 1 km2), which I match to district boundaries in 2015. I construct indicators for
four main geographical characteristics: elevation, gradient, area and river density. First, I
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compute the total area within the boundaries of each district. Second, I use the information
on surface elevation at each cell to compute the fraction of district area in four different el-
evation categories considering quintiles of the elevation distribution: [0–250] metres above
mean sea level (mamsl), {250–500] mamsl, {500–1,000] mamsl and above 1,000 mamsl.
Third, I compute gradient using surface elevation at each cell and neighbouring cells. I con-
struct indicators capturing the fraction of district area falling into four gradient categories:
[0–0.8] per cent, {0.8, 4.19] per cent, {4.19–13] per cent and above 13 per cent. The first
category captures flat areas below or equal to 0.8 per cent in which sewerage construction is
costliest as determined by technical guidelines (Panamerican Center of Sanitation Engineer-
ing and Environmental Sciences, 2005). The remaining categories are created considering
quintiles of the gradient distribution. I use quintiles because this ensures enough variation
across categories, while allowing the capture of differences in elevation and gradient within
districts (compared with, say, using the mean per district). Finally, I compute river density
as the fraction of the district area that falls in inland waters. The maps shown in Figure
2.17 show that districts in Peru vary greatly in their ruggedness, altitude and river density. I
draw on data from the National Register of Municipalities (RENAMU, Spanish acronym) to
measure municipal characteristics. As explained in Section 2.2, only districts that had access
to the Internet, numerous resources and approval to receive technical assistance were able
to formulate and implement sewerage projects. I control for these characteristics as a ro-
bustness check. From RENAMU, I also obtain reports concerning whether water and faecal
sludge is treated in the district. I use these variables to explore whether sewerage diffusion
had any effect on the removal of bacteria and contaminants from the sources of drinking
water and waste water. Data on the treatment of water are available only between 2008 and
2014, and data on the treatment of sludge are available between 2006 and 2014.
Furthermore, to compute measures of sewerage connectivity, I compile household-level
data from three Census rounds: 2005, 2010 and 2017. I use these data to evaluate whether
sewerage diffusion increased the percentage of households connected to the public sewers. I
also use these data to compute the percentage of households that have a head of household
who attained education above the secondary school level and the percentage of households
that are connected to the electricity network in each district. These variables are alterna-
tive outcomes used to evaluate whether sewerage diffusion affected early-life mortality rates
through changes in the population composition (i.e. selective migration).
Finally, I compute measures of other infrastructure development that could have affected
early-life mortality rates beyond sewerage diffusion. I use the SIAF budget reports from
the Ministry of Economy and Finance to identify the level of expenditure on transportation,
energy and health. These data are available at the district level between 2007 and 2014 (2015
only available for transport expenditure).




Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the beginning and end periods of analysis. The
first and third columns provide the sum for the variables of interest and the mean for the
geographical and control variables for 2005 and 2015, respectively. The second and fourth
columns provide the standard deviation for the geographical factors and additional variables
used in the analysis for 2005 and 2015. The last column shows the data source used to
compute the variables.
Between 2005 and 2015, both infant and under-five mortality fell by 35 per cent. Both
early-life deaths and the population of children under the age of five decreased, but the de-
crease in the number of deaths was greater. Meanwhile, the number of started and completed
sewerage projects grew dramatically.
Municipalities became richer during the period of study. The average revenue of a district
municipality quadrupled — from 4 million to 15 million soles (∼ USD 4.5 million) — and
many municipalities gained access to the Internet. The share of municipalities registered
as requiring technical assistance for the formulation of investment projects decreased, while
those managing a health centre increased.
Districts improved their access to public services greatly in the decade of analysis. Wa-
ter connectivity and treatment increased, while the share of households relying on unsafe
sources of water decreased. As expected, sewerage connectivity and treatment increased, as
well as the share of households relying on on-site sanitation increased, while those practis-
ing open defecation decreased. Districts also improved regarding the share of households
that had heads who had completed secondary education and households that had electricity
connectivity. Furthermore, public expenditure increased over the period of analysis in the
transportation, energy and health sectors.
Peru has a great geographical diversity, which I am able to exploit in my instrumental
variable strategy. On average, the largest share of area of districts falls in the highest elevation
category (74 per cent), followed by the lowest category (15 per cent) and all categories have
a relatively high standard deviation (20 per cent). Districts in the sample tend to have rugged
terrains. The lowest share of area, on average, falls in the flattest gradient category (only
10 per cent) and the largest share in the steepest category (37 per cent). River density is, on
average, 53 km per km2 and there is great variation across districts (124 standard deviations).
2.3.3 Project characteristics
Two factors are linked to the variation over time in the number of unfinished projects: mid-
construction abandonment and project duration. First, there is a high prevalence of projects
that stopped receiving funds while they were still underway. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution
of the number of years that a started project was abandoned. Strikingly, more than 60 per cent
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of the started projects in the period of study are “white elephants”, as they were abandoned at
least one year. Almost half of the projects were abandoned for at least two years and for up to
ten years (or indefinitely). Smaller projects, proxied by the number of potential beneficiaries,
tend to suffer slightly more mid-construction abandonment than larger projects. Bureaucratic
procedures to restart abandoned projects can put at risk whether the project is ever completed.
Second, there is great variation in the time to complete projects. I find that half of projects
took more than one year to be completed (see Figure 2.2). As expected, larger projects take
longer to be completed. However, even amongst larger projects, half took three years or
more (up to eight years) to be completed. This variation in project duration, even after
taking into account project complexity, suggests that delays are common. The prevalence
of cost overruns serves as additional evidence in support of delays. Figure 2.13 shows that
larger projects have greater cost overruns, as high as five times the planned cost. Only 5 per
cent of large projects had no cost overrun. Bureaucratic procedures to update costs can delay
project completion.
The measure of unfinished projects is thus a combination of projects still underway (on
time or delays) and abandoned (temporarily or indefinitely) in a given district.3 Figure 2.3
shows that the average number of unfinished projects per district increased over time. Be-
tween 2005 and 2015, on average, districts started four sewerage projects. Strikingly, by
2015, districts completed fewer than one project, on average. The low rate of completion
results in districts having, on average, more than one unfinished project between 2009 and
2012 and more than two unfinished projects in later years.
2.4 Empirical strategy
In order to understand the consequences of unfinished sewerage projects on early-life mor-
tality, I rely on an instrumental variable approach.
2.4.1 Instrument: project allocation by technical suitability
The instrument I use is a prediction of how sewerage diffusion would have evolved over
the decade of study had investments been based only on exogenous cost considerations. I
exploit the fact that a combination of geographic characteristics (i.e. elevation, land gradient
and river density) affects the suitability of districts to low-cost sewerage projects. I use an
3Although the majority of projects are “white elephants”, I would ideally disentangle the effects of a project
underway versus one that was abandoned. Because of the aggregate nature of the mortality data, I would have to
focus on districts with only one project being developed. Unfortunately, I do not have the capacity in this paper
to conduct such an analysis. By 2015, only 20 per cent of districts have started only one project, equivalent to
2,069 district–year observations. The statistical power is reduced even further if I focus on districts developing
only one project in previous years.
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algorithmic approach to generate variation over time in predicted sewerage diffusion, subject
to a nationwide budget constraint and a threshold of maximum project allocation.
The key identification assumption is that no other factors affecting mortality rates in-
dependently moved over time along the same spatial lines as the predicted allocation of
projects. In other words, I assume that behavioural changes and the implementation of other
health policies or social infrastructure that affect early-life mortality did not move from the
most suitable districts for low-cost sewerage in early years to slightly less suitable districts
in later years. The panel dimension of the data allows the inclusion of district and year fixed
effects that control for time-invariant effects of geography on health and common shocks,
respectively. Lipscomb et al. (2013) demonstrate that isolating the variation in infrastructure
linked to exogenous geographic cost and budget considerations is useful for studying the
effects of large infrastructure projects.
Relying on the technical suitability of a district makes the instrument comply with the
monotonicity assumption. While the instrument may have no effect on the launch of sewer-
age projects in some districts — that is, very suitable district with low political will (never-
takers) or unsuitable districts with high political will (always-takers) — all districts affected
by the instrument (compliers) are affected in the same way. In other words, all suitable dis-
tricts predicted to receive more and earlier sewerage projects are more likely to implement
more sewerage projects earlier on. It is sensible to assume that no district decreased its
likelihood of experiencing sewerage diffusion by being more technically suitable (defiers).
The predicted sewerage diffusion is constructed following three steps.
(1) District’s technical suitability for low-cost sewerage projects
For each district, an index is constructed capturing the technical suitability for imple-
menting low-cost sewerage systems. Although sewerage diffusion is likely to respond
mainly to demand-side factors, such as socio-economic characteristics and political
will, it also responds to exogenous geographical factors.
The cost of developing sewerage infrastructure is affected by a unique combination
of geographic factors. The gradient of the terrain plays a major role in determining a
district’s suitability for low-cost projects. The cheapest sewerage system is the conven-
tional gravity system, in which steepness allows waste water to flow rapidly through
pipes from houses to disposal areas (Romero Rojas, 2000). Fewer pipes and lower
depths are required to install pipe networks in steeper districts, reducing the costs even
further (Hammer, 1986). In very flat areas, it is necessary to install costly electric
bombs to pump water and effluent (Panamerican Center of Sanitation Engineering and
Environmental Sciences, 2005). Elevation above the level of the sea is another to-
pographic factor that affects districts’ suitability for low-cost sewerage projects. The
cheapest waste-water treatment plant works in low-altitude areas because it requires
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oxygen to work through aerobic digestion (i.e. the biological decomposition of or-
ganic sludge; Romero Rojas, 2000). Sludge requires additional costly treatment (i.e.
the injection of oxygen and chemicals) in high-altitude areas. The cost of sewerage
projects also depends on the availability of water to discharge effluent. Factors linked
to geographical dispersion also affect the district’s technical suitability for sewerage
and related costs. Considering that the span of settlements is greater in larger districts,
developing sewerage systems in districts that cover large areas of land requires the in-
stallation of longer networks of pipes. This increases both the complexity and cost of
projects.
A regression of the total number of projects developed in a given district between 2005
and 2015 on the above-described geographic factors confirms the hypotheses raised










β2kEdk + β4Rd + β3Ad + εd. (2.1)
Here, Sd is the total number of started projects in district d between 2005 and 2015,
Grd is the fraction of area of district d falling in each of the three steep categories k
(flat gradient is the reference category), Ed is the fraction of area of district d falling
in each of the three elevated categories k (low altitude is the reference category), Rd is
the district’s river density (river length in km per area in km2) and Ad is the total area
of land within district boundaries.
Table 2.13 in the Appendix shows that, as predicted by the engineering literature,
steep gradient categories and river density favour sewerage diffusion, while elevation
and district area are negatively associated with project placement. Steep gradient and
elevation predicts the allocation of sewerage projects non-monotonically: the largest
coefficient is the lower-middle ({0.8, 4.19] per cent) gradient category and the highest
elevation category (above 1,000 mamsl).
I compute a technical suitability index for all districts in Peru using principal com-
ponent analysis, including all the above-described geographic factors. The computed
index is the first component with an eigenvalue larger than 1.
(2) Nationwide budget as a constraint
The nationwide budget for projects to construct new sewerage systems and to expand
and improve existing sewerage systems is identified based on the total disbursement
made to all sewerage projects in a given year. The average cost of a sewerage project is
calculated from the cost of all sewerage projects. The nationwide budget for sewerage
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projects increased year to year and this generates variation over time on the expenditure
on sewerage projects. To get an idea of the over-time variation in budget spent, see
Figure 2.18.
(3) Time-variant allocation of projects
The final phase consists of an algorithmic approach to construct a time-variant in-
strument. Ranking all districts in Peru based on the technical suitability index, the
algorithm predicts how a central planner would allocate one project to each district
until the nationwide budget is exhausted (considering the average cost of a sewerage
project). The highest-ranking districts are forecast to receive sewerage projects ear-
lier and with more projects across the years. For instance, for 2005, the prediction
allocates one project for each of the 20 highest-ranking districts because the budget
spent that year amounts to the average cost of 20 projects. The prediction follows
the same procedure for the following years until a district receives a maximum of five
projects, which is the median of the distribution of projects allocated to districts that
developed sewerage between 2005 and 2015. This threshold of maximum project allo-
cation leaves extra generation capacity that is subsequently relocated to other districts
further down the ranking. Projects that would have been allocated to higher-ranked
districts that already hit the maximum are placed in lower-ranked districts. Therefore,
by 2015, the highest-ranked districts would have received up to five sewerage projects,
while the lowest-ranked districts would have received none. This creates an allocation
roll-out that provides variation across districts and years.
Description of the instrumental variable
Figure 2.4 shows a map of Peru, plotting the diffusion of sewerage from 2005 to 2015.
The early development of sewerage projects was focused on the affluent and populous north
coast as well as on the relatively less affluent centre region of the Andes. The intensity
of sewerage diffusion increases in these regions and expands eastward every year, until the
Amazon region is covered. By 2015, there is great variation in the number of sewerage
projects across districts. The regions that experienced relatively lower diffusion of sewerage
are the north-east region of the Amazon and the south of Peru.
Figure 2.5 plots the districts predicted to receive sewerage projects by year. Between
2005 and 2015, districts were predicted to receive up to five projects. Water-rich areas
with steeper gradients and lower altitudes are predicted to receive sewerage infrastructure
earlier, but the dynamics are mediated by the budget constraints and the restriction that dis-
tricts that received five projects in previous years do not receive more projects. Ignoring the
demand-side drivers of sewerage diffusion forces the prediction to over-allocate projects to
unattended places, such as the north-east Amazon area and the south coast. This weakens
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the relevance of the instrument, but allows the extraction of exogenous variation linked to
geographical characteristics. The strength of the spatial correlation between Figures 2.4 and
2.5 in a model with district fixed effects determines the predictive power of the instrumental
variable estimator. I test formally the relevance of the instrument in the first-stage estimation
explained in the next section.
2.4.2 Empirical model
I estimate the effect of unfinished sewerage projects on the IMR and U5MR rates between
2005 and 2015 relying on variation in the intensity of sewerage projects across districts
and years and using predicted sewerage projects as an instrument. The instrumental vari-
able strategy corrects for the bias introduced by the endogenous placement of projects. To
formally evaluate the relationship between actual and predicted projects, I estimate the fol-
lowing first-stage regression:
Sdt = αZdt + γd + δt + νdt. (2.2)
Here, Sdt denotes the number of unfinished sewerage projects and Zdt is the number of
projects predicted in district d and year t. This first-stage estimation attempts to isolate the
portion of the variation in sewerage diffusion that is attributable to exogenous cost consider-
ations.
I estimate the effect of sewerage diffusion on the IMR and U5MR using the following
two-stage least-squares (2SLS) model:
MRdt = α2Ŝdt + γ2d + δ2t + ξdt. (2.3)
Here, MRdt denotes infant (1qo) or under-five (5qo) mortality rates and Ŝdt is the in-
strumented number of unfinished sewerage projects in district d and year t. Because my
endogenous variable captures treatment intensity, there is more than one causal effect for a
given district: the effect of going from zero to one project, from one to two projects, and so
on. The following underlying functional relation generates the counterfactuals:
MRdt = fdt(S). (2.4)
Equation (2.4) indicates what the mortality rate of district d in year t would be for any
number of sewerage projects S, and not just for the realised value Sdt. Because Sdt takes
on values in the set 0, 1, 2, 3, Smax, there are Smax causal effects. In this case, the 2SLS
estimates are a weighted average of the unit causal response along the length of the potential
causal relation described by fdt(S). The unit causal response is the average difference in
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potential mortality rates for compliers at point S; that is, districts driven by the instrument to
implement a number of sewerage projects less than S to at least S.
The estimation strategy includes both district γd and year δt fixed effects. The former
controls for time-invariant characteristics in districts and the latter for annual shocks common
to all districts. Standard errors are clustered at the district level to deal with serial correlation
due to the panel characteristics of the data and the fact that the intra-cluster correlation is
lower within higher spatial levels.
Table 2.2 shows that the predicted sewerage diffusion is a relevant instrument for the
number of unfinished sewerage projects. This table presents the first-stage results, where the
dependent variable in column (1) is the number of unfinished sewerage projects. I find that,
on average, an additional project predicted to be allocated in a district is associated with 0.4
unfinished projects. The Sanderson–Windmeijer F-statistic of excluded instruments is high
and above the rule of thumb of Stock and Yogo (2002) (an F-statistic equal to or higher than
10), which confirms the relevance of the instrument.
In support of the identification assumption, columns (2) and (3) show that the instrument
is not associated with infant and under-five mortality before the start of sewerage projects.
The dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) is the infant and under-five mortality rate,
respectively. I find that, on average, an additional project predicted to be allocated in a
district has no effect on infant or under-five mortality in the years prior to the start of the first
sewerage project.
2.5 Effect of unfinished projects on early-life mortality
The main result of this paper is that unfinished projects increased early-life mortality. Table
2.3 presents the estimated effect of the number of unfinished sewerage projects on a district’s
IMR and U5MR. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS estimates and columns (3) and (4) show
2SLS estimates. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. Both the OLS
and 2SLS estimates show that sewerage diffusion increased the IMR and U5MR, though the
2SLS estimates are larger in magnitude.
On average, an additional unfinished sewerage project increased the IMR by 0.001 deaths
per 1,000 infants and the U5MR by 0.299 deaths per 1,000 children. These results translate
into a 5 and 6.2 per cent increase, respectively, from initial average mortality rates.
Figure 2.6 plots the mortality trends of districts predicted and not predicted to receive
projects by the instrument. In support of the identification strategy, infant (upper plot) and
under-five (lower plot) mortality trends are parallel before the start of the very first sewerage
project. After the start of the first project, infant mortality decreases at a slower rate in
Chapter 2. Can White Elephants Kill? Unintended Consequences of Infrastructure
Development in Peru
28
districts that started a sewerage project because they were predicted to (i.e. compliers),4
compared with districts that started a project although they were not predicted to (i.e. always-
takers). Under-five mortality even increases during the first years after the start of the first
project.
The fact that the mortality of “always-takers” decreases at a steeper rate after the start of
the very first project is evidence that these districts were better able to mitigate hazards during
the construction works and to take advantage of the social benefits of sewerage infrastructure.
This explains partially why the OLS estimates are smaller than the 2SLS estimates. The
compliers in the instrumental variable strategy (based on a district’s technical suitability
for low-cost sewerage projects) are different from the average district whose placement of
projects was affected by socio-economic and political considerations or other demand-side
factors. “Always-takers” are likely richer districts, better politically connected and with
greater willingness to improve living standards.
The OLS downward biased estimates also reveal the expected project placement bias, as
richer municipalities with lower mortality experienced greater diffusion. Finally, the 2SLS
estimates are larger than the OLS estimates likely because the 2SLS model corrects measure-
ment error. While the actual number of unfinished projects constructed using a combination
of administrative records likely suffers from classical measurement error, the geographical
variables used to predict the placement of projects are measured quite precisely (based on
1 × 1 km2 satellite maps). The 2SLS model may be addressing the associated attenuation
bias.
2.5.1 Robustness checks
A variety of checks bolster the robustness of the main results. I estimate the 2SLS model
with district and year fixed effects with a series of modifications.
First, I control for time-varying lagged population density. This addresses the concern
that the instrument may be capturing variation in population density.
Second, I control for municipal characteristics that were correlated with actual sewerage
diffusion (as discussed in Section 2.2). These include indicators for whether the district mu-
nicipality has access to the Internet and needs technical assistance to formulate investment
projects and municipal revenue, in order to control for public investment capabilities. I also
add as a covariate an indicator for whether the municipality manages at least one health cen-
tre, in order to control for political will on health policy. If the instrumental variable strategy
is as good as random when predicting unfinished projects, then I expect that controlling for
these factors will affect the point estimates only slightly.
4Compliers are also those that did not start a project because they were not predicted to, captured by the
blue dot in the red line.
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Third, I add an indicator for whether the district is located in the Amazon region, given
that peculiar factors of this area could be driving the results.
Fourth, I restrict the sample of analysis to districts that started at least one sewerage
project, in order to make the sample of study more comparable. Also, this test clarifies
the counterfactual scenario better: the effect of more versus fewer unfinished projects, as
opposed to also considering as counterfactual starting no projects.
Fifth, I exclude the capital and main province of Peru, Lima, to check that this different
region is not driving the results.
Moreover, I replace the independent variable with a version top-coded at the 90th per-
centile of the distribution of sewerage projects to ensure that the results are not driven by
outliers. Finally, I replace the independent variable with one capturing unfinished project
density, measured as projects per 10,000 people per km2. This transformation helps us to
understand the extent to which population density is a mediator of the effect.
Table 2.4 shows the different robustness checks (or specifications) in each row. The
magnitude and precision of the estimated effect of unfinished projects on IMR (column 1)
and U5MR (column 2) remain robust and highly significant. The Sanderson–Windmeijer
F-statistic of excluded instruments (column 3) remains similar in most cases (it drops to 8
for the project density transformation).
2.5.2 Validity of the instrument
To interpret the results as the causal effect of sewerage diffusion on early-life mortality, the
exclusion restriction must hold. In other words, the predicted sewerage diffusion across
districts and years must affect early-life mortality only through actual sewerage diffusion.
In this section, I provide evidence that supports the validity of the exclusion restriction and,
hence, the internal validity of the results.
The main threat to my identification strategy is the delivery of other infrastructure that
could affect early-life mortality. Infrastructure is frequently developed as a bundle. The
estimated results could be driven by other types of infrastructure that are developed following
the same spatial and temporal pattern as my instrument if these also pose health hazards,
such as pollution from roads and energy plants (Marcus, 2017; Gupta and Spears, 2017).
Furthermore, my results could be explained by other types of infrastructure that are beneficial
for early-life health, but developed following the opposite pattern to my instrument. Another
concern could be if investing in sewerage systems crowds out investment in other type of
infrastructure beneficial for early-life health.
To alleviate these concerns, I first control for district expenditure on transportation, en-
ergy and health. Next, I explore if the alternative infrastructure investments can explain the
direct effect of the instrument on early-life mortality. In other words, I test whether my
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instrument is a strong predictor of variation in other infrastructure expenditure and, if so,
whether the predicted variation can explain the increase in mortality rates.
Table 2.5 presents the estimates of the effect of unfinished projects on IMR (column
1) and U5MR (column 2) when controlling for expenditure in transport, energy and health
projects (specifications 1–3). This exercise confirms the main results: the magnitude of the
estimates remain similar. The Sanderson–Windmeijer F-statistic of excluded instruments
(column 3) also remains similar
Table 2.5 also presents 2SLS estimates of transport, energy and health expenditure on
early-life mortality rates using the predicted sewerage diffusion as an instrument (specifica-
tions 4–6). None of the three alternative infrastructure developments explains the estimated
effects in mortality. The transportation and energy expenditure channels are not statisti-
cally significant. If anything, the health expenditure channel has a negative effect on early-
life mortality. Because this effect is opposite to the one estimated, if anything my results
would be downward biased. Yet, in all cases, the first-stage is weak, as shown by the low
Sanderson–Windmeijer F-statistic of excluded instruments (column 3).
Another concern would be if the instrument is capturing variation driven by specific ge-
ographic characteristics or regions with greater suitability for low-cost sewerage projects. In
Table 2.6, I test the robustness of the estimated effect of unfinished projects on early-life
mortality when controlling for geography-specific trends and interactions with the annual
budget. I include as controls the following components interacted with year and annual bud-
get: the flat gradient category (specifications 1 and 5); the low elevation category (specifica-
tions 2 and 6); the district area in km2 (specifications 3 and 7); an indicator for the Amazon
region (specifications 4 and 8); and population density per km2 (specifications 9 and 10).
The estimated effects of unfinished sewerage projects on IMR (column 1) and U5MR (col-
umn 2) remain robust. The different specifications also have little effect on the first-stage
power (column 3), in some cases even increasing it (as with population density controls).
When controlling for elevation-specific trends and its interaction with nationwide budget,
the magnitude remains similar, but the precision and F-statistic of the excluded instrument
are lower. This finding reveals that elevation is an important driver of the variation used in
the instrument.
Another threat to my identification strategy is the possibility of my instrument being cor-
related with the distribution of rural population across districts. Because the instrument is
computed using geographic factors, such as gradient and elevation, which are likely to affect
residential sorting, the results could be driven by channels other than sewerage diffusion.
Flat and steep districts with greater river density may be beneficial for agriculture and might
attract households with farming as their main occupation. This sorting could explain the
main results as rural life has long been associated with higher mortality rates (Hathi et al.,
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2017). Figure 2.19 shows that, while the actual sewerage diffusion is correlated with the per-
centage of rural population (upper plot), this is not the case for predicted sewerage diffusion
(lower plot). Districts with a percentage of rural population above the median by 2005 have
an identical distribution of predicted sewerage projects as those with a percentage of rural
population below the median.
2.5.3 Mechanisms
There are several explanations for the observed rise in infant and under-five mortality, and I
perform tests to shed light on possible mechanisms.
I first investigate whether sewerage diffusion affected early-life mortality rates through
systematic demographic changes. The observed increase in mortality rates could be a result
of a decrease in the denominator, namely the number of infants (IMR denominator) and the
number of children aged under 5 (U5MR denominator). For instance, a decrease in births and
population could be a result of families moving away from disruptive infrastructure works.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.7 show that this is not the case: the estimated effects on
live births and the under-five population go in the opposite direction. The coefficients of
the effect of unfinished projects on early-life mortality are, if anything, underestimated. The
increase in the under-five population could be explained by the increase in mortality, as the
death of a young child may motivate families to have more children in order to achieve their
desired fertility.
Another channel explaining the estimated positive effect on early-life mortality is se-
lective emigration of the most well-off households and immigration of poorer households.
Disruptive sewerage works may create incentives for well-off households to move away, re-
ducing housing prices and rent and hence attracting poorer households. Columns (3) and (4)
show that there is no evidence of sorting across districts. The effect of sewerage diffusion
on the number of household heads with completed secondary education is not statistically
significant. There is a negative and statistically significant effect on households that have
electricity connectivity, but this could be because the results are restricted to a small sub-
sample (data are only available for 50 per cent of the districts of analysis and for two years).
Table 2.14 alleviates concerns that the results may be driven by education and electricity
trends picked up by the instrument: the estimates remain robust when controlling for educa-
tion and electricity-specific trends.
Next, I argue that the main mechanisms behind the estimated increase in mortality are
linked to the disruptions posed by the construction works to install sewerage lines. Interviews
with local engineers reveal that water cuts are needed in order to install sewerage pipes.
Cases of unfinished sewerage projects leaving the population without access to piped water
have attracted media attention (RPP Noticias, 2018). I find evidence that piped-water cuts
affected the water and sanitation behaviour in affected districts.
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Table 2.8 shows the coefficients of a 2SLS model of the effect of unfinished projects on
water and sanitation practices. The dependent variables in columns (1)–(5) are, respectively,
an indicator capturing whether the district has high connectivity to piped water (between 75
and 100 per cent), an indicator capturing whether the municipality treats water, the share of
households that rely on unsafe sources of water, the share of households that use a latrine
and the share of households that practise open defecation. Although, as expected, there is
no effect on the connectivity to piped water, I find a negative effect of the likelihood of the
municipality treating the piped water to make it safe (though not statistically significant).
Notably, I find that an additional unfinished project increased the percentage of households
relying on unsafe sources of water by 3 percentage points (ppts), which translates into a 4 per
cent increase over the initial average. The limited access to safe water resulted in a decrease
in the share of households relying on latrines by 0.04 ppts and an increase in those practising
open defecation by 0.05 ppts. These results are exactly opposite and equivalent to a 10 per
cent change over the initial average.
Further disruptions are linked to the excavation works. Open ditches required to install
sewerage pipes pose a number of hazards to children. 5 Environmental dangers documented
in Peru are linked to dust particles, stagnated ground water that creates sources of vector-
borne diseases and the use of ditches as landfill sites (Malpartida Tabuchi, 2018). Shock-
ingly, there is evidence of children falling and drowning in ditches from sewerage works
that were as deep as 2 m, became filled with water from nearby sources and had no secu-
rity fence (Serquen, 2018). Another important risk linked to open ditches is traffic diversion
into previously quiet residential areas. An interview with an engineering expert on the im-
plementation of sewerage projects disclosed that contractors frequently divert traffic in an
unorganised matter (i.e. failing to put in place effective signaling systems), which leads to
traffic accidents.
Table 2.9 investigates the effect of unfinished sewerage projects on different measures
of mortality depending on the diseases and health-related problems that caused the death.
Mortality data are disaggregated for general pathological groups following the World Health
Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD 10). The outcome in the first
row is all deaths caused by water-borne diseases, including infectious diseases (ICD-10 cat-
egory I), peri-natal complications (ICD-10 category XVI), diseases of the digestive system
(ICD-10 category XI) and malnutrition and other nutritional deficiencies (ICD-10 category
IV). The outcome in the second row is the mortality rate linked to external causes (ICD-10
category XX), which mostly includes deaths caused by falls, drowning and traffic-related
accidents. The following rows estimate the effect of sewerage works on deaths unrelated to
sanitation and external hazards. The outcome in the third row is the mortality rate resulting
5Figures 2.21 and 2.22 show how sewerage works look while underway and abandoned, respectively. Both
show how a sewerage project underway leaves equally dangerous open ditches as one abandoned.
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from diseases of the respiratory system (category X) and the fourth row shows the mortality
rate due to congenital malformations (ICD-10 category XVII). The outcome in the last row
is the mortality rate linked to other unrelated factors, including diseases of the nervous sys-
tem (ICD-10 category VI), circulatory system (ICD-10 category IX) and neoplasms (ICD-10
category II).
I find estimates in line with unfinished projects affecting mortality due to hazards from
the excavation works, in addition to potential infectious diseases from deteriorations in water
and sanitation behaviour. An additional unfinished sewerage project increased the mortality
caused by water-borne diseases by 0.001 deaths per 1,000 infants and by 0.2 deaths per 1,000
children (11 and 9.8 per cent increases from the initial rate, respectively). Furthermore, an
additional unfinished project increased the U5MR caused by accidents by 0.09 deaths per
1,000 children (7.2 per cent increase from the initial rate). Both infants and children are
exposed to infectious diseases, directly as a result of the pools of infection that open ditches
become, or indirectly because of the greater use of unsafe sources of water and the increase in
faecal exposure. As expected, there is no effect on the infant mortality caused by accidents,
as only older children are exposed to outdoor hazards.
If my estimates are well identified, then only an increase in mortality caused by pathogenic
infections and accidents would be observed. In line with this prediction, I find no statisti-
cally significant effect of unfinished sewerage projects on mortality caused by other diseases
or unrelated to external hazards from the construction works. Encouragingly, this means that
the instrumental variable methodology is not picking up a general difference in mortality
trends by all causes.
2.6 Effect of completed projects on early-life mortality
In order to get a full picture of the project implementation and to understand better the
counterfactual scenario, I additionally estimate the effect of completed sewerage projects. It
is necessary to consider project completion, given its potential confounding effect. On the
one hand, one may expect the social benefits of sewerage systems to manifest upon project
completion. On the other hand, mortality might not decrease if users do not connect to
the infrastructure, and it might even increase if systems become a collection of sludge that
contaminates the environment due to unsafe disposal.
To estimate both the effect on early-life mortality from unfinished sewerage projects and
those completed, I use two instruments. The first instrument is the low-cost prediction of
sewerage diffusion used in the main analysis. The second instrument is the interaction be-
tween the geographical suitability for low-cost sewerage projects with an indicator capturing
partisan alignment between the municipal mayor and the central government.
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I define partisan alignment as the case when the district mayor is from the same political
party as the party forming the Parliament. In Peru, there is a great percentage of municipal
mayors whose affiliation is to a new political party or an independent movement that has
no representation at the central level. Given that there were three municipal elections and
two central elections for the Parliament and President, there is variation over time in the
percentage of districts aligned (see Figure 2.20).
Table 2.10 presents the first-stage results. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2)
are, respectively, the number of unfinished projects and the number of projects completed.
An additional predicted sewerage project increases the number of unfinished projects by
0.26 and those completed by 0.11. This result corroborates the fact that completed projects
confound the effect of unfinished projects, as my original instrument predicts both unfinished
and completed projects.
Notably, the geographic suitability for low-cost projects increases by 0.88 the number of
projects completed in districts with partisan alignment. Mayors politically connected to the
Parliament are better able to secure funds to complete projects, conditional on starting them
due to the district’s geographic characteristics. This interaction has no statistically significant
effect on the number of unfinished projects.
The first-stage is weak, but there is no concern with this generating a bias. Following
the recommendation of Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) for applied work with multiple
endogenous variables, I report the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F-statistic (a robust version of
the Cragg–Donald statistic) and the Stock and Yogo (2002) weak ID test critical values. The
latter essentially tests if the bias of the instrumental variable estimator (IV), relative to the
bias of OLS, could exceed a certain threshold. For example, if one were willing to tolerate
a maximal size of 15 per cent, the size of the IV–OLS distortion would be 10 per cent for
the 5 per cent level test. The 10 per cent maximal IV size for my instrumental variable
estimation just identified is 7.03. Given that the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F-statistic is
less than all critical values, the instruments are weakly identifying the number of unfinished
and completed projects. Yet, the estimated first-stage coefficient above 0.1 and the exactly
identified model alleviate concerns linked to the low F-statistic generating a bias in the 2SLS
coefficients (Bound et al., 1995).
The omission of completed projects generates a downward bias of the estimated effect of
unfinished projects. Table 2.11 presents the effect of unfinished projects and those completed
on IMR (columns 1 and 3) and U5MR (columns 2 and 4). Columns (1) and (2) show OLS
estimates and columns (3) and (4) show 2SLS estimates. The naïve OLS estimates suggest
that both unfinished and completed projects increased mortality. The 2SLS estimates, how-
ever, reveal the expected results. While an additional unfinished project increased mortality,
an additional completed project decreased it, compared with not starting a project. Although
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I am unable to estimate statistically significant effects here, this exercise serves as a “san-
ity check”. Once completed projects are included in the estimation strategy, the effect of
unfinished projects is slightly larger than the original estimation.
Panel A shows that the magnitude of the negative effect of a completed project is greater
than the positive effects of an unfinished project; that is, an increase of 0.004 infant deaths
versus a decrease of 0.006 infant deaths and an increase of 0.862 child deaths versus a de-
crease of 1.214 child deaths. In line with my main hypothesis, early-life mortality increased
during the construction phase but these unintended consequences dissipate once projects are
completed (e.g. when water supply is resumed and open ditches are closed).
Given that the interaction between the geographical suitability for low-cost sewerage
projects and partisan alignment only predicts completed projects (as seen in Table 2.10), we
could use this as an instrument in a specification where we exclude unfinished projects. The
results of this alternative specification are shown in Panel B of Table 2.11. The estimated
effect of completed projects on mortality remains robust, though slightly lower in magnitude.
The Sanderson–Windmeijer F-statistic is now higher (3.62) and in the margin of the 25 per
cent maximal IV size. Hence, I assume a size distortion (bias of the IV estimator related to
the OLS) of 20 per cent for the 5 per cent level test.6
2.6.1 Mechanisms
Even when projects are completed, the health benefits associated with sewerage systems
may not fully materialise in the short run for two main reasons. First, if less than universal
connectivity is achieved, then this means that neighbours are still contaminating the environ-
ment. There are negative externalities from using rudimentary sanitation prone to leakages
(Augsburg and Rodríguez-Lesmes, 2018). Expanding access to sewerage systems may not
ensure universal connectivity. Governments often do not guarantee the connection of expen-
sive infrastructure to its final user, which is known as the “last mile problem” (Ashraf et al.,
2016).
Second, even if universal connectivity is achieved, untreated faecal sludge can contam-
inate bodies of water used for drinking or irrigation purposes. A study has revealed that in
Latin American, particularly in Peru, only about 30 per cent of waste water is treated, with
the remaining sludge being discharged in open waters (Fay et al., 2017).
The sustainability of sewerage systems depends on the effectiveness of government agen-
cies to operate and maintain the systems. A diagnosis of the institutional quality of the public
firms in charge of the operation and maintenance of sewerage systems in Peru revealed that
6The results are not statistically significant likely because this study does not have the statistical power to
estimate the effects of completed projects. Recall from Figure 2.3 that, on average, a district completed only
one project over ten years. The lack of variation in the intensive margin restricts the analysis of the effects
of completed projects. However, the purpose of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature on the effects of
unfinished projects, rather than completed.
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more than 80 per cent perform poorly, measured by transparency, customer support, insti-
tutional management, financial and operational sustainability and work environment (Von
Hesse, 2016).
Although the Peruvian norm establishes that it is compulsory for landlords to connect
households to public sewers when available, the enforcement of this norm is weak (Von
Hesse, 2016). Furthermore, there is evidence that the bad performance of public firms leads
to inoperative treatment plants, which contaminate local sources of water and agricultural
fields, and to a deterioration in the environment, which causes disease (Vega Ysela, 2015).
To quantify the extent to which sewerage diffusion was accompanied by an improvement
in the operation of sewerage systems, I use census data on the percentage of households
connected to sewerage (connectivity) and municipal reports indicating if water and sludge is
treated (treatment).
I estimate the effects of completed projects (using the same 2SLS specification as in
Panel B of Table 2.11, due to the higher first-stage F-statistic) on sewerage connectivity and
the likelihood of treating water and sludge. Table 2.12 shows that an additional completed
project increases connectivity by 23 ppts and sludge treatment by 15 ppts. Although pub-
lic sewers are introduced, the district’s average connectivity rate and prevalence of sludge
treatment are still less than universal (i.e. 46 and 39 per cent, respectively). Although a
higher number of completed projects may lead to universal connectivity and treatment, re-
call that during the period of study, on average, a district completed one project. Moreover,
water treatment decreases by 6 ppts (a decrease of 7 per cent), perhaps because better sludge
management is a substitute for supplying safer water. 7
2.7 Conclusions
Large public infrastructure can be a driver of development, setting LMICs on track to achieve
sustainable development goals (SGDs) by 2030. However, the implementation of large pub-
lic infrastructure can be highly disruptive, resulting in negative unintended consequences.
In this paper, I examine the logic of this trade-off by asking the following question. What
are the consequences of unfinished infrastructure projects? To answer this question, I focus
on the diffusion of sewerage infrastructure across district municipalities between 2005 and
2015 in Peru. The aim of this public intervention was to improve early-life mortality, as was
the case in advanced economies during the previous centuries.
There is a large prevalence of unfinished projects across years due to mid-construction
abandonment and delays. The majority of projects are “white elephants” (i.e. expensive in-
frastructure projects that are useless or troublesome) at some point, and the rest are projects
7Again, this study does not have the statistical power to estimate significant effects from the completion of
projects.
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at the verge of becoming one (i.e. experiencing delays). By the end of this study, 40 per
cent of the projects were still abandoned, with an average 40 per cent of the contractual sum
disbursed. If these projects are never completed, then a back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that this would generate a waste equal to 5 per cent of the public expenditure on ed-
ucation or 4 per cent of the expenditure on health in 2015 in Peru (World Bank, 2020). These
figures reflect the high social opportunity cost of the non-completion of public infrastructure.
In this paper, I document that unfinished infrastructure projects could not only be a waste-
ful use of public resources, but could also generate high social costs (i.e. kill children). Infant
and under-five mortality increased with every additional unfinished sewerage project, as op-
posed to not launching a project. The estimated effect is equivalent to ∼6–7 per cent over the
initial averages. Considering that, on average, districts in Peru started four projects, the esti-
mated increase in under-five mortality is equivalent to almost half the mortality rate in 2005
(3.08 deaths per 1,000 children). Because mortality decreased over the period of study, these
results can be interpreted as mortality decreasing at a lower rate because of the unfinished
infrastructure than it would have otherwise.
I find that water cuts forced the population to rely on unsafe sources of water and jeop-
ardised sanitation practices. Furthermore, the construction works exposed the population to
hazards, generating pools of infection from open ditches and increasing accidents among
older children. The estimated effect on infant mortality is mostly driven by water-borne dis-
eases, while the effect on under-five mortality can be separated into water-borne diseases
(0.20 deaths per 1,000 children) and accidents (0.1 deaths per 1,000 children).
I also show that an additional completed project decreases early-life mortality, as opposed
to not starting a project. The estimated negative effects of completed projects are comparable
to those of Alsan and Goldin (2019) in the United States during the late 19th century (∼30–
40 per cent from the initial averages). Completing one project did not ensure universal
connectivity or sludge treatment, and it crowded out water treatment, preventing the social
benefits of sewerage systems from fully manifesting.
By no means is the policy implication of the results that governments should not provide
public infrastructure, but its delivery should be complemented with other policies that can
mitigate the negative effects. Stricter health and safety measures, improvements in the qual-
ity of primary health care and the provision of alternative safe sources of water and sanitation
can prevent child deaths during the construction phase.
There is a need to understand better if the social costs of infrastructure development are
a result of the monopolistic nature of the institutional arrangement. Galiani et al. (2005), for
example, find large gains in connectivity and performance linked to the privatisation of sew-
erage services in Argentina, which decreased child mortality. The estimated negative effect
is of a similar magnitude to the estimated positive effect of an unfinished sewerage project
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in this paper. Post-construction privatisation could be as good as offsetting the negative ef-
fects of the implementation phase of sewerage systems. Nonetheless, Granados and Sánchez
(2014) find that municipalities that privatised sewerage services exhibited a slower reduction
of child mortality rates and lower increases in coverage.
Regardless of ownership, however, any institutional arrangement will have to deal with
the lumpy nature of finance and construction of infrastructure. A reform of the contractual
system can help finish projects that are started, such as leaving a high lump sum of the con-
tractual payment for when projects are finalised and including a penalty for not completing
infrastructure. The literature has pointed to other policy alternatives to attain project com-
pletion and universal connectivity, but there is room to explore further. Rasul and Rogger
(2018) suggest that managerial practices of local bureaucrats, such as incentive schemes,
increase the probability of completing infrastructure projects. Williams (2017) suggests the
inclusion of inter-governmental rules for completing a project before starting a new one, as a
way to deal with unstable local political dynamics that deter project completion. Ashraf et al.
(2016) suggests finding a “sweet spot” between fines and subsidies to promote connectivity
to public sewers.
Another avenue of future research is to identify whether sewerage is unique in trigger-
ing early-life mortality or if such an adverse effect can also be seen with other forms of
infrastructure. Equally, it is vital to quantify other negative consequences of unfinished pub-
lic infrastructure projects on well-being and economic outcomes. In short, we must gain a
better understanding of how dangerous “white elephants” can be.
Chapter 2. Can White Elephants Kill? Unintended Consequences of Infrastructure
Development in Peru
39
TABLE 2.1: Summary statistics and data sources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Beginning period End period Source
Sum Sum
1. Outcomes
Deaths under 1y 6,404 3,820 Vital records
Deaths under 5y 8,256 4,987
Population under 5y 2,672,357 2,481,908 INEI Pop forecast
Infant mortality (per 1,000 infants) 11.98 7.70
Under-five mortality (per 1,000 children) 3.08 2.01
2. Sewerage diffusion
Started projects 161 4,873 SNIP and SIAF reports
Completed projects 11 1,754
Mean SD Mean SD
2. District characteristics
Population density (pop/sq km) 642.91 2837.77 847.34 3188.96 Census and Spatial data
Population 23,403.32 57,020.49 32,947.11 75,973.03 Census
Municipal revenue (millions) 4.84 21.82 15.50 55.47 Municipal Registry
Internet access 0.38 0.48 0.93 0.26
TA in formulation of investment projects 0.66 0.46 0.58 0.49
Manages health centers 0.22 0.41 0.32 0.47
Water connectivity 0.61 0.49 0.86 0.34
Water treated 0.85 0.36 0.99 0.10
Sewerage treated 0.23 0.42 0.57 0.50
Share HH unsafe water 0.46 0.27 0.28 0.23 Census
Share HH sewer 0.25 0.27 0.46 0.29
Share HH on-site 0.34 0.23 0.40 0.25
Share HH open defecation 0.41 0.26 0.13 0.13
Share HH head secondary 0.22 0.15 0.34 0.16
Share HH electrified 0.56 0.26 0.79 0.16
Transport expenditure (millions) 1.50 7.62 1.92 7.94 SIAF reports
Energy expenditure (millions) 0.04 0.22 0.19 1.13
Health expenditure (millions) 0.71 2.53 0.36 1.49
Major affiliated to the government party 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33 Electoral data
3. Geography
Fraction district gradient ≤ 0.8% 0.10 0.23 Spatial data
Fraction district gradient {0.8-4.19]% 0.19 0.22
Fraction district gradient {4.19-13]% 0.34 0.20
Fraction district gradient above 13% 0.37 0.29
Fraction district elevation ≤ 250 mamls. 0.15 0.33
Fraction district elevation {250-500] mamls. 0.05 0.14
Fraction district elevation {500-1000] mamls. 0.06 0.15
Fraction district elevation above 1000 mamls. 0.74 0.41
River density (km/sq km) 53.32 124.30
District area (sq. km) 635.93 1,655.50
Notes: The beginning period is 2005 and the end period is 2015. Columns (1) and (3) provide the sum for the variables of interest and the
mean for the geographical and control variables for 2005 and 2015, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) provide the standard deviation for
control variables for 2005 and 2015, respectively, and column (2) also provides the standard deviation for the cross-sectional geographical
variables. Column (5) shows the data source used to compute each of the variables.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Years abandoned
Small Large
Notes: Abandonment is computed as the number of years that no additional funds are dis-
bursed even when a project is still underway. Projects are considered small if they are
planned to affect below the median of the distribution of beneficiaries, and large projects
otherwise. Sample is restricted to projects that were ever started between 2005 and 2015.












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Project duration
Small Large
Notes: Project duration is computed as the number of years it takes for a project to be
completed (if it ever accrued more than 90 per cent of the budgeted investment). Projects are
considered small projects if they are planned to affect below the median of the distribution
of beneficiaries, and large projects otherwise. Sample is restricted to projects that were ever
started and completed between 2005 and 2015.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
Started projects Unfinished projects
Completed projects
Notes: The grey dashed line shows the average cumulative number of projects started, the
red line shows the average number of projects unfinished and the blue line shows the average
cumulative number of projects completed.
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Notes: These maps show the district boundaries of Peru and the distribution across districts
of the actual number of sewerage projects started between 2005 and 2015. From top left
to top right, the maps show the years 2005, 2007 and 2009, respectively. From bottom left
to bottom right, the maps show the years 2011, 2013 and 2015, respectively. Light-shaded
districts are those in which no or few sewerage projects were allocated and dark-shaded
districts are those in which several sewerage projects were allocated.
Source: Author’s calculations using data on the number of sewerage projects started between
2005 and 2015 from the SNIP and the SIAF.
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Notes: These maps show the district boundaries of Peru and the distribution across districts
of the predicted number of sewerage projects to be started and completed between 2005 and
2015. From top left to top right, the maps show the years 2005, 2007 and 2009, respectively.
From bottom left to bottom right, the maps show the years 2011, 2013 and 2015, respectively.
Light-shaded districts are those in which no or few sewerage projects were allocated and
dark-shaded districts are those in which several sewerage projects were allocated.
Source: Author’s calculations using data on the number of sewerage projects started between
2005 and 2015 from the SNIP and the SIAF.
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TABLE 2.2: First-stage and reduced-form before the start of projects
(1) (2) (3)
Unfinished projects IMR U5MR
Predicted projects 0.356*** 0.000 0.069
(0.069) (0.000) (0.065)
F-statistic (SW) 27.00
Sample All years Before start Before start
District–year 10,494 5,443 5,443
Districts 1,408 1,234 1,234
Notes: The dependant variable in columns (1)–(3), respectively, is the number of unfinished projects, the IMR and the U5MR. Column
(1) includes all years, prior to and after the start of sewerage projects. Columns (2) and (3) restrict the sample to years before the start
of sewerage projects. The table also shows the Sanderson–Windmeijer F-statistic. All regressions include district and year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
TABLE 2.3: Effect of unfinished projects on early-life mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable IMR U5MR IMR U5MR
Unfinished projects 0.000*** 0.030*** 0.001*** 0.299***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.105)
F-statistic (Sanderson–Windmeijer) 27.00 27.00
IMR 0.018 4.816 0.018 4.816
Notes: This table presents the main results of the effect of the number of unfinished sewerage projects on early-life mortality rates. Columns
(1) and (2) show OLS estimates and columns (3) and (4) show 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the infant
mortality rate (IMR) and in columns (2) and (4) it is the under-five mortality rate (U5MR). The table also shows the Sanderson–Windmeijer
F-statistic and the average initial (2005) mortality rates. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
by district are given in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Notes: The plots show trends for infant mortality (upper plot) and under-five mortality (lower plot) before and after the first
project started in districts. The red vertical line denotes the time in which the first sewerage project in a given district was
started. The average mortality rate of districts that never started a sewerage project is also placed in time to start equal to
zero. The analysis is split into districts predicted to receive sewerage projects and those not predicted to.
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TABLE 2.4: Sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Specification IMR U5MR F-statistic (SW)
Additional controls
1. Population density (t − 1) 0.001 0.212* 21.43
(0.001) (0.116)
2. Municipal characteristics 0.001*** 0.322*** 24.44
(0.001) (0.115)
3. Amazon location dummy 0.001*** 0.299*** 27.00
(0.000) (0.105)
Changing sample
4. Districts with interventions 0.001*** 0.267*** 27.47
(0.000) (0.094)
5. Lima excluded 0.001** 0.250** 24.24
(0.000) (0.106)
Transformation
6. Projects top-coded 0.001** 0.198** 18.14
(0.000) (0.087)
7. Project density (10,000 people per km2) 0.002* 0.427** 8.81
(0.001) (0.207)
Notes: Each row represents a different sensitivity test on the specifications reported in columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.3. Columns (1)
and (2) in this table report the coefficient and standard error on unfinished projects where the dependent variable is the infant mortality
rate (1) and under-five mortality rate (2). Column (3) reports the associated first-stage F-statistic (Sanderson–Windmeijer). The different
specifications in each row are reported in the left-hand column. Coefficients correspond to 2SLS estimations. All regressions include
district and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Specifications are as follows: 1, controls for lagged population density; 2, controls for municipal characteristics,
including indicators capturing whether district municipality has access to the Internet, needs technical assistance to formulate investment
projects, and manages at least one health centre, and municipal income (ln), where missing values are replaced by the district’s average
value; 3, controls for a dummy capturing whether the district is located in the Amazon region; 4, restricts the sample of analysis to those
districts that ever had an intervention (at least one sewerage project ever started); 5, excludes the region of the capital of Peru, Lima,
from the sample of analysis; 6, transforms endogenous variable (unfinished projects) to a version top-coded at the top 10 percentile; 7,
transforms endogenous variable (unfinished projects) and instrumental variable (predicted projects) to a version interacted with population
density (10,000 people per km2).
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TABLE 2.5: Validity of IV: projects in other sectors
(1) (2) (3)
Specification IMR U5MR F-statistic (SW)
Expenditure controls
1. Transportation 0.001*** 0.306*** 25.47
(0.000) (0.110)
2. Energy 0.001*** 0.309*** 25.27
(0.000) (0.110)
3. Health 0.001*** 0.307*** 24.93
(0.000) (0.111)
Alternative endogenous variable
4. IV for transportation −0.012 −3.040 0.28
(0.023) (5.770)
5. IV for energy 0.007 1.595 1.03
(0.007) (1.668)
6. IV for health −0.002** −0.609** 7.96
(0.001) (0.288)
Notes: Each row represents a different sensitivity test on the specifications reported in columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.3. Columns (1) and (2)
in this table report the coefficient and standard error on unfinished projects where the dependent variable is the infant mortality rate (1) and
under-five mortality rate (2). Column (3) reports the associated first-stage F-statistic (Sanderson–Windmeijer). The different specifications
in each row are reported in the left-hand column. Coefficients correspond to 2SLS estimations. All regressions include district and year
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Specifications are as follows: 1, controls for district’s expenditure in transportation projects (log); 2, controls for district’s
expenditure in energy projects (log); 3, controls for district’s expenditure in health projects (log); 4, alternative endogenous variable –
district’s expenditure in transportation projects (log); 5, alternative endogenous variable – district’s expenditure in energy projects (log); 6,
alternative endogenous variable – district’s expenditure in health projects (log).
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TABLE 2.6: Validity of IV: geographic controls
(1) (2) (3)
Specification IMR U5MR F-statistic (SW)
1. Gradient × year dummies 0.001** 0.297** 21.15
(0.001) (0.125)
2. Elevation × year dummies 0.001 0.230 13.41
(0.001) (0.164)
3. Area × year dummies 0.001*** 0.293*** 26.94
(0.000) (0.104)
4. Amazon × year dummies 0.001*** 0.295*** 26.89
(0.000) (0.106)
5. Gradient × annual budget 0.001* 0.279** 15.70
(0.001) (0.141)
6. Elevation × annual budget 0.001 0.130 7.10
(0.001) (0.219)
7. Area × annual budget 0.001** 0.284*** 26.70
(0.000) (0.104)
8. Amazon × annual budget 0.001** 0.288*** 26.51
(0.000) (0.107)
9. Population density × year dummies 0.001** 0.231** 29.85
(0.000) (0.092)
10. Population density × annual budget 0.001** 0.212** 30.47
(0.000) (0.089)
Notes: Each row represents a different sensitivity test on the specifications reported in columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.3. Columns (1)
and (2) in this table report the coefficient and standard error on unfinished projects where the dependent variable is the infant mortality
rate (1) and under-five mortality rate (2). Column (3) reports the associated first-stage F-statistic (Sanderson–Windmeijer). The different
specifications in each row are reported in the left-hand column. Coefficients correspond to 2SLS estimations. All regressions include
district and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Specifications are as follows: 1 and 5, gradient is the percentage of area falling in the lowest gradient category
(0–0.8 per cent); 2 and 6, elevation is the percentage of area falling in the lowest elevation category (below 250 mamsl); 3 and 7, area is
km2; 4 and 8, Amazon location dummy is one if the region is in the Amazon; 9 and 10, population density corresponding to the initial year
(2005).
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TABLE 2.7: Effects on fertility and migration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Births Pop U5 Educ sec Electricity
Unfinished projects 0.369 0.018*** -0.002 -0.036***
(0.256) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011)
F-stat (SW) 27.03 27.00 19.46 21.30
Initial mean 2.92 6.99 0.22 0.56
District-year 10494 10494 2630 1406
Districts 1408 1408 1014 703
The dependent variable in columns (1)–(4), respectively, is the number of live births (ln), the under-five population (ln), the percentage of
household heads with secondary education completed and the percentage of households connected to the electricity network. Coefficients
correspond to a 2SLS estimation. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in
parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
TABLE 2.8: Effects on water and sanitation behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Water Sanitation
Connectivity Treated % Unsafe % Latrine % OD
Unfinished projects 0.031 −0.067* 0.030** −0.039*** 0.049***
(0.024) (0.037) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
F-statistic (SW) 26.14 7.98 19.46 19.46 19.46
Initial mean 0.97 0.85 0.46 0.34 0.41
District–year 3,326 6,355 2,630 2,630 2,630
Districts 1,054 1,277 1,014 1,014 1,014
The dependent variables are the following: the district has high connectivity to piped water (column 1); the municipality treats water
(column 2); the percentage of households that rely on unsafe sources of water (column 3); the percentage of households that use a latrine
(column 4); the percentage of households that practise open defecation (OD; column 5). Coefficients correspond to a 2SLS estimation.
All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses. Statistical significance
denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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TABLE 2.9: Effect of unfinished projects on mortality by cause of death
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. Initial mean
Specification IMR U5MR IMR U5MR
Water borne 0.001** 0.221***0.009 2.265
(0.000) (0.078)
Accidents 0.000 0.091* 0.004 1.248
(0.000) (0.051)
Respiratory −0.000 −0.003 0.003 0.736
(0.000) (0.044)
Malformation 0.000 0.030 0.002 0.388
(0.000) (0.034)
Other 0.000 −0.012 0.005 1.303
(0.000) (0.056)
Notes: Each row represents a different cause of death. Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficient and standard error on unfinished projects
where the dependent variable is the IMR and U5MR. Columns (3) and (4) report the mean mortality of the initial year (2005). Coefficients
correspond to 2SLS estimations. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in
parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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TABLE 2.10: First stage for unfinished and completed projects
(1) (2)
Unfinished Completed
Predicted projects 0.259*** 0.113***
(0.067) (0.038)
Geography * partisan alignment 1.027 0.887**
(0.705) (0.452)
Partisan alignment 0.002 −0.049
(0.100) (0.061)
F-statistic (Kleibergen–Paap) 0.60
10% maximal IV size 7.03
15% maximal IV size 4.58
20% maximal IV size 3.95
25% maximal IV size 3.63
District–year 8,517 8,517
Districts 1,212 1,212
Notes: The dependant variable in columns (1) and (2) is the number of unfinished projects and the number of completed projects, respec-
tively. The lower number of observations is due to omissions in the partisan alignment variable. The table also shows the Kleibergen–Paap
rk Wald F-statistic and the Stock–Yogo weak ID test critical values. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered by district are given in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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TABLE 2.11: Effect of unfinished and completed projects on early-life mor-
tality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable IMR U5MR IMR U5MR
Panel A: Multiple endogenous
Unfinished projects 0.000*** 0.023*** 0.004 0.862
(0.000) (0.008) (0.004) (0.830)
Completed projects 0.000*** 0.033***−0.006 −1.214
(0.000) (0.012) (0.008) (1.700)
F-statistic (Kleibergen–Paap) 0.60 0.60
Panel B: Single endogenous
Completed projects 0.000*** 0.050***−0.001 −0.244
(0.000) (0.012) (0.003) (0.558)
F-statistic (SW) 3.62 3.62
IMR 0.018 4.816 0.018 4.816
District–year 8,517 8,517 8,517 8,517
Districts 1,212 1,212 1,212 1,212
Notes: This table presents the results of the effect of the number of unfinished sewerage projects and cumulative completed projects on
early-life mortality rates. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS estimates and columns (3) and (4) show 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable
in columns (1) and (3) is the infant mortality rate (IMR) and in columns (2) and (4) it is the under-five mortality rate (U5MR). The lower
number of observations is due to omissions in the partisan alignment variable. The table also shows the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F-
statistic for the regression with multiple endogenous variables and the Sanderson–Windmeijer F-statistic for the regression with a single
endogenous variable. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses.
Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Completed projects 0.231 0.158 −0.066
(0.372) (0.155) (0.080)
F-statistic (SW) 0.41 3.28 4.17
Initial mean 0.227 0.234 0.838
District–year 3,583 10,395 8,209
Districts 1,211 1,212 1,212
The dependent variables in columns (1)–(3), respectively are the percentage of households connected to sewerage, an indicator for whether
the municipality reports that sludge is treated in the district and an indicator for whether water is treated in the district. All regressions
include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses.




















District Province Region Ministry of Sanitation Other sectors
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of sewerage projects formulated by each
government agency. The percentage is calculated from the pool of projects declared
viable and started between 2005 and 2015.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the SNIP and SIAF.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of started sewerage projects by initial municipal revenue. The blue distribution
corresponds to municipalities with budgets below the median and the red distribution corresponds to municipalities with
budgets above the median of the distribution of municipal budget by 2005.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of started sewerage projects by initial Internet access. The blue distribution corre-
sponds to municipalities without access and the red distribution corresponds to municipalities with Internet access by 2005.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of started sewerage projects by the dis-
trict’s percentage of households with unmet basic needs. The blue distribution cor-
responds to districts with a percentage of households with unmet basic needs below
the median and the red distribution corresponds to districts above the median of the
distribution by 2005.
Chapter 2. Can White Elephants Kill? Unintended Consequences of Infrastructure
Development in Peru
57











0 1 2 3 4 5
Sewerage projects
Below mean Above mean
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of started sewerage projects by the dis-
trict’s percentage of households already connected to sewerage. The blue distribu-
tion corresponds to districts with a percentage of households connected to sewerage
below the median and the red distribution corresponds to districts above the median
of the distribution of sewerage connectivity by 2005.
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Royalties Transfers Taxes Funds Loans
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of sewerage projects financed by each
of the different public resources. The percentage is calculated from the pool of
projects declared viable and started between 2005 and 2015.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the SNIP and the SIAF.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of cost overrun as a percentage of the
planned cost. It is calculated as the difference between actual and planned costs,
divided by the planned cost.
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VS
Notes: Alternative data obtained from the Health and Demographic Surveys (DHS), the National Survey of Health and
Demography (ENDES) and Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME).
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Notes: Alternative data obtained from the Health and Demographic Surveys (DHS), the National Survey of Health and
Demography (ENDES) and the Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME).
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Notes: This figure shows the cumulative number of started sewerage projects and districts with interventions between 2005
and 2015. The y-axis on the left-hand side indicates the cumulative number of started projects. The grey bars indicate the
cumulative number of started projects for the construction of new sewerage systems and the expansion of existing sewerage
systems. The lower red bars indicate the cumulative number of started projects for the improvement of existing sewerage
systems. The y-axis on the right-hand side indicates the cumulative number of districts with interventions. A district is
classified as having an intervention when at least one sewerage project was started. The green line indicates the cumulative
number of districts with interventions.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the SNIP and the SIAF.
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FIGURE 2.17: Geography in Peru
Notes: Darker shaded grid cells are at a higher altitude. The top-left and top-right maps show maps of elevation and gradient
in Peru, respectively. The lower map shows river density in Peru.
Source: Digital elevation maps provided by the Peruvian Ministry of Environment with information on multiple cells (1 × 1
km2).
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TABLE 2.13: Geographic cost parameters for sewerage projects
(1) (2)
Dependent variable Sewerage projects 2005–2015
OLS coeff. Beta coeff.
Fraction district gradient {0.8-4.19]% 0.833 0.022
(2.047)
Fraction district gradient {4.19-13]% 2.315 0.064
(1.785)
Fraction district gradient above 13% 0.903 0.038
(1.542)
Fraction district elevation {250-500] mamls -5.015*** -0.103
(1.475)
Fraction district elevation {500-1000] mamls -1.425 -0.029
(1.818)
Fraction district elevation above 1000 mamls -6.710*** -0.369
(1.233)
River density (km/sq km) 0.005* 0.096
(0.003)
District area (sq. km) -0.001** -0.134
(0.000)
Observations 1832
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of sewerage projects started between 2005 and 2015. Column (1) shows the coefficients of
an OLS regression and column (2) shows the standardised beta coefficients. The omitted gradient category is the fraction of district area in
the flat category (below 0.8 per cent) and the omitted elevation category is the fraction of district area in the low-altitude category (below
250 mamsl). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Note: Author’s calculation using data from the National System of Public Investment (SNIP for its Spanish acronyms) and
the Integrated System of Financial Administration (SIAF for its Spanish acronyms).
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of actual (upper plot) and predicted (lower plot)
sewerage projects by the district’s percentage of rural population. The blue distribution cor-
responds to districts with a rural population below the median and the red distribution corre-
sponds to districts above the median of the distribution of the percentage of rural population
by 2005.
Chapter 2. Can White Elephants Kill? Unintended Consequences of Infrastructure
Development in Peru
66
TABLE 2.14: Robustness check: socio-economic trends
(1) (2) (3)
Specification IMR U5MR F-stat (SW)
1. Education × year dummies 0.001** 0.300** 21.51
(0.001) (0.126)
2. Electrification × year dummies 0.001** 0.328** 16.46
(0.001) (0.153)
Notes: Each row represents a different sensitivity test on the specifications reported in columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.3. Columns (2)
and (3) in this table report the coefficient and standard error on unfinished projects where the dependent variable is the infant mortality
rate (1) and under-five mortality rate (2). Column (3) reports the associated first-stage F-statistic (Sanderson–Windmeijer). The different
specifications in each row are reported in column (1). Coefficients correspond to 2SLS estimations. All regressions include district and
year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. 1. Share of households with the head having completed secondary education. 2. Share of households connected to the electricity
grid.
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Notes: Blue lines for municipal elections and green lines for central elections.
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FIGURE 2.21: Sewerage project abandoned in Piura with a completion rate
below 60 per cent
Source: Photograph taken in Piura from Google streets on 2013, the year the project was started.
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FIGURE 2.22: Sewerage project abandoned in Huanuco
Source: Photograph taken in Huanuco for the technical report of the Defensoria del Pueblo (Vega Luna, 2015) exploring mid-construction
abandonment of sewerage projects.
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Abstract
Shared infrastructure can help improve living standards in urban slums, where insuf-
ficient public goods provision has led to extremely poor health and low levels of human
capital. However, poor quality infrastructure, generated partially by low valuation and pay-
ment, can hamper environmental quality even further. We study how to break this vicious
cycle in the context of community toilets in Uttar Pradesh, India. Our data reveals rampant
free-riding and a remarkably low willingness to pay for community toilets which are usually
of very bad quality and underutilised. We used a randomised field experiment to test the
effectiveness of two interventions: (i) a “supply push” that rehabilitates the infrastructure
and promotes cleanliness; and (ii) a complementary information campaign. We document
that externally funded improvements crowd-out willingness to pay and to use the shared in-
frastructure, worsen attitudes towards paying the users’ fees, increase the demand for public
intervention and generate no sustained improvement in usage. 1
1joint work with Alex Armand (Nova School of Business and Economics) and Britta Augsburg (Institute
for Fiscal Studies). I certify that the writing and data analysis presented in this chapter is solely my own
work. While I led the fieldwork, the research idea, funding application, project management, survey design,
research design, sampling and randomization, analysis plan, interpretation of results and framing of the paper
was joint work. My co-authors also edited the Introduction section of the paper. We gratefully acknowledge
financial support from the 3ie - International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (grant number DPW1-1105).
Ethics approval was secured from University College London (application n. 2168/012). The experiment
was pre-registered as Armand, A., Augsburg, B. and Bancalari, A. 2018. "Community toilet use in slums -
willingness to pay and the role of informational and supply side constraints." AEA RCT Registry. June 20.
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3087-1.0.
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3.1 Introduction
While urbanisation can bring benefits for economic development, cities in low and middle-
income countries (LMICs) are struggling to keep up with the necessary investment to build,
operate and maintain public infrastructure. In particular in densely populated urban settle-
ments, commonly known as “slums”, the public infrastructure is stressed beyond capacity.
Slums lack adequate living space and have insufficient public goods provision, which lead
to extremely poor health and low levels of human capital (Marx et al., 2013). To tackle this
problem, governments are backing infrastructure-sharing projects in slums, such as commu-
nity toilets (CTs), public taps and solar powered community hubs.
After providing access to shared infrastructure in slums, an additional problem emerges:
the infrastructure quality is extremely poor in LMICs. Poor infrastructure quality can hamper
environmental quality even further in slums, generating health and productivity costs (Green-
stone and Jack, 2015). An important determinant of infrastructure quality is the financial
sustainability of its operation and maintenance and user charge financing is commonly used
for this purpose (Bird, 2010). Yet, studies reveal a very low willingness to pay (WTP) among
affected households, particularly for public health infrastructure and goods (Kremer et al.,
2011; Devoto et al., 2012; Ashraf et al., 2010; Berry et al., 2020). Non-payment for public
infrastructure can lower effective prices below the marginal cost of operation and mainte-
nance, jeopardising supply and ultimately diminishing the already low WTP even further
(Burgess et al., 2020; Coville et al., 2020; Mcrae, 2015). How to break this vicious cycle is
a question that is yet to be answered.
We study this question in the context of CTs in the slums of two Indian cities, Lucknow
and Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. While considered an important public health solution for the
foreseeable future in slums, our data reveal rampant free-riding and remarkably low valuation
for CTs. Using incentive-compatible measures of WTP, we find that the average respondent
is willing to pay just below 27 per cent of the official rate to use the community toilet. In
line with this, the CTs are of very poor quality, which is reflected in the measures taken by
the state in terms of the infrastructure, the observed dirtiness, and the presence of harmful
bacteria. Interestingly, we find a hypothetical WTP for the highest standard CTs that is more
than double the actual WTP. The worse the observed dirtiness, the higher the rate of open
defecation, which 30 per cent of households regularly using CTs reported that members
occasionally revert to. It is estimated that such a practice of openly defecating is responsible
for 9 per cent of India’s total infant mortality and that the country’s economy is significantly
hampered in terms of its sanitation status, having lost 6.4 per cent of its annual GDP in 2006
alone (Geruso and Spears, 2018; World Bank, 2018).
We used a randomised field experiment to test the effectiveness of two interventions
aimed at breaking the vicious cycle of low quality public health infrastructure and low WTP
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and use. 70 catchment areas with a total of 110 CTs in the two study cities were allocated to
receive a “supply push”, which promoted cleanliness and maintenance. The first of the two
components of this intervention was a grant scheme, whereby CT managers could choose
whether the grant was used for deep cleaning, repairs, or cleaning tools, agents and training.
The second component was a financial rewards scheme, aimed at incentivising caretakers
to maintain the facility. The financial reward they could receive at four points in time was
high —equivalent to one third of their average monthly salary. The second intervention,
allocated to 35 CTs subject to the “supply push”, targeted households with a campaign aimed
at generating awareness of the importance of payment and the negative externalities resulting
from unsafe sanitation behaviour. We refer to this intervention as the “supply push plus
campaign”. In the control group of 40 CT catchment areas, participants did not receive any
intervention.
This field experiment, combined with several rounds of data collection over a period of
18 months, both at the household and the community toilet level, allowed us to address our
research objective. We first conducted a census of 33,000 households living in slums and
close to CTs. We then collected five rounds of observations and survey data on the 110 study
CTs and three waves of a household panel survey involving more than 1,500 households
living in the CT catchment areas. In addition, we conducted behavioural games to obtain
incentive-compatible measures of WTP and demand for public intervention, as well as to
measure sensitive behaviour. Furthermore, we collected swabs during each of the five visits
to the CT, which were tested in a laboratory for the presence of bacteria.
We found that the “supply push” generated marginal improvements in CT quality shortly
after the grant implementation, evidenced by a reduced bacteria count and by users reporting
improved infrastructure perception and washing their hands with soap. These improvements,
however, were not sustained over the 18-month study period, implying that the substan-
tial financial reward scheme was ineffective in sustaining, let alone further increasing, the
marginal improvement achieved by the one-off supply push —a typical public intervention
when rehabilitating infrastructure.
Surprisingly, by analysing households’ WTP over the course of the experiment, we found
that externally funding public infrastructure rehabilitation backfires. The “supply push” re-
duced WTP by 24 per cent over the control mean at a time when households appreciated the
improvements from the grant scheme; and furthermore, with time, attitudes towards paying
a user fee deteriorated by ten per cent over the control mean. Those residing in catchment
areas of treated CTs were more likely to state that CT operation and maintenance should be
funded by external agents (government and NGOs), rather than by the users themselves. In
addition, the intervention shifted the demand for public intervention away from other press-
ing issues in the community towards the maintenance of the CTs. We estimate an increase
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equivalent to 50 per cent over the control mean in the reports to public officials that CT dirti-
ness is the most pressing issue in the community. Altogether, these findings provide evidence
that external funds crowd-out private contribution in our study context.
Importantly, we found that the information campaign was ineffective in counteracting any
of these effects, despite having left a lasting impression on households. The only exception
was an attenuation in the reduction in the number of users (estimated to be 23 per cent lower
than the control), driven mainly by men, which we found accompanied the reduced WTP.
Over time, the interventions increased the percentage of users that paid by 20 per cent over
the control. Although diminishing free-riding might be desirable, it is questionable if it
comes at the expense of safe sanitation behaviour. Indeed, we found that open defecation
increased by 23 per cent over the control, again driven by men.
This study contributes to three literature streams. First, it contributes to the growing
sub-field of “envirodevonomics”, focused on understanding why environmental quality is so
poor in LMICs. A key question arising from this literature is: given the poor environmental
quality and high health burdens in LMICs, why is the WTP seemingly so low? (Kremer
et al., 2011; Dupas, 2011; Devoto et al., 2012; Ashraf et al., 2010; Berry et al., 2020; Ben
Yishay et al., 2017). This study provides a unique opportunity to identify the determinants
of the low WTP in a setting with significant health externalities. Besides, CTs are a type
of sanitation infrastructure with salient coordination problems. Our results provide direct
answers to questions raised by Greenstone and Jack (2015): Do transfers of funds crowd out
investments? Can providing information to the public change their behaviour and exposure
to environmental risks?
Another related literature stream is the one exploring the costs and benefits of policies
related to the adoption of health goods (e.g. toilets, vaccines, bednets), in particular the
provision of subsidies and information. Numerous studies have estimated the impact of
information programmes (Jalan and Somanathan, 2008; Luoto et al., 2011) and subsidies
(Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Ashraf et al., 2010; Dupas, 2014) in isolation. This study is
closely related to the growing literature on the interactions between the two policies. While
Ashraf et al. (2013) and Guiteras et al. (2015) find that subsidies and information campaigns
are complementary when promoting the take-up of a newly introduced health good (water
purification and latrines), we find that the complementarity is weak when respondents are
familiarised with the good and the aim is to increase adoption.
Finally, our paper is connected to the literature stream exploring the determinants of low
quality infrastructure in LMICs. We join Mcrae (2015); Burgess et al. (2020); Coville et al.
(2020) in showing that non-payment affects infrastructure quality. We add to this stream by
providing evidence that the distortions also affect the demand for public infrastructure. Our
results provide evidence supporting their narrative: a non-payment equilibrium persists in the
longer-run and the demand for public intervention in the provision of public infrastructure
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increases. We also show evidence of the effectiveness of two policy options recommended by
Burgess et al. (2020). We show that an intensive information campaign has limited power to
incentivise payment and that financial incentives involving large amounts for the employees
who collect the payments have little effect on the collection effort.
The paper proceeds as following. Section 3.2 explains the data collection efforts and
presents the context of the study, describing key features of the market of CTs. Section
3.3 presents the research design, including details of the field experiment and the estima-
tion strategy. Section 3.4 presents the results of the study and Section 3.5 discusses and
concludes.
3.2 Background and data
More than four million households living in slums in India (13 per cent of the total) do
not have access to a toilet at home, and thus their only option is to use a community toilet
or practice open defecation (IndianMinistryofHomeAffairs, 2011). CTs are a compound of
several defecation cubicles and urinals, arranged in gender-specific areas. The sanitation fa-
cilities are either connected to the sewerage system or septic tanks (classified as improved
facilities), contrary to the rudimentary private sanitation facilities (e.g. pit latrines without a
slab or platform) widely available in peri-urban areas. Hand-washing and bathing facilities
are also available and soap is frequently supplied. CTs are constructed by local municipal-
ities and their management is conducted by private contractors and NGOs. In general, a
public-private partnership (PPP) is formed for the operation and maintenance of CTs with a
long-term duration.
The operation and maintenance of the CTs consist of hiring and supervising a caretaker,
centrally providing the cleaning agents and tools, hiring cleaners, and arranging services such
as repairs (e.g. to water taps, doors, locks, lights) and the cleaning of sanitation systems. The
caretakers are charged with collecting the fees and either cleaning or supervising the cleaning
of the compound and cubicles. A community toilet is typically located in or near a specific
slum area and used by a defined group of residents in that area. The standard price to use
the community toilet is Rs. 5, which allows for using all of the facilities and services. Some
CTs charge Rs. 2 for using the urinals only, which are mostly located outside the compound.
In Section 3.2.1 we first provide details about the different data collection efforts we
carried out. Based on the analysis of these data, we then proceed to examine the CTs market
at the baseline in Section 3.2.2. The evaluation, literature review and on-ground observations
will motivate the form of our empirical analysis, exploring how to promote demand for
shared infrastructure in slums, which is covered in Section 3.3.
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3.2.1 Data
This section describes the range of data sources we collected to conduct our analysis. Our
aim was to obtain a comprehensive picture of the community toilet market in the slums, gath-
ering rich information on both the supply and demand sides. We orchestrated a substantial
amount of original data gathering in the form of geo-coded censuses of CTs and households,
a four-round household panel survey and a six-round panel survey of CTs including observa-
tions and the collection of bacteria swabs. Furthermore, we conducted several innovative be-
havioural games that allowed us to obtain high-quality incentive compatible measurements.
Figure 3.5 in the Appendix illustrates how our different data collection efforts were struc-
tured. During the first half of 2017, we undertook a census of all CTs and households living
within the slum borders and 400 metres from a pay-to-use community toilet. These censuses
were subsequently used to identify eligible CTs and households and assign slums to the treat-
ment and control groups, and as the basis from which we drew the sample of households for
our panel survey. We collected household-level data in a sequence of four waves: A base-
line survey in April-June 2018, a Rapid Assessment between July and September 2018, a
Midline survey between January and March 2019 and an Endline survey in July-September
2019. In addition, we collected community toilet-level data in a sequence of six waves: a
Baseline survey in April-June 2018, Follow-up 1 between July and September 2018, Follow-
up 2 in October-November 2018, a Midline (or Follow-up 3) survey between January and
March 2019, Follow-up 4 between April-May 2019 and an Endline (or Follow-up 5) survey
in July-September 2019.
CT and household censuses
To construct our sample for analysis, first a CT census was performed to map all of the CTs
in Lucknow and Kanpur, together with the distribution of slums close to these CTs, to un-
derstand how many CTs there are and how they are distributed, who uses them (from the
community, passers-by, workers), and their characteristics, management structure and pay-
ment, among others. Through this census, 409 CTs were identified in Lucknow (201) and
Kanpur (208). The instrument was administered to CT caretakers and/or supervisors. In
addition, the census included the collection of GPS coordinates for all of the CTs. This com-
munity toilet census allowed for identifying eligible CTs for the study: pay-to-use, mostly
used by slums residents and not close to another community toilet 2.
Afterwards, a household census was performed with the purpose of identifying our sam-
ple of eligible households. The household census covered more than 30,000 households
located within the slum borders and 400 metres from each of the 144 pre-selected CTs based
2We set 200 metres as a minimum distance between CTs because after this point sanitation behaviour and
open defecation are not associated anymore
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on the above-mentioned eligibility criteria. This census collected demographics, dwelling
characteristics and sanitation practices and beliefs. We identified eligible households based
on this household census: those in which at least one household member used a sanitation
facility other than the private latrine and where the household had no intention of migrating
within the following 18 months. The collection of GPS coordinates was extremely valuable
to link eligible households to a given community toilet based on distance estimates.
Finally, we selected 110 slums and their corresponding CTs given the availability of
eligible households. See Appendix 3.6.1 for more details of the selection procedure.
Household panel survey
In each selected slum, a random sample of households from those eligible was selected to
be part of the study (see Appendix 3.6.1 for a description of the sampling procedure). These
households participated in up to four waves of household surveys.
We first collected a standard Baseline survey, including information on socio-demographics
as well as dwelling characteristics, assets, income and expenditure. In addition, we collected
baseline information on health status and sanitation and hygienic behaviour and priors, atti-
tudes and health expectations linked to open defecation and CTs. Sanitation behaviour was
measured by asking where each demographic group went to defecate the last two times 3.
The main respondent to the household survey was the most senior household member in
terms of decision-making —in most cases the household head, but sometimes the spouse or
other knowledgeable household member, always falling in the age range of 18-64 years. The
scope of the baseline survey was 110 slums and 1,575 households, with an average cluster
size of 12 households.
We then collected three follow-up data rounds: a Rapid-Assessment survey, a Mid-line
survey and an End-line survey. The purpose of these follow-up surveys was to update the
information on household demographics and re-collect data on exposure to campaigns, hy-
gienic and sanitation behaviour, priors, attitudes and health expectations linked to open defe-
cation and CTs. During the End-line survey we also collected data on attitudes towards
paying the fee for the community toilet. To keep the sample size in line with our power cal-
culations, we interviewed replacement households, who were randomly sampled, in a ran-
dom order. In total, we interviewed 1,532 households during the Rapid-Assessment, 1,586
households during the Mid-line and 1,772 households during the End-line. Appendix Table
3.11 shows that the attrition rate of the Rapid Assessment with respect to the baseline survey
3To prevent under-reporting of open defecation due to social stigma, we included the following prelude:
“I’ve been to many similar communities and I’ve seen that even people owning latrines and having nearby CTs
defecate in the open” (Coffey et al., 2014)
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was 9 per cent; for the Mid-line survey it was 19 per cent 4; and for the End-line survey it
was 14 per cent.
Community toilet panel survey
The second source of data used in the analysis was a panel survey of CTs. All 110 CTs
participated in up to six rounds of surveys and recorded data during regular unannounced
visits: Baseline and five follow-ups. The recorded data consisted of three different types of
indicators: 1) observed number of users and those that pay within one hour, at dawn when
there is higher user traffic; 2) observed cleanliness and maintenance, including the presence
of faeces, flies and a bad smell; and 3) number of bacteria species identified in the swabs we
collected from the floor of randomly selected areas in the community toilet and analysed by
a local laboratory. We also administered a survey to the caretaker to collect data on cleaning
practices and daily tasks.
We were able to obtain data for all of the 110 selected CTs at the Baseline, but only
for 108 in Follow-up 1, 109 in Follow-up 2, 107 in Follow-up 3, 105 in Follow-up 4 and
106 in Follow-up 5, given that some CTs closed temporarily/permanently for refurbishment
or due to problems with the caretaker. In addition, two new CTs opened very close to the
study toilets. Because households also used these new CTs, we collected data from these
additional toilets during Follow-ups 2 to 5. These new CTs did not increase the number of
clusters, since we consider them part of the same cluster as the old CTs given their close
proximity.
Behavioural measurements
We also employed lab-in-the-field experiments, using incentive-compatible methods and
structured community activities, to measure behaviour; each of these was administered after
either the household survey or the community toilet survey. First, we elicited the willingness
to pay of potential users of the closest community toilet to their household using a Multiple
Price List methodology and random draw. This methodology bounds the WTP for using
the community toilet by prompting the participant to choose between different amounts of
money or a bundle of ten tickets to use the CTs with a market value of Rs. 50, before ran-
domly drawing one allocation to be paid. We offered different choices of price, starting
from Rs. 0, up to above the current market price (Rs.55 and Rs.60) to deal with truncation.
Because the choice of the price to be paid at the end was randomly selected, each choice
was independent. We identified the WTP for community toilet use as the point at which the
participant was willing to take the cash as opposed to the bundle of tickets. We piloted the
4there was slightly higher attrition in this round because the timing of the survey coincided with school
vacations when families go back to their villages
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design of the experiment in great detail in order to apply the most effective methodology
in our setting, both in terms of question framing and the actual and expected price points.
We measured the WTP for community toilet use for both the most senior male and female
member in terms of decision-making. To prevent the presence of the other senior member
affecting elicitation, we revisited households and played the behavioural games with each
member alone. We elicited WTP four times during the study, after each of the household
survey rounds: Baseline, Rapid Assessment, Midline and Endline.
Second, we measured the demand for public intervention using “voice-to-the-people”
style cards. A similar instrument was used by Collier et al. (2014); Batista et al. (2011);
Armand et al. (2017) to measure the demand for political accountability. We provided re-
spondents with the opportunity to fill in these cards, in which they could report the most
pressing issue in their community from a set of different topics (including community toilet
cleanliness) to local public officers. Respondents were informed that the content of these
cards would be summarised and provided to the municipal corporation of their city. We con-
ducted this structured community activity after the household panel survey at the Midline.
Third, we used List Randomisation to measure sanitation behaviour more accurately.
This technique created privacy for respondents, as it allowed them to report on potentially
sensitive behaviour without allowing the researcher or surveyors to identify individual re-
sponses. In practice, some proportion of the survey respondents was randomly selected to
receive a short-list of statements (e.g. general behaviour) and asked to report how many, but
not which, statements were true. Other survey respondents were presented with the same list
of statements and one key additional statement designed to capture sensitive behaviour (i.e.
open defecation, CT use or handwashing). The difference between the mean number of true
statements in the first group from the mean number of true statements in the second group
allowed for estimating the proportion of the sample that engaged in the sensitive behaviour.
This approach has been widely used to study sensitive behavioural choices (Karlan et al.,
2011).
External validity
This study is set in the slums of Lucknow and Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, India. Uttar Pradesh
is home to 200 million people and it is the fourth most densely populated state in India (out
of 32 states). More than six million people live in slums in Uttar Pradesh, making it the
sixth state in terms of the percentage of the population living in such slums (IndianMinistry-
ofHomeAffairs, 2011). Appendix Table 3.9 shows that the slum population in Uttar Pradesh
is comparable to that of the whole of India in terms of the share of adult males, females and
children, as well as the sex ratio and share of the population belonging to Schedule Castes.
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Furthermore, Appendix Table 3.9 shows that our study sample is representative of house-
holds located in the slums of Uttar Pradesh, in terms of their socio-demographic character-
istics. The difference lies in the fact that our study sample is restricted to potential users of
CTs. Due to this eligibility criteria, our study sample is composed of the poorest households
in the slums —i.e. we study a larger share of households from the scheduled caste (0.45 vs.
0.20 in slums of India) and with a lower literacy rate (0.46 vs. 0.78 in India).
3.2.2 The Market of CTs at Baseline
This section uses the baseline data to analyse the market of CTs. The facts that we will doc-
ument in this section are: (i) free-riding is rampant; (ii) WTP is low; (iii) the infrastructure
quality is poor; and (iv) open defecation is prevalent.
CTs are a particular type of sanitation that resembles a traditional public good. While the
maintenance of private latrines relies on the households, CTs rely on users’ fees, and hence
there is a risk of coordination problems. In line with this, we find that free-riding is rampant.
On average, only 64 per cent of users pay the community toilet fee. This is mainly driven
by women: on average, half of women users do not pay the fee, compared to 75 per cent
of men. Figure 3.1 documents the distribution of the share of men (grey bars) and women
(white bars) that use the community toilet without paying, across the CTs. Strikingly, in 30
per cent of CTs no women pay and only in 20 per cent of CTs do all women pay. One may
wonder whether caretakers offer women the use of the community toilet for free because
it is socially desirable, but there is great variation in the percentage of women that pay. In
half of the CTs, the percentage of women paying ranges from 15 per cent to 90 per cent.
Although there is a smaller percentage of CTs in which no men pay (5 per cent) the fee and
a larger percentage in which all men pay (35 per cent) it, there is also great variation in the
percentage of men that pay the fee across CTs.
Free-riding is possible because it is difficult to exclude users. Caretakers have low en-
forcement power, as evidenced by only 5 per cent of respondents claiming that the caretaker
had told them off for not paying the fee and 7 per cent claiming that they had been prevented
from using the facility during the last month. Free-riding could be a result of inability to pay,
rather than low WTP. An average household of 5 members would spend Rs. 750 per month
to use daily the community toilet, which translates into 8 per cent of the average household
income. Yet, households spend more than this required amount on intoxicants per month
(Rs. 817). One could argue that women’s low bargaining power in regard to household ex-
penditure drives this result, but we still find that households spend twice as much on hygienic
products as they do on CT fees. To disentangle ability to pay from WTP, we elicited WTP
by offering a choice between cash and a bundle of ten tickets to use the community toilet,
as explained in Section 3.2.1. WTP was hence computed as the minimum price per ticket at
which the respondent started to prefer cash.
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WTP for using the community toilet is very low. Figure 3.2 shows that a large percentage
of households are not willing to pay to use the community toilet (35 per cent). The distri-
bution of WTP for men (grey bars) is slightly shifted towards the right compared to that of
women (white bars). On average, women are willing to pay Rs. 1.34 and men Rs. 1.46. We
note that this average WTP is significantly below the market price for a community toilet use
—it is equivalent to just 27 per cent of the official rate of Rs.5 per ticket. The low average
WTP is the same even among women who report that they must pay a price greater than zero
to use the community toilet. The average WTP for men is the same between households that
always use the community toilet and between those that do not. Yet, for women the WTP is
marginally higher for households that always use it (only by Rs. 0.35). Such low WTP may
therefore reflect a truly low valuation of CTs. Meanwhile just 11 per cent of respondents re-
ported a WTP more for CT use than the official price of Rs. 5. However, care must again be
taken in interpreting this WTP as a maximum, since even respondents who value community
toilet use at a rate higher than Rs.5 may, rationally, not have been willing to give up more
than the market price in our incentivised task if they could obtain usage tickets for less.
Due to non-payment and low WTP, the operation and maintenance of CTs can be com-
promised. Evidence suggests that this is common in the water and sanitation market. Sridhar
(2007) found that the revenues of water and sewerage services cover approximately 50 per
cent of the total expenditure in the urban area of Punjab, India, affecting the quality of supply.
In the urban slums of Uttar Pradesh, we also found that the CTs are of very poor quality. We
found an average score of 0.33 standard deviation units in the index capturing dirtiness in the
compound, 0.51 in the index capturing dirtiness in the cubicle and 0.83 in the index captur-
ing bad infrastructure quality (standardised scores ranging between 0 and 1) 5. Additionally,
we found an average of 3.5 dangerous bacteria species in the swabs taken from the CTs.
Notably, this low quality was perceived by households. Less than half of the households re-
ported liking the sanitation and water services offered in their community toilet. 36 per cent
reported that they considered it clean, only 15 per cent reported liking the infrastructure (e.g.
well-functioning facilities) and 28 per cent reported that they considered it safe (e.g. locks
and lights). Non-payment may force providers to ration supply across slums, resulting in
supply not being governed by market powers. Appendix Figure 3.8 shows that CT dirtiness
is negatively correlated with the percentage of people paying when CTs are cleaner, but the
correlation is lost once CTs become very dirty.
To better understand the relationship between low quality and WTP, we elicited respon-
dents’ WTP for a hypothetical high-quality toilet. Figure 3.3 shows that men and women
would be willing to pay more than double for CTs that have been improved to the highest
standard — very clean, with good handwashing facilities, and well-lit and locked cubicles.
5See Appendix 3.6.2 for more information on how these indices were constructed
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Both women and men reported that they would, on average, be willing to pay above the
market price of Rs. 5 if the quality of CTs were to be improved.
Given that CTs are poorly maintained, it is not surprising that households continue prac-
tising open defecation, as opposed to using the infrastructure. At the baseline, in 30 per
cent of households that reported using the community toilet, at least one member above the
age of five practised open defecation. Figure 3.4 confirms this conjecture: the practice of
open defecation is a function of the dirtiness of the community toilet. While less than 15 per
cent of households openly defecate when the community toilet has a relatively low dirtiness
index (0.2 standard deviations units), almost 50 per cent openly defecate when the dirtiness
index is at its maximum (1 standard deviation unit). Notably, few CTs are relatively clean
(dirtiness index below 0.2 standard deviations units), as denoted by the confidence intervals.
The preference for defecating in the open over using a dirty community toilet may be
driven by information asymmetries about the health risks that open defecation poses to fam-
ilies and communities. Yet, at the baseline we find that 70 per cent of households are well
aware of the risks that open defecation can pose to their families and 65 per cent are aware of
the risks that this practice can pose to their communities. Although the information is imper-
fect, the awareness of health risks is not low. It could be then that individuals underestimate
the health risk of open defecation compared to that of dirty toilets. When measuring expec-
tations at the baseline, we find this postulation to be true. On average, respondents expected
64 per cent more adults and 62 per cent more children to become ill due to widespread open
defecation practice as opposed to the eradication of this practice. In contrast, respondents
expected 72 per cent more adults and 69 per cent more children to become ill due to the use
of a dirty community toilet as opposed to a clean one.
Taken together, the evidence suggests a vicious cycle of non-payment that jeopardises
quality and, ultimately, diminishes the already low WTP even further. How to break this
vicious cycle is an empirical question that is yet to be answered. In the light of the market
failures identified in our context —i.e. coordination problems, negative externalities and
asymmetric information— we explore how an external push towards the maintenance of CTs,
alone and coupled with a campaign to generate awareness of the importance of payment and
release informational constraints about public health, affects WTP and usage.
3.3 Intervention and Research Design
3.3.1 Intervention
We tested the effectiveness of two interventions aimed at breaking the vicious cycle of low
quality public health infrastructure and low WTP and use. The first intervention we called the
“supply push”, which was designed to maintain the infrastructure and promote cleanliness.
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The first component of this intervention was a one-off push to rehabilitate the infrastructure,
which represents “low-hanging fruit” in the spectrum of policy interventions. We provided
a grant scheme offering a choice of packages of the same monetary value: (i) deep clean-
ing (i.e. septic tank sewage removal, unclogging latrines and sewerage pipes and cleaning
walls, floors and inside toilets); (ii) repairs (i.e. sanitation/water connection repairs and/or
infrastructure refurbishment); or (iii) cleaning tools and agents (i.e. disinfectants, soap) and
cleaning training. The caretakers of each community toilet could choose one of these pack-
ages according to the toilet’s needs and their expectations in terms of increasing usage. 41
per cent of CTs selected deep cleaning and the same percentage repairs, while only 17.7 per
cent selected cleaning tools, agents and training.
After this initial push, we introduced a financial reward scheme as a means to sustain
the initial improvement in quality resulting from the grants provided. Two months after the
grant scheme (and every two months from then on), caretakers received a financial reward
conditional on achieving the following: (i) availability of soap in the hand-washing facilities;
(ii) latrines free of visible faeces; and (iii) bacteria count in defecation cubicles kept to a
minimum standard (i.e. above the mean of the baseline distribution) 6.
In each round, caretakers could receive Rs. 500 for achieving goal (i), an additional Rs.
500 for achieving goal (ii) and an additional Rs. 1,000 for achieving goal (iii). The maximum
amount that caretakers could receive at the four points in time was equivalent to one third
of their average monthly salary. In CTs with more than one caretaker, the reward was split
between them. On average, treated caretakers won Rs. 778.6 in the first round (39 per cent
of the potential reward), Rs. 1,036 in the second round (52 per cent of the potential reward),
Rs. 1,058 in the third round (53 per cent of the potential reward) and Rs. 972 in the last
round (49 per cent of the potential reward).7
The second intervention complemented the “supply push” intervention with an informa-
tion campaign. We designed this campaign to increase awareness of the negative externalities
resulting from unsafe sanitation behaviour (e.g. open defecation, polluting CTs) and the im-
portance of paying to use CTs for their operation and daily maintenance. This component
6When announcing the financial reward scheme and making the subsequent payments, caretakers were
informed of their performance during the previous round, though their payment for the next round was not
a function of their performance during previous rounds to prevent strategic behaviour. The aim of providing
feedback on past performance was to increase the perceived return on effort (substitution effect), though we
were aware that the caretakers may not increase their effort if they knew they could achieve the same outcome
with less effort (income effect) (Bandiera et al., 2015)
7We implemented the “supply push” intervention at the caretaker level for three main reasons. First, care-
takers are able to improve the cleanliness of CTs by exerting more effort when cleaning or supervising the
cleaner. Second, caretakers can (to some extent) stop users if they refuse to pay the fee to use the facilities.
Third, caretakers work only in one community toilet, contrary to mid-level managers, who supervise more than
one toilet in the study. In terms of sample size and contamination concerns, we did not treat mid-line managers.
To prevent control caretakers from learning about the intervention, we provided a list to the city managers of
all of the CTs in the study without revealing which toilet had been allocated to which treatment arm. City
managers were informed about the intervention, but were encouraged not to discuss with contractors, mid-line
managers and caretakers the different interventions in order to prevent complaints.
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targeted all household members, especially household heads and spouses, and was designed
such that participants with low literacy could process the information. We provided the in-
formation in four forms. The first was a door-to-door information campaign using a flipchart
with cartoons and messages targeted at all household members. This campaign was con-
ducted three times: after the baseline, rapid assessment and midline rounds of the household
panel survey. Secondly, a leaflet was left with households after the door-to-door campaign
that included a summary of the flipchart. Thirdly, posters were placed in the community
toilet, highlighting messages provided during the door-to-door campaign. Fourthly, monthly
reminders were sent 8 in the form of voice messages to all mobile phones collected in the
household.
To disentangle the effects of receiving voice messages, all of the treatment arms received
messages including no new information (specifically stating that the community toilet was
open from early morning until late evening). Households allocated to the “supply push”
additionally received voice messages informing them that the community toilet has been
granted aid to improve its service.
Figure 3.5 in the Appendix shows the timeline of the different interventions. At the
community toilet level (upper panel), we started by providing the Grant Scheme immediately
after the baseline data collection; we announced the Financial Reward Scheme two months
later and we paid the reward every two months after that. At the household level (middle
panel), we started the information campaign immediately after the baseline and we repeated
the door-to-door visits immediately after the rapid assessment and midline survey rounds.
We also sent messages during every month of the study (denoted by M). The timeline shows
the evolution of the intervention and its different components relative to the data collection
(lower panel).
3.3.2 Research Design
Allocation to the treatment arms was randomised in the catchment area of a community toi-
let, namely within a radius of maximum 250 metres away from the facility and within the
slum borders. One group was allocated to receive the “supply push” intervention, another to
receive the “supply push plus campaign” intervention and another to not be treated (control).
Randomising at the catchment area level has the advantage of limiting contamination of the
control group, especially considering the possible spread of information. To allocate clus-
ters to treatment arms, we stratified the sampled clusters by the main organisation managing
the CTs in our study area (versus other organisations) and by city of study (Lucknow and
Kanpur). We then built blocks of three CTs using m-distance (Mahalanobis) relative prox-
imity. To construct the m-distances, we used the rich census information we had collected,
8Cortes (2018) suggest that this is an adequate frequency for behavioural change.
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including community toilet and slum-dweller characteristics. After forming blocks of simi-
lar clusters, we randomly allocated each community toilet and catchment area in a block to
each treatment group. Each one of the three possibilities had the same probability. 35 catch-
ment areas were allocated to “supply push” (557 households with an average cluster size of
16 households); another 35 catchment areas were allocated to “supply push plus campaign”
(559 households with an average cluster size of 17 households) and 40 catchment areas were
allocated to the control (673 households with an average cluster size of 16.7 households).
Table 3.16 in the Appendix presents the balance test for our main outcomes, both at the
household and community toilet level. For each outcome we present the mean and standard
deviation when the sample is restricted to the control group only (column 1), and the balance
test on the joint treatment groups versus the control group (column 2) and for each treatment
group (columns 3 and 4). We also present the p-values of the test of joint-significance of
differences across both treatment arms (column 5). Overall, the results show that the ran-
domisation was successful in creating observationally equivalent groups. None of the 20
tests yielded a p-value lower than 0.05 and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal
means in difference across the treatment arms for any of the outcomes.
Over the whole study from the Baseline to the Endline, 29 per cent of households dropped
out in at least one survey round. Table 3.17 in the Appendix estimates the probability of
attrition as a function of treatment status and baseline WTP and sanitation practice. This
shows that the attrition rates did not differ between the treatment and control groups, that
the likelihood of attrition was not associated with WTP for using the community toilet or the
practice of open defecation and, most importantly, that there was no differential attrition by
baseline outcomes: the coefficients of the interaction terms between the treatment status and
each outcome at the baseline are not statistically significant.
3.3.3 Estimation strategy
We evaluated the effect of the “supply push” and “supply push plus campaign” treatments on
the individual, household and community toilet level outcomes exploiting the experimental
variation caused by the random assignment of slums to treatment groups. We estimated the
following specification for each survey round:
Yijt = β1T1j + β2T2j + αxXij + δt + εijt (3.1)
where Yijt is the outcome of interest for the individual/household/community toilet i in
slum j at time t, where the time periods refer to the different survey rounds. T1j = 1 if
the slum was assigned to the “supply push” treatment and T2j = 1 if slum was assigned
to the “supply push plus campaign” treatment and 0 otherwise. Xij are city and manager
indicators that were included to improve efficiency because the randomisation was stratified
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by those variables, as well as gender indicators included in the specifications at the individual
level. δt are survey round indicators. The error term εijt is clustered by slum, the unit of
randomisation.
β1 and β2 identify the intent-to-treat (ITT) impact of the “supply push” and “supply push
plus campaign” on the individual/household/toilet i under the identification assumption of
random assignment; there are no spillovers between the treatment and control slums. These
estimates compare the levels in outcomes among the units in the treated slums to the levels
among counterfactual units in the control slums in the same city and among CTs managed
by the same provider. The identification assumption is supported by the fact that households
and CTs were identified in identical ways in the treatment and control locations before the
start of the interventions (as shown in Table 3.16).
As robustness checks, following work by Mckenzie (2012), we ran an analysis of covari-
ance (ANCOVA) specification, accounting for the baseline value of the outcomes considered,
namely Yij,t=0. Appendix 3.6.6 probes the robustness to using this alternative specification.
9 All of the results are quantitatively and qualitatively robust. To deal with the fact that
testing multiple null hypotheses simultaneously increases the probability of false rejections,
we ran two sets of tests. First, we reduced the number of hypotheses tested by merging the
two treatment arms. The results are presented in Appendix 3.6.7. Second, we adjusted the
p-values following List et al. ([2019)’s bootstrap-based procedure, which has been proven to
asymptotically control the familywise error rate (the probability of one or more false rejec-
tions) and be asymptotically balanced (in that the marginal probability of rejecting any true
null hypothesis is approximately equal in large samples). The procedure was modified to be
used in a multivariate regression setting. The adjusted p-values are presented in Appendix
3.6.5.
3.4 Results
This section tests the impact of the interventions at each step of the causal chain that links re-
leasing constraints to improving community toilet quality and available information, to WTP
and sanitation behaviour. The comparison between shorter-run (few months after Baseline)
and longer-run effects (6 to 1 years after Baseline) reveals how the effects change over time,
which is important for understanding whether a one-off push can set CTs on a sustainable
trajectory.
9We also estimated a different specification controlling for baseline variables selected using Double
LASSO. The results are very similar to those of the ANCOVA specification and thus are not included in the
Appendix.
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3.4.1 CT quality
We start by exploring whether the treatments were effective at improving the quality of the
CTs. Table 3.1 presents the treatment impacts on the quality of the CTs. Panel A shows the
shorter-run effect of the Grant Scheme (up to four months after the Baseline) and Panel B
the longer-run effect of the Grant Scheme combined with the effect of the Financial Reward
Scheme (after 6 to 12 months). Column (1) of Panel A shows that CTs allocated to the
“supply push” treatment had 0.14 fewer types of bacteria than the control: between two and
four months after the Grant Scheme, the number of bacteria species was 4 per cent lower
relative to the control CTs in the same time frame.
We cannot rule out that the impacts of the “supply push” and “supply push plus cam-
paign” treatments were statistically different (the p-value of the t-test of differences in impact
is 0.92), meaning that the effects were driven by the “supply push”. This is the case for most
of the estimated effects; hence, we will focus first on the effect of the “supply push” and in
Section 3.4.5 we will describe the cases in which the campaign generated a different effect.
Although we find a negative effect on the observed dirtiness of the toilet compounds and
cubicle indices, as well as the index of bad infrastructure quality, we are underpowered to
estimate the statistically significant effects in the shorter-run.
Comparing the shorter-run and longer-run effects, we note that the marginal improvement
in bacteria species happened immediately after the Grant Scheme and that the Financial
Reward Scheme was not effective at sustaining the initial marginal improvement. Yet, we
found in the longer-run that CTs allocated to the “supply push” treatment had 13 per cent less
observed dirtiness in the cubicles than the control toilets. Again, we cannot rule out that the
impacts of the treatments were statistically different (the p-value of the t-test of differences
in impact is 0.22).
The results highlight two policy-relevant facts: first, that a one-off supply push — a
typical public intervention when rehabilitating infrastructure— is not enough to improve the
quality of public sanitation infrastructure in a sustainable manner; and second, that a financial
reward scheme, even when it involves a large amount, is not effective in terms of ensuring
adequate maintenance of CTs.
Although the estimated shorter-run improvements in the quality of CTs were marginal,
we did find improvements in the attitude of potential users towards their community toilet.
In column (3) of Table 3.2 we can see that households allocated to the “supply push” treat-
ment were more likely to report that they liked the infrastructure of their community toilet
(i.e. well-functioning facilities, somebody else maintaining it, walls well-painted, functional
doors, looks nice, etc.) by 8 percentage points (ppts) —40 per cent more than the respondents
in the control slums.
The perceived improvement in the CT infrastructure was as expected. Recall from section
3.3 that more than 40 per cent of the treated toilets selected the “repairs” intervention during
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the Grant Scheme, which consisted of improving the infrastructure quality of the community
toilet. The impact was purely driven by the “supply push”, as we cannot rule out that the
impacts of the treatments were statistically different (the p-value of the t-test of differences
in impact is 0.13).
The effect on attitudes towards CTs was, however, immediate: we found no statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of participants reporting that they liked something about
their community toilet in the longer-run (Panel B).
3.4.2 WTP, attitudes and demand for public intervention
We now explore the impacts of the interventions on WTP for using CTs. On the one hand,
users may now value the facility and its services more highly, due to the marginal improve-
ments in the CT quality, and hence we could observe an increase in their WTP for its use.
On the other hand, externally funding (without increasing the users’ fees) the maintenance
of CTs may crowd-out users’ private contributions, as evidenced by Peltzman (1973); Cutler
(1996) in advanced economies and discussed in Bennett (2012); Das et al. (2013); Armand
et al. (2017) for low- and middle-income countries.
Recall from Section 3.2.1 that we elicited WTP for a bundle of 10 tickets to use the com-
munity toilet using an incentive-compatible Multiple Price List and random draw method.
We measured WTP as the point at which the respondent chose cash as opposed to the tickets.
Table 3.3 column (1) analyses the effect of the treatments on the WTP for using the
community toilet during the rapid assessment (Panel A)—two months after the Baseline and
immediately after the Grant Scheme— and during the Midline and Endline survey rounds
(Panel B) — six and twelve months after the Baseline respectively.
Column (1) shows that respondents allocated to the “supply push” treatment were willing
to pay, on average, Rs. 0.24 less per usage than those allocated to the control (24 per cent
lower than the control’s average WTP). This negative effect on WTP was observed imme-
diately after the Grant Scheme was provided in the community toilet and disappeared in the
longer-run. The results are in line with the second conjecture stated above: an externally
funded supply push crowds-out private contribution. Therefore, external funds and private
contributions are substitutes.
As evidence that the “supply push” treatment was perceived by users as externally funded,
we found that most respondents believed that the improvement in their community toilet had
been funded by the Government (65 per cent) or an external organisation (15 per cent), rather
than users’ fees.
We further explored whether there had been an impact on users’ attitudes towards paying
the fee. We measured this outcome by building a “negative attitudes to pay” index, which
standardised and aggregated the answers to the following questions: (i) "Why do you think
the community toilet charges a fee to use it?"; (ii) "Who do you think should be paying for
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the operation and maintenance of the community toilet?"; (iii) "Do you think the community
toilet should charge a fee for usage?"; (iv) "Do you think people are justified to pay less/not
pay for the CT if the government would increase funds for maintaining the CT in good
shape?"; and (v) "Do you prefer paying the community toilet fee and having a clean toilet
or not?". We constructed the index using principal component analysis, with the highest
load coming from (iii) and (iv). The index captured the answers to the questions in the same
direction, such that higher values corresponded to worse attitudes towards paying to use CTs.
Table 3.13 in the Appendix provides more details on how this index was constructed.
Table 3.3 examines the treatments’ impact on the index capturing negative attitudes to-
wards paying to use CTs in column (2). Respondents allocated to the “supply push” treat-
ment had worse attitudes towards paying the community toilet fee by almost 10 per cent
compared to the average of the control group. Notably, these effects were only measured at
the Endline, one year after the Grant Scheme had been implemented, meaning that even a
one-off push in infrastructure maintenance can crowd-out private contributions.
Because most users believed that the government funded the “supply push”, next we
explored whether a one-off intervention generated greater demand for public intervention.
To measure this outcome, we used the reports of the “voice-to-the-people” style cards. Recall
that we gave participants the chance to report the most pressing issue in their community to
the local municipality. The idea was to capture whether treated respondents demanded more
public intervention in the operation and maintenance of CTs, relative to other issues in their
community.
Columns (3) to (5) in Table 3.3 present the treatments’ impact on this incentivised mea-
sure of demand for public intervention. The dependent variables capture the likelihood of
at least one participant in the household reporting each of the following community issues:
community toilet dirty (column 3); open defecation (column 4); and other issues (column 5),
including children being ill, limited water availability, no jobs, bad quality roads, no solid
waste collection, poor lighting at night and limited access to healthcare.
Column (3) shows that the likelihood of reporting to public officials that the commu-
nity toilet was dirty as the most pressing issue in their community was 6 ppts higher for
respondents allocated to the “supply push” —i.e. 50 per cent more likely than the control
households. Interestingly, in column (4) we can see that the likelihood of reporting open
defecation as the main issue in the community was 8 ppts lower for those treated (16 per
cent less likely than the control households). The effects were estimated more precisely
when the two treatment arms were merged (Panel C). Notably, our treatments had no effect
on the demand for public intervention in issues unrelated to sanitation in the community. We
cannot rule out that the estimated effects were the same across the treatment arms for any of
the outcomes, meaning that the impact was mainly driven by the “supply push” treatment.
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3.4.3 Sanitation behaviour
We now explore what happens with sanitation behaviour, relying on two types of measures:
(i) observed usage and payment of the fees; and (ii) self-reported behaviour by respondents.
Table 3.4 first presents in columns (1) and (2) the effects of the treatments on the observed
number of users during one hour at dawn (i.e. the time of most traffic in the CTs) and the
percentage of those that pay. In CTs allocated to the “supply push” treatment, usage was
lower by 7 users than in the control CTs (which translated into 23 per cent lower usage).
This effect was not statistically significant in the longer-run, but the effect on the percentage
of users paying was. In column 2, Panel B, we can see that the percentage of users that paid
the fee was 11 ppts higher in CTs allocated to the “supply push” treatment than those in the
control group (20 per cent higher payment). Apparently, externally funding the operation
and maintenance of CTs not only crowds-out private contributions, but also disincentivises
usage. If anything, the treatment seems to screen-out users who are not willing to pay, which
decreases free-riding in the longer-run. Although reducing free-riding is desirable, it is not
if the reduction is at the expense of lowering the total usage of CTs.
Table 3.4 next examines the treatments’ effect on self-reported sanitation and hygiene
behaviour. Column (3) analyses the effect on the likelihood of at least one member of the
household practising open defecation; column (4) on the likelihood of household members
always using the community toilet; column (5) on the ownership of a private latrine and
column (6) on the likelihood of the household head and spouse washing their hands with
soap.
We found no statistically significant effects on sanitation behaviour nor the ownership
of a latrine using these self-reported measures. We did find, however, that the likelihood of
reporting washing hands with soap was 4 ppts higher for households allocated to the “supply
push” treatment than for those in the control group (i.e. 4 per cent more likely). We cannot
rule out that the effect was purely driven by the “supply push” treatment (the p-value of the
t-test of differences in impact is 0.01). Furthermore, we found that the impact of the supply
push intervention on hand-washing with soap was immediate, as there was no statistically
significant effect in the longer-run. We therefore attribute this effect to the Grant Scheme,
which distributed soap and dispensers to CTs. Recall from Section 3.3 that almost 18 per
cent of CTs selected the grant providing cleaning agents and tools.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity by gender
Treatment effects are likely to be heterogeneous depending on gender. Women have greater
biological needs (e.g. attending to menstrual hygiene) and face more psychosocial stress in
regard to addressing their sanitation needs. Concerns about privacy and dignity are greater
for women since they suffer disproportionately from male harassment when they serve their
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needs in public places (Stopnitzky, 2017; Augsburg and Rodríguez-Lesmes, 2018). Due to
these issues, there has been a growing push to consider sanitation as a right for women (Jansz
et al., 2018). Section 3.2.2 reveals that free-riding is more prevalent among women, who also
reveal a lower WTP.
We tested for heterogeneous effects of the treatments by estimating the following speci-
fication:
Yijt = β0kTj + ∑
k
βkdik ∗ Tj + ∑
k
νkdik + αxXij + δt + εijt (3.2)
where k is a sub-group such that dik = 1 or dik = 0. The impact on outcome Yijt of the
treatments combined in sub-group k = 1 is given by β0k + βk and in sub-group k = 0 is
given by β0k. The heterogenous effects are captured by βk.
Table 3.5 reveals that the positive effect on negative attitudes to paying and on the demand
for public intervention was driven mostly by women. The negative attitudes to paying the
CT fee were 11 per cent higher (column 3) and the demand for public intervention 80 per
cent higher (column 4) for women allocated to the “supply push” treatment than those in the
control group.
The effects were also positive for men, but slightly lower in magnitude and not statis-
tically significant. Given that women use the toilet for free more than men (as shown in
Section 3.2.2), it is not surprising that externally funding the operation and maintenance of
CTs is mainly reinforcing the non-payment among women.
We also estimated heterogeneous effects on observed usage. Table 3.6 shows that the
“supply push” decreased the number of men users, though it had no statistically significant
effect on women users. We found no differential effect in the observed percentage of users
that paid in the longer-run across genders.
Because self-reported behaviour suffers from social desirability bias, we also measured
sanitation behaviour using list randomisation. As explained in Section 3.2.1, list randomisa-
tion is a survey technique that creates privacy for respondents by reporting only the number
of behaviours that respondents perform. Because we randomly assigned the number of items
from which respondents could report, the difference in the number of items reported reveals
whether the behaviour was performed. We formally estimated the impact on the number of
behaviours performed by interacting the treatments with the randomly assigned number of
items for each behaviour (open defecation, CT use and hand-washing behaviour). Consistent
with a decrease in the WTP of a slightly higher magnitude for men and a decrease in the use
of CTs by men, we found that our interventions increased the practice of open defecation
by men by 23 ppts. This increase is not trivial: it is almost double the prevalence of open
defecation by men in the control group.
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3.4.5 Information campaign
In this section we explore in detail what happened when the information campaign is added
to the “supply push” intervention.
We start by identifying whether the information campaign was effective at changing ex-
pectations and awareness of the health risks of unsafe sanitation behaviour and facilities.
Table 3.8 shows that respondents allocated to the “supply push” expected a greater dif-
ference in child illness between a clean and dirty community toilet (column 4) by 12 ppts
(15 per cent higher than the expected difference for the control group). We cannot rule out
that this effect was purely driven by the “supply push” and not the additional campaign.
However, in the longer-run (Panel B), we found that those allocated to the “supply push plus
campaign” expected a greater difference in adult illness between a clean and dirty commu-
nity toilet (column 3) by 3 ppts (3.5 per cent higher than the expected difference for the
control group). The coefficients remain robust and the statistical significance is higher when
estimating an ANCOVA specification, as shown in Appendix Table 3.28.
In the longer-run (Panel B), we found that respondents allocated to the complementary
campaign had greater awareness of private health risks (i.e. family illness) from open defeca-
tion by 8 ppts (13 per cent relative to the control group). Contrary to the aim of the campaign,
this intervention had no effect on the awareness of public health risks.
These small effects on expectations were, however, not explained by the low-intensity
information campaign. All households received a door-to-door information campaign and
leaflet at least once, all CTs had posters that were replaced when damaged and participants
listened on average to seven of the ten monthly rounds of voice messages. In fact, Table 3.18
Panel A in the Appendix shows that households allocated to the “supply push plus campaign”
were 7 ppts more likely to recall being exposed to information about sanitation through any
communication means two months after the beginning of the information campaign. Dur-
ing this period, households exposed to the information campaign were 9 ppts more likely to
recall hearing messages (evidence of monthly reminders in the form of voice messages), 19
ppts more likely to recall door-to-door visits and 10 per cent more likely to recall commu-
nity activities (though this was not part of our campaign, we allowed neighbours to join the
flipchart demonstrations when conducting the door-to-door visits). The effects were statis-
tically different from those allocated to the “supply push” only (all p-values of the t-test of
differential effects were lower than 0.1).
Table 3.18 Panel B in the Appendix shows that even when measuring recall four months
(at Midline) and six months (at Endline) after exposure to the last door-to-door visit, house-
holds allocated to the “supply push and campaign” were 12 ppts (20 per cent) more likely
to recall the campaign than the control group. During this period, households exposed to
the information campaign were 9 ppts more likely to recall hearing messages and 16 ppts
more likely to remember posters in the community toilet, the two activities that happened
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throughout the year of study. We did not find statistically different effects on the recall of
the door-to-door visit and community activities between the treatment arms in this period,
which is not surprising given that many months had passed since their last exposure to such
an event.
After identifying that the information campaign had a limited effect on expectations and
awareness of health risks, we explored whether the campaign had a differential effect on
willingness and attitudes towards CTs and sanitation behaviour. Table 3.2 shows that, in the
shorter-run (Panel A), respondents allocated to the information campaign were 9 ppts less
likely to like the CT’s water, sanitation and hygienic facilities. Perhaps the messages related
to the benefits of using CTs in the information campaign increased expectations of the water
and sanitation services to be found in these compounds.
When looking at heterogenous effects by gender in Table 3.5, we can see in column (2)
that the negative effect on WTP was mainly driven by the information campaign for women
(though when merging both shorter- and longer-run effects, the estimated effect was not sta-
tistically significant anymore). Perhaps the information campaign made women more aware
of the externalities of unsafe sanitation behaviour (i.e. open defecation), which reinforces
the notion of “sanitation is a right” and non-payment among this group.
Even though we found no differential effect of the information campaign on WTP and
attitudes towards paying, as well as the demand for public intervention on CTs, we did find an
effect on observed usage. Tables 3.4 and 3.6 column (1) show that the information campaign
counteracted the reduction in observed users (in the latter table for men), resulting in no
change on average. Interestingly, respondents allocated to the information campaign were
also more likely to report using a private latrine (column 5, Panel A), though the estimated
effect was not statistically significant.
3.5 Conclusions
Non-payment for public infrastructure can lower effective prices below the marginal cost of
operation and maintenance, jeopardising supply and ultimately diminishing WTP and usage
even further. We explored how to break this vicious cycle in the context of CTs —a shared
public health infrastructure with salient coordination problems. We showed that externally
funding the rehabilitation of infrastructure backfires: it reduces the already low WTP, de-
teriorates users’ attitudes towards paying a fee and increases the demand for public inter-
vention. Altogether, these findings provide evidence that external funds crowd-out private
contributions in our study context. Despite showing that improving infrastructure quality
significantly reduces free-riding, it is done at the expense of reducing usage and worsening
environmental quality. Hence, the vicious cycle is not broken, but rather reinforced.
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The implications of our study go beyond shared sanitation infrastructure. Our results
are consistent with Burgess et al. (2020)’s and Mcrae (2015) thesis, which explains the low-
quality equilibrium in the electricity market. A vicious cycle is generated by treating public
infrastructure as a right: theft and non-payment are widely tolerated, which results in util-
ities losing money and facing no other option but to ration supply, and ultimately supply
is no longer governed by market forces. Over the past decades in India, large government
programmes have provided universal rights to electricity, sanitation and education, among
others. Particularly relevant for this study is Modi’s insignia Swachh Bharat Mission to de-
clare India open defecation free by fully subsidising the construction of private latrines and
CTs. At the core of the vicious cycle is supplying infrastructure on criteria other than eco-
nomic and social return, leading consumers to learn that the way to get more is to appeal to
their local elected representatives. This results in allocative inefficiency of large subsidies,
which deters private investment to improve infrastructure, trapping households and firms in
a non-payment, low-quality equilibrium. This vicious cycle is exacerbated in settings with
weak institutions, such as the case of slums, where increasing enforcement may be challeng-
ing to implement and susceptible to extortion (Ashraf et al., 2016).
How can we effectively break the vicious cycle then? Further research is needed to
answer this question and we provide three key areas to focus on. First, it is important to
understand which policy option is cost-effective to achieve sustainable improvements in en-
vironmental quality. Despite directing resources towards improving CT quality, as opposed
to providing subsidies that are allocated inefficiently, we document that a one-off push is not
enough to sustain improvements over time, valuation and usage. Exploring other solutions
in a similar setting to ours, Coville et al. (2020) shows that hard threats of disconnection
decrease non-payment. Yet, disconnecting/preventing usage may not be socially desirable in
a high disease burden and low environmental quality setting such as slums, so there is a need
to explore policy alternatives. Policies range from fully subsidising usage to removing ex-
plicit subsidies while continuing to support the poor. Guiteras et al. (2015) shows that fully
subsidising the purchase of private latrines, coupled with an information campaign, increases
usage and decreases open defecation. However, additionally subsidising the operation and
maintenance of infrastructure may be too costly to sustain for local governments with lim-
ited resources and may create distortions due to weak institutional capacity. Few CTs that
have been made free in the slums of Uttar Pradesh are still of bad quality and thus under-
utilised. Another approach is to remove any explicit subsidies, which are often enjoyed by
users across the income distribution. Instead, funds could be used to provide cash transfers
to poorer users, ear-marked for example to pay for public services. Though this strategy is
subject to effective targeting, conditional cash transfers have been proven to incentivise the
adoption of public goods (Attanasio et al., 2011).
Second, there is a need to investigate how to change the social norm making free-riding
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acceptable, while not deterring safe behaviour. Externally funding improvements in CTs,
although decreasing free-riding, screens-out users that revert to open defecation. An in-
tense information campaign and large financial incentives to the employees who collect the
payments, as suggested by Burgess et al. (2020), proved to have limited power to deter
free-riding and improve behaviour. Perhaps a more effective campaign could be one that ex-
poses free-riders, for example, by comparing the expenditure on intoxicants to that on public
health. Collective action, such as community group surveillance, could be another effective
avenue. Community Total Sanitation Campaigns (CLTS), which uses psychosocial levers of
shame and disgust and appoints a local monitoring committee, has proven to be effective to
improve sanitation behaviour in poorer settings (Abramovsky et al, 2018). Though evidence
of CLTS mainly comes from rural areas, there is scope to understand whether an approach
adapted to urban areas could be effective at reducing free-riding in slums. Incentive schemes
at the community level based on the percentage of people that pay to use CTs could also be
effective at creating and reinforcing a new local norm of payment (Neal et al., 2015).
Finally, we must explore technologies that make public infrastructure excludable, making
it possible to link payments with supply. Like many other public goods, CTs are not easily
excludable and anyone can access the facilities regardless of whether they have paid to use
them. Coin operated doors, for example, could help caretakers who are not empowered to
enforce payment. The downside of making public infrastructure excludable is that greater
control can actually decrease usage (Greenstone and Jack, 2015). Better monitoring can also
be undermined by bureaucratic collusion, as highlighted in the healthcare literature (Banerjee
et al., 2008). Further research is needed in order to understand the effectiveness of better
control and monitoring technologies in high free-riding environments.
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FIGURE 3.1: Distribution of share of users that pay, by gender
Note: Data collected in the baseline community toilet survey. Data corresponds to counts of the number of users and those
that pay in the lapse of 1 hour at dawn, when users traffic is the highest. The distribution of the percentage of men that pay
is denoted by the gray bars and the distribution of women by the white bars.
FIGURE 3.2: Distribution of willingness to pay for using community toilets,
by gender
Note: Data collected in the Baseline community toilet survey. Data corresponds to the minimum price per ticket at which the
respondent started to prefer cash in the willingness to pay behavioural experiment. The distribution of the percentage of men
that pay is denoted by the gray bars and the distribution of women by the white bars.
Chapter 3. Challenges to Promoting Demand for Shared Infrastructure: Experimental
Evidence from Slums in India
96
FIGURE 3.3: Distribution of WTP for using hypothetical high-quality CTs, by
gender
Note: Data collected in the Baseline community toilet survey. Data corresponds to the minimum price per ticket at which the
respondent started to prefer cash in the willingness to pay behavioural experiment. The distribution of the percentage of men
that pay is denoted by the gray bars and the distribution of women by the white bars.
FIGURE 3.4: Share practising open defecation, by CT dirtiness
Note: Data collected in the Baseline household and community toilet surveys. The x-axis shows the dirtiness index ranging
from 0 to 1 and the y-axis the share of households reporting that at least one member defecates in the open. The blue line
shows the quadratic fit, the gray area the confidence intervals and the green dots the open defecation share for every dirtiness
index bin.
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TABLE 3.1: Treatment effects on the quality of CTs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bacteria Dirty compound Dirty cubicle Bad infrastructure
Panel A: Shorter-run
Supply push -0.14* -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Supply push + Campaign -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
(0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.92 0.98 0.45 0.46
Mean (Control) 3.07 0.23 0.46 0.27
Obs-round 219 217 217 217
Community 111 111 111 111
Panel B: Longer-run
Supply push 0.02 -0.02 -0.06* -0.03
(0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Supply push + Campaign 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.22 0.68 0.22 0.94
Mean (Control) 3.07 0.23 0.46 0.27
Obs-round 324 325 325 325
Community 111 111 111 111
Notes. Analysis at the community toilet level. Sample in Panel A includes follow up 1 (2 months after Baseline) and follow-up 2 (4 months
after Baseline), right after the Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel
B includes the remaining follow-up rounds of the community toilet panel survey: Follow-up 3 (6 months after Baseline), Follow-up 4 (8
months after Baseline) and Endline (more than 1 year after Baseline). All specifications include round dummies and strata variables
as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard errors clustered by slum in parenthesis to deal with serial correlation.
Statistical significance denoted by * p<0.1 , ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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TABLE 3.2: Treatment effects on attitudes towards CTs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WASH Clean Infrastructure Safe
Panel A: Shorter-run
Supply push 0.02 0.01 0.08** 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Supply push + Campaign -0.09* -0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.03 0.76 0.13 0.31
Mean (control) 0.52 0.42 0.20 0.31
Obs-round 1,532 1,532 1,532 1,532
Slums 110 110 110 110
Panel B: Longer-run
Supply push 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Supply push + Campaign -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.84 0.84 0.32 0.41
Mean (control) 0.53 0.35 0.13 0.17
Obs-round 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Slums 110 110 110 110
Notes. Analysis at the household level. Sample in Panel A includes the Rapid Assessment round of the household panel survey, after the
Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel B includes the Midline and
Endline rounds. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider.
Standard errors clustered by slum in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 3.3: Treatment effects on willingness and attitudes to pay and demand
for public intervention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WTP Negative ATP Public intervention




Supply push + Campaign -0.24*
(0.13)





Supply push 0.09 0.04*** 0.06* -0.08* -0.03
(0.11) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Supply push + Campaign -0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.07* -0.02
(0.10) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.18 0.22 0.91 0.81 0.66
Panel C: Merged treatment
Treatments 0.01 0.03** 0.05** -0.07** -0.03
(0.09) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Mean (Control) 1.20 0.41 0.10 0.43 0.85
Obs-round 6,113 3,301 1,580 1,582 1,580
Community 110 110 110 110 110
Notes. Analysis at the individual level for columns (1) and (2) and household level for columns (3) to (5). Sample in Panel A includes only
the Rapid Assessment follow-up round of the panel household survey. For the willingness to pay outcome, the sample in Panel B includes
both Midline and Endline follow-up rounds. The attitudes towards paying the fees were measured only during the Endline follow-up survey.
The demand for public interventionw as measured only during the Midline survey. All specifications include round dummies and strata
variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Columns (1) and (2) additionally control for gender. Standard errors
clustered by slum in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 3.4: Treatment effects on sanitation behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CT use % Pay OD CT use Latrine Use soap
Panel A: Shorter-run
Supply push -7.13** 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.04***
(3.44) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Supply push + Campaign 0.37 0.06 -0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02
(4.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.04 0.60 0.45 0.96 0.05 0.01
Mean (Control) 30.08 0.55 0.28 0.66 0.05 0.95
Obs-round 218 218 1,532 1,532 1,532 1,532
Community 111 111 110 110 110 110
Panel B: Longer-run
Supply push -0.39 0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
(1.77) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
Supply push + Campaign -0.61 0.11** 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.01
(1.62) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.89 0.52 0.89 0.67 0.19 0.65
Mean (Control) 30.08 0.55 0.28 0.33 0.10 0.95
Obs-round 324 324 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Community 111 111 110 110 110 110
Notes. Analysis at the community toilet level for columns (1) and (2), where the outcomes correspond to a tally of the number of users
and those that pay in a random day at dawn (when the CT has the highest traffic). For the CT-level analysis, Sample in Panel A includes
follow up 1 (2 months after) and follow-up 2 (4 months after), right after the Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of
the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel B includes the remaining follow-up rounds of the community toilet panel survey. Analysis
at the household level for columns (3) to (6), where the outcomes correspond to self-reports. The first outcome is an indicator of whether at
least one household members practices open defecation the last time he/she defecated (column 3); the second outcome indicates whether
all household members always use the community toilet to defecate (column 4); the third outcome indicates whether the household owns
a private latrine (column 5) and the last outcome is an indicator of whether the respondent and its partner, usually the household head
and spouse, washed their hands with soap the last time they washed their hands (column 6). For the household level analysis, sample in
Panel A includes only the Rapid Assessment follow-up round of the panel household survey and in Panel B, the Midline and Endline survey
rounds. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard
errors clustered by slum in parenthesis to deal with serial correlation. Statistical significance denoted by * p<0.1 , ** p<0.05, and ***
p<0.01.
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TABLE 3.5: Heterogeneous treatment effects on WTP, ATP and demand for
public intervention, by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WTP Negative ATP Public int - CT
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Supply push -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.05*** 0.02 0.04*
(0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Supply push + Campaign -0.13 -0.10 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04
(0.10) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.23 0.05 0.47 0.14 0.81 0.91
Mean (control) 1.28 1.02 0.38 0.43 0.06 0.05
Obs-round 111 111 110 110 110 110
Slums 4,234 4,574 1,635 1,666 1,580 1,580
Notes. Analysis at the individual level for columns (1) and (2) and household level for columns (3) to (5). Sample in column (1)-(2)
include all rounds, columns (3)-(4) only Endline and columns (5)(6) Endline follow-up rounds. The attitudes towards paying the fees were
measured only during the Endline follow-up survey and the demand for public interventionw as measured only during the Midline survey.
All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard errors
clustered by slum in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 3.6: Heterogeneous treatment effects on sanitation behaviour, by gen-
der
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CT use % Pay
Men Women Men Women
Panel A: Shorter-run
Supply push -4.40** -2.73 0.04 0.02
(1.95) (1.87) (0.06) (0.08)
Supply push + Campaign 0.99 -0.62 0.07 0.02
(2.36) (2.51) (0.05) (0.08)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.02 0.34 0.51 0.98
Mean (Control) 19.17 10.90 0.66 0.36
Obs-round 218 218 218 218
Community 111 111 111 111
Panel B: Longer-run
Supply push -1.00 0.61 0.09* 0.08
(1.22) (0.80) (0.05) (0.07)
Supply push + Campaign -0.94 0.32 0.12*** 0.12*
(1.14) (0.76) (0.04) (0.07)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.96 0.73 0.60 0.59
Mean (Control) 19.17 10.90 0.66 0.36
Obs-round 324 324 324 324
Community 111 111 111 111
Notes. Analysis at the community toilet level for columns (1) and (2), where the outcomes correspond to a tally of the number of users
and those that pay in a random day at dawn (when the CT has the highest traffic). For the CT-level analysis, Sample in Panel A includes
follow up 1 (2 months after) and follow-up 2 (4 months after), right after the Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment
of the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel B includes the remaining follow-up rounds of the community toilet panel survey. All
specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard errors clustered
by slum in parenthesis to deal with serial correlation. Statistical significance denoted by * p<0.1 , ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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Treatments * OD 0.23* 0.12
(0.12) (0.12)
Treatments * CT use 0.03 0.17
(0.13) (0.14)
Treatments * Hand-washing with soap 0.07 0.03
(0.11) (0.12)
Mean OD (Control) 0.20 0.24
Mean CT (Control) 0.66 0.52
Mean HW (Control) 0.73 0.90
Obs-round 1,643 1,682
Community 110 110
Notes. Sample includes Endline round of the panel household survey. All specifications include strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii)
managed by main provider. Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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3.6 Appendix
FIGURE 3.5: Time of data collection and intervention
Note: This figure illustrates how our different data collection efforts were structured. During the first half of 2017, we
undertook a census of more than 400 community toilets in the two cities of study and during the second half of 2017, we
conducted a census of more than 30,000 households living within slum borders and 400 meters from a pay-to-use community
toilet. These censuses were subsequentially used to identify eligible community toilets and households, assign slums to
treatment and control groups and as the basis from which we drew the sample of households for our panel survey. We
collected household-level data in a sequence of four waves: a baseline survey in April-June 2018, a rapid assessment between
July and September 2018, a midline survey between January and March 2019 and an endline survey one year after the baseline
in July-September 2019. In addition, we collected community toilet-level data in a sequence of six waves: a baseline survey
in April-June 2018, a first follow-up between July and September 2018, a second follow-up in October-November 2018,
a midline survey between January and March 2019, a fourth follow-up between April-May 2019 and an endline survey
one year after the baseline in July-September 2019. This figure also shows the timeline of the different interventions. At
the community toilet level (upper panel), we start by providing the Grant Scheme right after the baseline data collection;
we announce the Financial Reward Scheme two months after and we pay the reward every two months onwards. At the
household level (middle panel), we start the information campaign right after the baseline and we repeat the door-to-door
visits right after the rapid assessment and midline survey rounds. We also send messages every month of the study (denoted
by M). The timeline shows the evolution of the intervention and its different components relative to the data collection (lower
panel).
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3.6.1 Sampling strategy
This study performs a two-level randomization design and therefore, we are interested in two
different level of the sampling frame. 3.6 summarizes the sampling strategy. The first level
of the sampling frame is defined by all community toilets (CTs) in the cities of Lucknow and
Kanpur. In order to obtain this sampling frame, we performed a CT Census in both study
cities. This census collected GPS coordinates and information on CT characteristics. We
identified at total of 409 CT. Figure 3.6 presents the distribution of CTs in Lucknow (left
map) and Kanpur (right map).
FIGURE 3.6: Sampling frame
The second-level sampling frame is characterized by all households in the catchment ar-
eas of selected community toilets (which represents a cluster). Out of the 409 CTs identified
in the first stage, we chose a subset of CTs to become part of the study, based on the follow-
ing criteria: the CT has to be pay-to-use; the CT has to be located close to a residential area
(slum) and used by residents. We drop CTs for which the distance to another CT is below a
certain threshold. In particular, there should be sufficient distance between two CTs to avoid
users switching between CTs (possibly driven by their treatment status). We drop CTs that
are closer than 300 meters to each other, and CTs that have two other CTs closer than 350
meters.
In addition, we drop CTs in whose catchment areas fewer than eight eligible households
are living. A household is considered eligible if the following conditions are respected:
the household lives in the catchment area of a selected CT, which is broadly defined as
slum area within 250 meters from the CT building. Households are linked to CTs based on
GPS coordinates collected during the census;10 at least one household member uses a CT or
shared toilets (i.e. neighbours, makeshift, work, school), or practices open defecation; the
10A small percentage of households with inaccurate geo-coordinates (missing geocodes or distance to closest
community toilet greater than the 400 meters buffer area set for household census) were linked to the commu-
nity toilet located in the slum (0.7 percent in Lucknow and 1.6 percent in Kanpur). In these cases, we imputed
the distance to the community toilet using the median of eligible households in the slum.
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household must have reported during the census interview not to intend to migrate during
the following 18 months (i.e. until the planned study endline survey).
Figure 3.7 shows the flowchart for the CT and household sampling procedure. Within
each of the 110 CTs and their catchment areas, we sampled up to 17 eligible households.
Given that distance is a major determinant of CT usage, we focused on eligible households
living closer to the CT (within 150 meters). Since some CTs have more dispersed popu-
lations, we conducted a two-step sampling procedure. First, in large-population catchment
areas (where 10 or more eligible households are available within 150 meters), we sampled
only from eligible households that are located within this bound. Second, in small-population
CTs (where less than 10 eligible households are available within 150 meters), we first sam-
pled all eligible households within 150 meters and then randomly selected the remaining
households from those that are located between 150 and 250 meters from the CT. In total,
we sampled for interview 1,650 households in 110 randomization units (catchment areas of
CTs) and one CT caretaker per randomization unit.
FIGURE 3.7: Sampling procedure
Notes. The flowchart presents the procedure followed for the sampling of community toilets and its catchment area for the surveys.
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TABLE 3.9: Descriptive statistics of slum population
(1) (2) (3)
India Uttar Pradesh Study sample
Male 0.52 0.53 0.53
Female 0.48 0.47 0.47
Sex ratio 1.08 1.12 1.12
Children 0-6 0.12 0.14 0.09
Scheduled Castes 0.20 0.22 0.45
Literacy rate 0.78 0.69 0.46
Note: The table describes the slum population in India (column 1), Uttar Pradesh (column 2) and the study sample (column 3). All rows
denote the share of the population with each characteristic, except for the sex ratio and the literacy rate. The source of data for the first
and second column is the Indian Slum Population Census of 2011.
TABLE 3.10: Distribution of selected CTs and households, by treatment arm
and city
Control External push Push + Campaing Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. CTs
Total (%) 40(36.36) 35 (31.82) 35 (31.82) 110 (100)
- Lucknow (%) 19 (36.54) 17 (32.69) 16 (30.77) 52 (100)
-Kanpur (%) 21 (36.21) 18 (31.03) 19 (32.76) 58 (100)
B. Households
Total (%) 576 (36.57) 487 (30.92) 512 (32.51) 1,575 (100)
-Lucknow (%) 255 (35.47) 225 (31.29) 239 (33.24) 719 (100)
-Kanpur (%) 321 (37.5) 262 (30.61) 273 (31.89) 856 (100)
Notes. This table presents the distribution of selected CTs (panel A) and households (panel B) by treatment
arm and city.
TABLE 3.11: Attrition across rounds of household panel survey
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rapid assessment Midline Endline Total
Baseline 9% 19% 14% 1,575
Rapid assessment 17% 12% 1,532
Midline 9% 1,586
Endline 1,772
Note: The table shows the attrition rate across different household survey rounds. Row (1) shows the attrition rate with respect to the
baseline survey. Rows (2)-(4) shows the attrition rate with respect to the rapid assessment and midline surveys, respectively. Column
presents the total number of households surveyed in each survey round, including replacements.
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3.6.2 Measurements
TABLE 3.12: Variable definition
Variable name Definition
Household:
Attitudes towards CTs: WASH Dummy =1 if likes water, sanitation and hygiene facilities in CT
Attitudes towards CTs: Clean Dummy =1 if likes cleanliness of CT
Attitudes towards CTs: Infrastructure Dummy =1 if likes infrastructure of the CT
Attitudes towards CTs: Safe Dummy =1 if likes safety of the CT
Expectations: Illness OD vs. CT Difference in % adults or children expected to get ill
if everybody practices OD vs. using CT
Expectations: Illness dirty vs. clean CT Difference in % adults or children expected to get ill
if everybody practices uses a dirty CT vs. a clean CT
Awareness of OD health risks: private Dummy=1 if mentions OD can affect health of their own family
Awareness of OD health risks: public Dummy=1 if mentions OD can affect health of their community
Willingness to pay Amount of cash that respondent prefers instead of ticket to use CT
Demand for public intervention: CT dirty Dummy = 1 if reports CT dirty as most pressing policy issue
Demand for public intervention: OD Dummy = 1 if reports open defecation as most pressing policy issue
Demand for public intervention: Child ill Dummy = 1 if reports child illness as most pressing policy issue
Demand for public intervention: No water Dummy = 1 if reports lack of water as most pressing policy issue
Demand for public intervention: Other issues Dummy = 1 if reports other issues as most pressing policy issue
OD Dummy =1 if at least 1 member (above 5y) practiced
open defecation during last episode
CT use Dummy =1 if all HH members (above 5y) used
CT during last episode
Latrine Dummy =1 if reports having functional latrine
Handwash Dummy =1 if respondent reports (and spouse) washing
hands with soap during last episode
Community Toilet:
Bacteria Number of bacteria species
% Collect fees % time caretaker allocates to collect fees
% Clean % time caretaker allocates to clean and supervise cleaner
% Repairs % time caretaker allocates to conduct repairs
% Manager % time caretaker allocates to deal with the manager
% Leisure % time caretaker allocates to socialize and rest
CT use Total number of users counted in the tally at dawn
% Pay % users that pay in the tally at dawn
Indexes
Dirty compound Index of dirtiness in CT compound
Dirty cubicles Index of dirtiness in CT female and male cubicles
Bad infrastructure Index of bad CT infrastructure quality
Negative attitudes to pay Index of negative attitudes towards paying the fee to use the CT
We construct our outcome indexes using principal components analysis. We use all principal
components for each family of outcomes. The index is standardized to range between 0 and
1. Below we report a list of variables contained in each index, denoting whether the variable
enters the index with a positive or negative sign. The individual variables and their loading
factors are shown below.
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TABLE 3.13: HH index construction
Index family Sign 1st component’s loading
Negative attitudes to pay 0.262
Why do you think the community toilet charges a fee to use it? +
To pay for services (lighting, honey sucker, etc.) in CT -
To pay for caretaker and/or cleaner salaries -
To fill CT managers’ pockets +
To fill the government’s pockets +
Who do you think should be paying for the
operation and maintenance of the community toilet? + 0.427




Do you think the community toilet should charge a fee for usage? + 0.599
Yes, for everybody -
Yes, but free for some people +
No, it should be free for everybody +
Do you think people are justified to pay
less or not pay for the CT if the government
increases funds for maintaining the CT in good shape? + 0.582
No, fees are still needed to keep CT clean and running -
If government gives funds, people should pay less +
If government gives funds, CT should be free +
What would you prefer: 0.225
Paying community toilet fees and having a clean toilet -
Paying half price, but having a not so clean toilet +
Not paying fee and having a dirty toilet +
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TABLE 3.14: CT index construction
Index family Sign 1st component’s loading
Bad infrastructure
At least one latrine not functioning + 0.297
At least one door not functioning + 0.344
At least one lock not functioning + 0.325
Rudimentary walls + 0.246
Poor painting + 0.207












Hand-washing facilities available for both genders - 0.307
Soap available and visible for both genders - 0.295
Dirty compound
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TABLE 3.15: CT index construction (continuation)
Index family Sign 1st component’s loading
Dirty cubicle
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3.6.3 Balance and attrition
TABLE 3.16: Baseline households’ and CTs’ characteristics balanced across
treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control Treatments Supply-side Supply-side+Info Joint test (4)-(5)
Mean Diff. Diff. Diff. p-value
Household:
Like CT (items) 1.710 -0.094 -0.156 -0.036 0.495
[1.392] (0.122) (0.140) (0.135)
Knowledge: OD private health risk 0.712 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.445
[0.453] (0.029) (0.034) (0.035)
Knowledge: OD public health risk 0.651 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 0.964
[0.477] (0.033) (0.039) (0.039)
Illness OD vs. CT (adult) 0.604 0.028 0.015 0.040 0.392
[0.389] (0.026) (0.030) (0.029)
Illness OD vs. CT (child) 0.626 0.015 0.011 0.019 0.768
[0.366] (0.024) (0.031) (0.027)
Illness dirty vs. clean CT (adult) 0.723 -0.016 -0.014 -0.018 0.763
[0.334] (0.022) (0.025) (0.027)
Illness dirty vs. clean CT (child) 0.687 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.969
[0.378] (0.023) (0.026) (0.026)
WTP for CT use (men) 1.476 -0.025 0.142 -0.187 0.420
[2.043] (0.173) (0.203) (0.220)
WTP for CT use (women) 1.367 -0.037 -0.135 0.054 0.622
[2.020] (0.153) (0.166) (0.208)
Price to use CT (men) 4.398 0.059 0.032 0.084 0.811
[1.298] (0.145) (0.171) (0.145)
Price ot use CT (women) 3.160 0.212 0.263 0.164 0.625
[1.846] (0.254) (0.271) (0.308)
Open defecation 0.321 -0.028 0.022 -0.075 0.199
[0.467] (0.051) (0.060) (0.056)
Always uses CT 0.224 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 0.970
[0.417] (0.028) (0.034) (0.031)
Private latrine 0.071 0.014 0.011 0.017 0.706
[0.257] (0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
Hand-wash w/ soap 0.929 0.001 0.018 -0.015 0.222
[0.257] (0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
Community Toilet:
Users (observed) 37.410 -2.251 -1.501 -2.938 0.587
[13.331] (2.600) (3.195) (2.844)
% users paying (observed) 0.672 -0.046 -0.078 -0.016 0.472
[0.304] (0.058) (0.068) (0.064)
Bacteria 3.551 0.072 0.085 0.060 0.784
[0.503] (0.105) (0.130) (0.122)
Dirty compound 0.342 -0.014 -0.034 0.003 0.711
[0.219] (0.043) (0.050) (0.048)
Dirty cubicles 0.512 -0.002 0.021 -0.024 0.528
[0.171] (0.034) (0.037) (0.042)
Bad infrastructure 0.826 0.019 0.046 -0.005 0.189
[0.210] (0.038) (0.035) (0.048)
Notes. Column (1) reports sample mean and standard deviation in brackets for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference with the
control group with all treatment groups pooled together using an OLS regression of the correspondent outcome on the treatment indicator.
Columns (3)-(4) report the difference with the control group for each treatment group. Standard errors clustered at slum level are reported
in parentheses. Column (5) present a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy. Statistical significance denoted
by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 3.17: Attrition balanced across treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Treatments -0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Willigness-to-pay (HH mean) -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Open defecation 0.00 0.08
(0.03) (0.06)
Willigness-to-pay (HH mean) x Treatments -0.00
(0.02)
Open defecation x Treatments -0.12
(0.07)
Attrition rate 0.29
Community 110 110 110
CT-round 1,575 1,575 1,575
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the household dropped from at least one of the three follow-up survey
rounds (rapid assessment, midline, endline) and zero otherwise. All specifications control for strata variables (managed by main provider
and city) and cluster the standard errors at the slum level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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FIGURE 3.8: Share paying to use the CT, by CT dirtiness
Note: Data collected in the Baseline household and community toilet surveys. The x-axis shows the dirtiness index ranging
from 0 to 1 and the y-axis the share of users paying to use the CT. The blue line shows the quadratic fit, the gray area the
confidence intervals and the green dots the open defecation share for every dirtiness index bin.
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3.6.4 Implementation Fidelity
TABLE 3.18: Households exposed to the information campaign recall it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any means Message Visit Community Posters
Panel A: Shorter-run
Supply push 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (.)
Supply push + Campaign 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.19*** 0.10** 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (.)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.06 .
Mean (control) 0.85 0.79 0.40 0.65 0.00
Obs-round 1,532 1,532 1,532 1,532 1,532
Slums 110 110 110 110 110
Panel B: Longer-run
Supply push 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Supply push + Campaign 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.05** 0.16***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.03 0.01 0.69 0.31 0.00
Mean (control) 0.59 0.47 0.17 0.17 0.33
Obs-round 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Slums 110 110 110 110 110
Notes. Sample includes all follow-up rounds of the panel household survey. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables
as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by *p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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3.6.5 Multiple Hypothesis Testing
TABLE 3.19: Treatment effects on the quality of CTs
Hypo Coef Pvalue Adjpvalue
Panel A: Shorter-run
1 -0.14 0.10 0.50
2 -0.14 0.14 0.54
3 -0.04 0.25 0.55
4 -0.04 0.16 0.52
5 -0.02 0.59 0.83
6 -0.04 0.13 0.58
7 -0.02 0.71 0.71
8 -0.05 0.24 0.62
Panel B: Longer-run
1 0.02 0.79 0.79
2 0.12 0.13 0.55
3 -0.02 0.29 0.82
4 -0.01 0.67 0.95
5 -0.06 0.09 0.47
6 -0.01 0.79 0.96
7 -0.03 0.44 0.89
8 -0.04 0.38 0.87
Note: Odd rows show the hypothesis of the "Supply push" treatment arm and even of the "Supply push + Campaign" treatment arm. Rows
(1) and (2) have "Bacteria" as the outcome, rows (3) and (4) "Dirty compound", rows (5) and (6) "Dirty cubicle" and rows (7) and (8)
"Bad infrastructure".
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TABLE 3.20: Treatment effects on attitudes towards CTs
Hypo Coef Pvalue Adj-pvalue
Panel A: Shorter-run
1 0.02 0.65 0.98
2 -0.09 0.09 0.42
3 0.01 0.77 0.94
4 -0.00 0.97 0.97
5 0.08 0.06 0.32
6 0.01 0.74 0.98
7 0.03 0.57 0.99
8 -0.02 0.58 0.98
Panel B: Longer-run
1 0.00 0.92 0.92
2 -0.01 0.91 1.00
3 -0.01 0.70 0.98
4 -0.02 0.59 0.98
5 0.01 0.68 0.99
6 0.03 0.18 0.67
7 0.02 0.47 0.96
8 -0.00 0.92 0.99
Note: Odd rows show the hypothesis of the "Supply push" treatment arm and even of the "Supply push + Campaign" treatment arm. Rows
(1) and (2) have the CT characteristics "WASH" as the outcome, rows (3) and (4) "Clean", rows (5) and (6) "Infrastucture" and rows (7)
and (8) "Safe".
TABLE 3.21: Treatment effects on WTP and ATP
Hypo Coef Pvalue Adj-pvalue
1 0.09 0.43 0.64
2 -0.06 0.55 0.55
3 0.04 0.01 0.07
4 0.02 0.23 0.54
5 0.06 0.10 0.44
6 0.05 0.13 0.41
7 -0.08 0.06 0.34
8 -0.07 0.11 0.42
Note: Odd rows show the hypothesis of the "Supply push" treatment arm and even of the "Supply push + Campaign" treatment arm. Rows
(1) and (2) have "Willigness to pay" as the outcome, rows (3) and (4) "Attitude to pay", rows (5) and (6) "Demand for public intervention
in CTs" and rows (7) and (8) "Demand for public intervention in OD".
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TABLE 3.22: Treatment effects on sanitation behaviour (reported)
Hypo Coef Pvalue Adj-pvalue
Panel A: Shorter-run
1 -0.03 0.64 0.93
2 -0.08 0.17 0.64
3 0.01 0.86 0.98
4 0.01 0.88 0.88
5 -0.01 0.37 0.77
6 0.03 0.22 0.62
7 0.04 0.02 0.15
8 0.02 0.19 0.65
Panel B: Longer-run
1 0.03 0.68 0.96
2 0.02 0.74 0.93
3 -0.02 0.67 0.98
4 -0.04 0.26 0.81
5 -0.02 0.24 0.82
6 0.00 0.94 0.94
7 0.01 0.60 0.98
8 0.01 0.38 0.91
Note: Odd rows show the hypothesis of the "Supply push" treatment arm and even of the "Supply push + Campaign" treatment arm. Rows
(1) and (2) have "CT use" as the outcome, rows (3) and (4) "Open defecation", rows (5) and (6) "Has a toilet" and rows (7) and (8)
"Hand-washing with soap".
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TABLE 3.23: Treatment effects on expectations and awareness of health risks
Hypo Coef Pvalue Adj-pvalue
Panel A: Shorter-run
1 -0.01 0.74 0.98
2 0.00 0.88 0.99
3 0.21 0.23 0.87
4 0.08 0.45 0.98
5 -0.12 0.20 0.83
6 -0.09 0.15 0.76
7 0.09 0.27 0.90
8 0.12 0.06 0.45
9 -0.02 0.47 0.97
10 -0.02 0.61 0.97
11 -0.00 0.99 0.99
12 -0.03 0.47 0.95
Panel B: Longer-run
1 0.01 0.77 0.96
2 0.02 0.14 0.62
3 -0.00 0.83 0.96
4 0.01 0.71 0.98
5 0.00 0.89 0.89
6 0.03 0.08 0.44
7 0.01 0.67 0.98
8 0.01 0.55 0.95
9 0.02 0.40 0.94
10 0.08 0.01 0.05
11 0.02 0.53 0.97
12 -0.03 0.31 0.89
Note: Odd rows show the hypothesis of the "Supply push" treatment arm and even of the "Supply push + Campaign" treatment arm. Rows
(1) and (2) have "Illness OD vs. CT - Adults" as the outcome, rows (3) and (4) "Illness OD vs. CT - children", rows (5) and (6) "Illness
dirty vs. clean CT - adults" and rows (7) and (8) "Illness dirty vs. clean CT - children", rows (9) and (10) "Public health risks" and rows
(11) and (12) "Private health risks".
Chapter 3. Challenges to Promoting Demand for Shared Infrastructure: Experimental
Evidence from Slums in India
122
3.6.6 ANCOVA
TABLE 3.24: Treatment effects on the quality of CTs (ANCOVA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bacteria Dirty compound Dirty cubicle Bad infrastructure
Panel A: Shorter-run
Supply push -0.15* -0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Supply push + Campaign -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
(0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.89 0.51 0.12 0.31
Mean (Control) 3.07 0.23 0.46 0.27
Obs-round 217 213 213 213
Community 109 108 108 108
Panel B: Longer-run
Supply push 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Supply push + Campaign 0.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.04
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.21 0.94 0.26 0.67
Mean (Control) 3.07 0.23 0.45 0.28
Obs-round 318 315 315 315
Community 109 107 107 107
Notes. Analysis at the community toilet level. Sample in Panel A includes follow up 1 (2 months after Baseline) and follow-up 2 (4 months
after Baseline), right after the Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel
B includes the remaining follow-up rounds of the community toilet panel survey: Follow-up 3 (6 months after Baseline), Follow-up 4 (8
months after Baseline) and Endline (more than 1 year after Baseline). All specifications include round dummies and strata variables
as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard errors clustered by slum in parenthesis to deal with serial correlation.
Statistical significance denoted by * p<0.1 , ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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TABLE 3.25: Treatment effects on attitudes towards CTs (ANCOVA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WASH Clean Infrastructure Safe
Panel A: Shorter-run
Supply push 0.02 0.01 0.07* 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Supply push + Campaign -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.07 0.93 0.26 0.47
Mean (control) 0.52 0.42 0.20 0.30
Obs-round 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434
Slums 110 110 110 110
Panel B: Longer-run
Supply push -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Supply push + Campaign -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.86 0.83 0.50 0.49
Mean (control) 0.54 0.36 0.13 0.16
Obs-round 2,622 2,622 2,622 2,622
Slums 109 109 109 109
Notes. Analysis at the household level. Sample in Panel A includes the Rapid Assessment round of the household panel survey, after the
Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel B includes the Midline and
Endline rounds. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider.
Standard errors clustered by slum in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Supply push + Campaign -0.25**
(0.13)







Supply push + Campaign -0.04
(0.11)




Notes. Sample in Panel A includes only the Rapid Assessment follow-up round of the panel household survey and Panel B the Midline and
Endline. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Columns (1)
and (2) additionally control for gender. Standard errors clustered by slum in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 3.27: Treatment effects on sanitation behaviour (ANCOVA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CT use % Pay OD CT use Latrine Use soap
Panel A: Shorter-run
Supply push -6.72* 0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.04***
(3.57) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Supply push + Campaign 0.16 0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02
(3.81) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.06 0.83 0.77 0.89 0.02 0.01
Mean (Control) 3.07 0.23 0.28 0.66 0.05 0.05
Obs-round 214 214 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434
Community 108 108 110 110 110 110
Panel B: Longer-run
Supply push -0.56 0.08* 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
(1.82) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Supply push + Campaign -0.80 0.10** 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.02
(1.60) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
SS = SS + C [p-value] 0.89 0.59 0.88 0.44 0.26 0.33
Mean (Control) 3.07 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.10 0.10
Obs-round 314 314 2,622 2,622 2,622 2,622
Community 107 107 109 109 109 109
Notes. Analysis at the community toilet level for columns (1) and (2), where the outcomes correspond to a tally of the number of users
and those that pay in a random day at dawn (when the CT has the highest traffic). For the CT-level analysis, Sample in Panel A includes
follow up 1 (2 months after) and follow-up 2 (4 months after), right after the Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of
the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel B includes the remaining follow-up rounds of the community toilet panel survey. Analysis
at the household level for columns (3) to (6), where the outcomes correspond to self-reports. The first outcome is an indicator of whether at
least one household members practices open defecation the last time he/she defecated (column 3); the second outcome indicates whether
all household members always use the community toilet to defecate (column 4); the third outcome indicates whether the household owns
a private latrine (column 5) and the last outcome is an indicator of whether the respondent and its partner, usually the household head
and spouse, washed their hands with soap the last time they washed their hands (column 6). For the household level analysis, sample in
Panel A includes only the Rapid Assessment follow-up round of the panel household survey and in Panel B, the Midline and Endline survey
rounds. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard
errors clustered by slum in parenthesis to deal with serial correlation. Statistical significance denoted by * p<0.1 , ** p<0.05, and ***
p<0.01.
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3.6.7 Merged Treatments
TABLE 3.29: Treatment effects on the quality of CTs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bacteria Dirty compound Dirty cubicle Bad infrastructure
Panel A: Shorter-run
Merged treatments -0.14* -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
(0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Mean (control) 3.81 0.35 0.64 0.27
Obs-round 219 217 217 217
Slums 111 111 111 111
Panel B: Longer-run
Merged treatments 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Mean (control) 3.07 0.23 0.46 0.27
Obs-round 325 325 325 325
Slums 111 111 111 111
Notes. Analysis at the community toilet level. Sample in Panel A includes follow up 1 (2 months after Baseline) and follow-up 2 (4 months
after Baseline), right after the Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel
B includes the remaining follow-up rounds of the community toilet panel survey: Follow-up 3 (6 months after Baseline), Follow-up 4 (8
months after Baseline) and Endline (more than 1 year after Baseline). All specifications include round dummies and strata variables
as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard errors clustered by slum in parenthesis to deal with serial correlation.
Statistical significance denoted by * p<0.1 , ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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TABLE 3.30: Treatment effects on attitudes towards CTs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WASH Clean Infrastructure Safe
Panel A: Shorter-run
Merged treatments -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Mean (control) 0.52 0.42 0.20 0.31
Obs-round 1,532 1,532 1,532 1,532
Slums 110 110 110 110
Panel B: Longer-run
Merged treatments -0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean (control) 0.53 0.35 0.13 0.17
Obs-round 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Slums 110 110 110 110
Notes. Analysis at the household level. Sample in Panel A includes the Rapid Assessment round of the household panel survey, after the
Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel B includes the Midline and
Endline rounds. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider.
Standard errors clustered by slum in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.















Notes. Sample in Panel A includes only the Rapid Assessment follow-up round of the panel household survey and Panel B the Midline and
Endline. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Columns (1)
and (2) additionally control for gender. Standard errors clustered by slum in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 3.32: Treatment effects on sanitation behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CT use % Pay OD CT use Latrine Use soap
Panel A: Shorter-run
Merged treatments -3.43 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03**
(3.28) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Mean (Control) 30.08 0.55 0.28 0.66 0.05 0.95
Obs-round 218 218 1,532 1,532 1,532 1,532
Community 111 111 110 110 110 110
Panel B: Longer-run
Merged treatments -0.50 0.09** 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.01
(1.48) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Mean (Control) 30.08 0.55 0.28 0.33 0.10 0.95
Obs-round 324 324 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Community 111 111 110 110 110 110
Notes. Analysis at the community toilet level for columns (1) and (2), where the outcomes correspond to a tally of the number of users
and those that pay in a random day at dawn (when the CT has the highest traffic). For the CT-level analysis, Sample in Panel A includes
follow up 1 (2 months after) and follow-up 2 (4 months after), right after the Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment of
the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel B includes the remaining follow-up rounds of the community toilet panel survey. Analysis
at the household level for columns (3) to (6), where the outcomes correspond to self-reports. The first outcome is an indicator of whether at
least one household members practices open defecation the last time he/she defecated (column 3); the second outcome indicates whether
all household members always use the community toilet to defecate (column 4); the third outcome indicates whether the household owns
a private latrine (column 5) and the last outcome is an indicator of whether the respondent and its partner, usually the household head
and spouse, washed their hands with soap the last time they washed their hands (column 6). For the household level analysis, sample in
Panel A includes only the Rapid Assessment follow-up round of the panel household survey and in Panel B, the Midline and Endline survey
rounds. All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard
errors clustered by slum in parenthesis to deal with serial correlation. Statistical significance denoted by * p<0.1 , ** p<0.05, and ***
p<0.01.
Chapter 3. Challenges to Promoting Demand for Shared Infrastructure: Experimental
Evidence from Slums in India
130
TABLE 3.33: Heterogeneous treatment effects on WTP, ATP and demand for
public intervention, by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WTP Negative ATP Public int - CT
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Merged treatments -0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.04**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Mean (control) 1.28 1.02 0.38 0.43 0.06 0.05
Obs-round 111.00 111.00 110.00 110.00 110.00 110.00
Slums 4,234 4,574 1,635 1,666 1,580 1,580
Notes. Analysis at the individual level for columns (1) and (2) and household level for columns (3) to (5). Sample in column (1)-(2)
include all rounds, columns (3)-(4) only Endline and columns (5)(6) Endline follow-up rounds. The attitudes towards paying the fees were
measured only during the Endline follow-up survey and the demand for public interventionw as measured only during the Midline survey.
All specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard errors
clustered by slum in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
TABLE 3.34: Heterogeneous treatment effects on sanitation behaviour, by
gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CT use % Pay
Men Women Men Women
Panel A: Shorter-run
Merged treatments -1.74 -1.69 0.05 0.02
(1.85) (1.92) (0.05) (0.07)
Mean (control) 25.18 18.65 0.78 0.43
Obs-round 218 218 218 218
Slums 111 111 111 111
Panel B: Longer-run
Merged treatments -0.97 0.46 0.11** 0.10*
(1.03) (0.66) (0.04) (0.06)
Mean (control) 19.17 10.90 0.66 0.36
Obs-round 324 324 324 324
Slums 111 111 111 111
Notes. Analysis at the community toilet level for columns (1) and (2), where the outcomes correspond to a tally of the number of users
and those that pay in a random day at dawn (when the CT has the highest traffic). For the CT-level analysis, Sample in Panel A includes
follow up 1 (2 months after) and follow-up 2 (4 months after), right after the Grant Scheme was provided and before the first payment
of the Financial Reward Scheme. Sample in Panel B includes the remaining follow-up rounds of the community toilet panel survey. All
specifications include round dummies and strata variables as control: (i) city and (ii) managed by main provider. Standard errors clustered
by slum in parenthesis to deal with serial correlation. Statistical significance denoted by * p<0.1 , ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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Running the Last Mile: Sewerage
Connectivity Density and Child Height
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Abstract
Stunting is widely recognised as major impediment to human capital development. In this
study, I contribute to the understanding of key drivers of international child height disparities.
Specifically, I examine the role of the sanitation environment, defined as the density of the
local adoption of sewerage systems. I present three complementary analyses: (i) a cross-
country analysis among low- and middle-income countries; (ii) a within-country analysis
in Latin America; and (ii) an over-time analysis in Peru. In the latter analysis, I rely on an
instrumental variable strategy, making use of the average two-year lag connectivity density of
adjacent districts. Using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), complemented by census
and spatial data, the three separate analyses represent different points in a trade-off between
external and internal validity. I find that sewerage connectivity density is robustly associated
with higher child height across the three different strategies. The mechanisms behind this
result are a safer disease environment and greater parental investment in nutrition.
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4.1 Introduction
Physical height has been widely recognised as an important measure of human capital. There
is evidence that impaired growth during the early years is associated with lower cognitive
ability, educational attainment and adult productivity, as well as a greater risk of adult chron-
ical health impediments (Case et al., 2002; Case and Paxson, 2010; Grantham-McGregor
et al., 2007; Currie and Vogl, 2013). Child height has been increasing over recent decades
in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), but two out of ten children in these countries
are still estimated to be stunted —i.e. too short for their age (World Bank, 2020).
It is generally understood that an inadequate diet and a disease environment are impor-
tant immediate causes of low mean height (Bozzoli et al., 2009; Smith and Haddad, 2015;
Deaton and Drèze, 2009). Deaton (2007)’s thesis claims that the contribution of genetics
and maternal influence on height is much smaller when analysing the variation in mean
height across countries with different environmental risks. However, knowledge is still lim-
ited with respect to the key drivers affecting these mediating factors. Although research has
documented links between the adoption of sanitation facilities and a disease environment in
historical populations (Cutler and Miller, 2005; Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal, 2017; Alsan
and Goldin, 2019), few have explored the role of sanitation in explaining the international
heterogeneity in height in LMICs today. In these countries, there is great variation in the
sanitation environment, which can be a key determinant of human capital beyond income.
Pathogens from faeces cause infectious diseases that consume energy and impair the phys-
ical growth of young children (Guerrant et al., 1992; Humphrey, 2009) as well as of the
mothers who nurture them in pregnancy and early life (Behrman et al., 2009; Prendergast
et al., 2014).
Achieving safe sanitation environments in LMICs is, however, not a trivial task. It de-
pends on three key factors: the adoption level, the population density and the quality of the
sanitation solution. First, even when infrastructure is available, adoption levels are far from
universal. This has been recognised as one of the main reasons that interventions entailing
the construction of latrines have no effect on the disease environment (Patil et al., 2014;
Clasen et al., 2014; Gertler et al., 2015). With open defecation as a natural alternative, the
adoption of sanitation facilities not only protects individual families from faecal pathogens,
but also entails positive health externalities for neighbouring families. Therefore, the aver-
age cost of sanitation infrastructure is less than the total social benefits, but frequently greater
than the private willingness to pay (Ashraf et al., 2016).
Second, high population density, a common feature of cities and town in LMICs, im-
poses additional health challenges, given that people living closer together are more likely
to encounter their neighbours’ germs. In addition, the available infrastructure in LMICs’
overcrowded cities is stressed beyond capacity and fails to protect citizens from infectious
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diseases (Hathi et al., 2017; Marx et al., 2013).
Third, the quality of the sanitation facility denotes the extent to which it can improve
the disease environment. The Joint Monitoring Program WHO-UNICEF (2017) classifies
sewerage infrastructure as one that can safely remove excreta away from human contact.
Yet, most of the evidence regarding the effectiveness of sanitation facilities in improving
child health comes from the adoption of rudimentary on-site latrines, where the status-quo
is the practice of open defecation (Spears, 2020; Geruso and Spears, 2018; Augsburg and
Rodríguez-Lesmes, 2018). Understanding these key factors and their link with human capital
is thus of utmost importance for the development agenda.
In this paper, I aim to bring together these three factors by exploring the relationship
between child height and the local connectivity density of sewerage: the interaction between
the local share of households connected to sewerage and the population density. I present
three complementary analyses. The first is a cross-country analysis that establishes the broad
importance of sewerage connectivity density for predicting child height in LMICs. For this
analysis, I construct a new international dataset from 89 Demographic and Health Surveys
(hereafter, DHS) collected in 52 countries between 1991 and 2015, and match it to country-
level population density data.
The second provides further evidence of this relationship. I focus specifically on Latin
American countries because: (i) they have lower levels of connectivity relative to other coun-
tries with a similar income level, so this region is a special case in which economic devel-
opment is not accompanied by an improvement in disease environment; and (ii) there is
significant variation within countries both in child height and connectivity. I combine the
last rounds of the DHS for nine Latin American countries, with height measures for more
than 78,000 children surveyed between 1996 and 2015, and construct a fine-grained measure
of sewerage connectivity at the community level, using the primary sampling unit (PSU) as
proxy. I finally match the DHS to the country-level population density. This dataset allows
the measure of local connectivity density to be more precise than is possible in the interna-
tional dataset and to control for higher-resolution geographic fixed effects.
Finally, the third analysis supports the internal validity of the association of interest. For
this I focus on Peru, one of the special cases in Latin America where the recent economic
development has not been followed by greater adoption of a basic good such as sewerage and
has left 14 per cent of children under the age of five stunted (World Bank, 2020). I construct
a pooled cross-sectional dataset of more than 86,000 children surveyed between 2007 and
2015 living in 1,383 districts. I match this dataset to district-level population density to
compute an even finer measure of local sewerage connectivity density by both PSU and
district. In this analysis, I attempt to improve the identification by using an instrumental
variable strategy. Relying on two census rounds and spatial data, I use as an instrument for
connectivity density the average two-year lag connectivity density of adjacent districts. The
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identification assumption is that adjacent connectivity density only affects a given district’s
child height through the district’s sewerage connectivity. I argue that the relevance of the
instrument occurs through a “keeping up with the Joneses” effect: trying to emulate or not
be outdone by the neighbours.
Across the analysis, I focus on three different types of heterogeneity. The first is age
in months. Height-for-age is well-understood to be correlated with age during the first few
months. A focus on younger ages has the advantage that the local environment recorded at
the time of the survey matches more closely the environment in younger children’s infancy
if sewerage connectivity density has been changing over time (Spears, 2020). Another ad-
vantage of focusing on younger children is that impaired growth has been proven to have
adverse functional consequences during the first 24 months of life (Prendergast et al., 2014).
A focus on older ages has the advantage that age is not mechanically correlated with height-
for-age. Furthermore, older children are more likely to be exposed to the environment given
their increased mobility (Buttenheim, 2008). Younger and older children also differ in their
nutritional patterns —i.e. breastfeeding for infants and solid food for children. Second, I
look at heterogeneity by gender. As height-for-age is affected by net nutrition (diseases and
nutritional intake), biological traits and social norms that systematically differ across the
genders may moderate the association between height and local sewerage connectivity. For
instance, evidence in India shows that improvements in the sanitation environment and socio-
economic status benefit girls’ more than boys’ anthropometrics (Augsburg and Rodríguez-
Lesmes, 2018; Duflo, 2003). Third, I look at heterogeneity by parity. Favouritism by birth
order may affect parents’ resource allocation across children. Evidence in India shows that
favouritism towards eldest sons generates a steep birth-order height gradient (Jayachandran
and Pande, 2017). Height disadvantage in girls (younger children) may decrease (increase)
if they are now (not) able to take advantage of the improvements in the local environment
and parents’ investment in health.
I show that sewerage connectivity density positively predicts children’s height-for-age in
all three complementary strategies. This association remains robust when accounting for in-
come, child characteristics and maternal input. Notably, connectivity density increases child
height beyond the sewerage connectivity of the child’s household, which serves as evidence
of a positive externality. I find that a 10 per cent increase in the country-level sewerage con-
nectivity density predicts an average increase in the country’s average child height-for-age
of 1.4 standard deviation units. Within Latin American countries, I find that a 10 per cent
increase in the local-level sewerage connectivity density predicts an average increase in child
height-for-age of 0.4 standard deviation units. The association is concentrated at the bottom
of the height-for-age distribution, suggesting that stunted children benefit most from greater
connectivity density. I also show that improvements in the current sanitation environment
can affect child height beyond maternal inputs: the mother-child correlation is a function of
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connectivity density.
In Peru, I find that the association is stronger for children above six months of age —
the age when exclusive breastfeeding is not recommended anymore and children are in turn
more exposed to the environment through drinking water, food and soil. The association in
Peru is twice as strong for boys than for girls. Moreover, there is a non-linear relationship
between connectivity density and height: a greater magnitude of the association above the
middle of the connectivity distribution and declining at the top. Finally, the instrumental
variable strategy reveals that the estimated positive association can be interpreted as a causal
one. The two-stage least-square estimates reveal that a 10 per cent increase in the district-
level sewerage connectivity density increases child height by 1.4 standard deviation units,
on average. This increase is almost equivalent to the negative deviation in height from the
WHO reference category in districts with no sewerage connectivity. I also find that the effect
is driven by the oldest group of children aged 25 to 59 months. The results also reveal that
the increase in child height is accompanied by a decrease in the mortality of children under
the age of five, which suggests that the effects on height are underestimated if the probability
of survival increases for potentially shorter children.
The mechanisms behind the findings are twofold. First, the local sanitation environ-
ment apparently improved with greater sewerage connectivity density, reducing the burden
of diseases (other than diarrhoea, such as enteric diseases) that affect nutritional status in
the short-run. Second, there was a change in parental investment, particularly that affecting
nutritional intake. While infants below six months of age were less likely to be exclusively
breastfed, dietary diversity was greater for those children in communities with greater con-
nectivity density. These mechanisms explain why the positive association between sewerage
density and child height is concentrated in older children —those that eat food and are more
mobile outdoors.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on economics, human capital,
and health. First, it contributes to the literature exploring the drivers of international dis-
parities in human capital, specifically height (Deaton, 2007; Bozzoli et al., 2009; Deaton
and Drèze, 2009; Jayachandran and Pande, 2017; Spears, 2020). It proposes and analyses
a hypothesis to resolve an important puzzle regarding international height disparities across
LMICs, which has attracted attention in the historical economics literature focused on ad-
vanced economies: the role of sewerage connectivity (Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal, 2017).
Second, it contributes to the literature focused on early-life human capital accumulation
(Cunha et al., 2010; Maluccio et al., 2009; Gertler et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2014) by
providing evidence on the determinants of child height. Height is a key variable in LMICs
because it captures early-life health: an important dimension of children’s human capital
(Currie, 2000; Currie and Vogl, 2013).
Third, by advancing evidence on the importance of sanitation adoption on a higher-rung
Chapter 4. Running the Last Mile: Sewerage Connectivity Density and Child Height 138
of the sanitation ladder and population density in LMICs, this paper contributes to the active
and growing literature on sanitation and child health. While a number of studies have been
able to rigorously show positive impacts of improved household sanitation (see for example
Duflo et al. (2015); Pickering at al. (2015); Dickinson et al. (2015); Cameron et al. (2019)),
many other recent randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have shown no health impacts (Patil
et al., 2014; Clasen et al., 2014; Gertler et al., 2015). As stated above, the nil effects in these
studies were possibly due to low levels of adoption. My study considers the impact of sani-
tation on child health, but instead of focusing on individual household sanitation ownership,
I concentrate on sanitation adoption at an aggregate level. Specifically, I measure sanitation
as the percentage of households connected to sewerage in the area of residence of a child
(henceforth sewerage connectivity).
Recent studies have turned their attention to linking sanitation at the aggregate level to
child health. The main motivation for this lies in the fact that household sanitation is un-
likely to improve health when it is not used and neighbours are still contaminating the envi-
ronment. Most relevant for the context of this study are Dickinson et al. (2015); Augsburg
and Rodríguez-Lesmes (2018); Cameron et al. (2019). Using a randomised-controlled trial,
Dickinson et al. (2015) estimates the effect of a community-led (known as CLTS) campaign
in India, and finds that village- rather than individual-level interventions aimed at ending
open defecation increased child height-for-age by 0.37–0.52 standard deviations. In con-
trast, Cameron et al. (2019) finds that a similar intervention in Indonesia had no effect on
child height, which was attributable to the modest increase in the rate of latrine construction
and adoption. Other studies that have achieved a greater first-stage, in the sense of greater
adoption of latrines, show a better picture. Augsburg and Rodríguez-Lesmes (2018) find
that a 10 percentage point increase in latrine adoption translates into an approximately 0.7
centimetre increase in height at age four. They exploit the village-level variation in sani-
tation investment prices, which determines the marginal cost of this investment, to induce
exogenous variation in the sanitation environment. In a systematic review of field experi-
ments, Spears (2020) shows that the positive effect of reducing village-level open defecation
on height ranges between 0.3 and 0.55 standard deviation units. However, all of the stud-
ies in this literature stream have focused only on the eradication of open defecation and the
adoption of on-site rudimentary latrines.
My study fills a gap in this literature by placing the analysis in the jump from on-site
sanitation to sewerage systems. Finally, by moving beyond dichotomous rural and urban
distinctions, this study explores the extent to which sanitation adoption interacts with popu-
lation density to predict health (Hathi et al., 2017).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data used in the three com-
plementary analyses. Section 4.3 presents the cross-country evidence from the 52 LMICs,
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Section 4.4 presents the within-country evidence of nine Latin American countries and Sec-
tion 4.5 expands the analysis for Peru. Section 4.6 discusses the conclusions of the study.
4.2 Data
In this study, I compile data from several sources, including the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and census and spatial
data. I match and combine these data to compute indicators at the country, district, PSU and
individual level.
For the cross-country analysis, I use all of the DHS that have ever collected data on child
height and sewerage connectivity. These surveys are from 52 LMICs and the years spanning
1991-2015, a total of 89 DHS rounds. I use the country-level estimates for average child
height and sewerage connectivity provided by the DHS’s Statcompiler. Additionally, I use
publicly available country year data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
on GDP per capita (PPP adjusted international dollars) and population density (people per
sq. km of land area).
For the within-country analysis in Latin America, I use the latest round of DHS available
for nine Latin American countries: Bolivia (2008), Colombia (2010), Dominican Republic
(2013), Guatemala (2015), Guyana (2009), Haiti (2012), Honduras (2012), Nicaragua (2001)
and Peru (2015). I construct a pooled cross-section of 78,117 children surveyed under the
age of five, born between 1996 and 2015 and living in 11,613 PSUs . I match this dataset
to country-level population density data (people per sq. km of land area) in the year of the
survey obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
For the analysis in Peru, I use all of the annual DHS rounds measuring child height and
access to sanitation facilities, spanning 2007-2015. I construct a pooled cross-section of
86,845 children under the age of five, born between 2000 and 2015, living in 9,376 PSU and
1,383 districts. I match these data to spatial data measuring district-level population density.
I compute a measure of the population density at the district level using population fore-
casts provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI for its Spanish
acronyms) and district boundaries provided by the Ministry of Environment of Peru. To do
so, I rely on a polygon overlay technique to compute yearly population by square kilometre
of land for each Peruvian district. I match the DHS height data to the 2005 and 2007 Peru-
vian Censuses, which contain the share of households connected to sewerage in each district.
Finally, I match the district-level mortality rates computed using vital statistics reports pro-
vided by the Ministry of Health of Peru.
The key dependent variable in this study is the height-for-age z-scores. The DHS pro-
vides height-for-age z-scores for children under the age of five obtained from the WHO’s
2006 standardised age- and sex- specific growth reference group. This captures how short
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a given child is relative to the age- and sex-adjusted WHO reference group. The WHO ref-
erence group was formed through a population-based study that took place in the cities of
Davis, California, USA; Muscat, Oman; Oslo, Norway; and Pelotas, Brazil; and in selected
affluent neighbourhoods of Accra, Ghana and South Delhi, India between July 1997 and
December 2003 (World Health Organisation, 2006). A caveat of using this reference group
to determine impaired growth is that it may not be representative of the average height-for-
age of affluent populations in LMICs. Because stunting indicators are sensitive to particular
cut-offs, I use the mean height-for-age z-score for the cross-country analysis and the child-
level height-for-age z-scores for the within-country analysis in Latin America and Peru. I
also use mortality as an additional measure of child health. For the analysis in Peru at the
district-level, I rely on vital statistics from which I compute the infant and under-five dis-
trict mortality rate per 1,000 infants and children under-fives, respectively, as described in
Chapter 1. Infant mortality data is also available in the DHS, but I do not use this source for
two reasons. First, infant mortality is measured in the DHS as an indicator of children dying
during the first year for every live birth that occurred at least one year before the date of the
survey and no more than five years before the date of the survey. Thus, this measure of infant
mortality may be affected by the sanitation environment not only of the survey year, but also
of the previous five years. Second, infant mortality in the DHS is a low probability binary
outcome, which poses power challenges.
The key independent variable used in this study is sewerage connectivity density. The
DHS provides information on the sanitation facility typically used by a household. Although
different categories of sanitation are used across countries and years, I use the broad classi-
fication of the Joint Monitoring Program WHO-UNICEF (2017) of sewerage connectivity:
toilet connected to the public sewers. The log of sewerage connectivity density is computed
as follows:
ln(local sewerage connectivity × population density + 1),
where local local sewerage connectivity is the computed share of [0, 1] of households con-
nected to sewerage in a child’s area (country, district or PSU) and population density is the
population by square kilometre of land in a child’s area (country or district). The sewerage
connectivity density variable is measured at the time of the survey, meaning that it best de-
scribes the disease environment faced in that specific year by the youngest child, born at a
time closest to the survey. Because the disease environment at the time of the survey may not
have been similar to that a few years earlier, when the child was born, I am able to analyse
the relationship between sewerage connectivity density and child height at different stages
of the child’s early life.
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4.2.1 Descriptive statistics
Three tables in the Appendix present descriptive statistics of the three main datasets that are
used for the analysis. First, Table 4.11 presents summary statistics of the sample of 52 LMICs
by global region. The average height-for-age among LMICs is -1.29 standard deviation units,
where children are taller in North-Africa/West-Asia/Europe (-0.94) and shorter in South and
South-East Asia (-1.71). On average, LMICs’ sewerage connectivity is 18 per cent and
the average sewerage connectivity density globally is 1.93 connected per sq. km. North-
Africa/West-Asia/Europe leads again (41 per cent connectivity and 3.36 connections per sq.
km.) and Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind (5 per cent connectivity and 0.87 connections per
sq. km).
Table 4.12 presents summary statistics of the study sample of Latin American countries.
The average height-for-age in Latin America is -1.08 standard deviation units, where children
are taller in the Dominican Republic (-0.29) and shorter in Guatemala (-1.89). Only 42 per
cent of households are connected to sewerage systems in Latin America on average, with
the Dominican Republic again leading (72 per cent), followed by Colombia (67 per cent)
and Haiti lagging behind dramatically (less than 1 per cent). Although Haiti has the highest
population density (371 people per square km), its average sewerage connectivity density
(based on PSU connectivity and country-level population density) is of course one of the
lowest in Latin America (0.23). Colombia and Peru, although fast growing large economies
in South America, have a sewerage connectivity density comparable to that of a relatively
poorer Central American country like Guatemala (lower than 3).
The table also shows that the average age in months is 29 across all countries. 33 per
cent of the sample corresponds to children aged between 6 and 24 months and 58 per cent
corresponds to children aged between 25 and 59 months. The remaining small share corre-
sponds to infants born during the last 5 months. Because the DHS measures the height of
the last children born to every women, only 30 per cent of the sample are first-borns and the
average birth order is around 3 for all countries.
There is also great variation across Latin American countries in terms of socio-economic
status. On average, the surveyed mothers had 7 years of education, with better educated
mothers in Peru and the Dominican Republic (10 years) and worse educated ones in Guatemala
and Haiti (5 years). Only 55 per cent of the households in Latin America use piped water
as the main source for drinking, ranging from 4 per cent in Haiti to more than 80 per cent
in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. Notably, only 10 per cent of households drink piped water
in the Dominican Republic, with the majority of households drinking bottled water (72 per
cent). Households in Latin America are concentrated in the lowest wealth quintiles, with
only 14 per cent located in the highest quintile (wealth quintile 5).
Finally, Table 4.13 presents summary statistics for Peru over time, specifically for the
years 2007, 2011 and 2015. Height-for-age increased over time in Peru, starting with -1.34
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standard deviation units up to -0.89. While the characteristics of the children in the sample
remained similar over time, mothers’ height and educational attainment improved. Between
2005 and 2015, there was also a great improvement in local sewerage connectivity density
(from 3.36 to 4.69 connections per sq. km). Both sewerage connectivity and population
density increased over time, but the increase was greater in the former. While there was no
change in the upper tail of the wealth distribution, by 2015 a larger percentage of households
were located in the first quintile and a smaller percentage in the second wealth quintile.
4.3 Evidence from 52 low- and middle-income countries
I start with the cross-country analysis, which reveals that countries’ sewerage connectivity
density is positively associated with child height, even after accounting for economic de-
velopment. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between average child height-for-age and the
share of households connected to sewerage per square kilometre for 52 low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs). The y-axis reveals that the average height-for-age in the LMICs
is always lower than that of advanced economies (all values are lower than zero). Each circle
corresponds to an LMIC and the radius of the circle denotes the total population of each
country. The plots show a positive relationship between average child height and sewerage
connectivity density (blue dashed line). Notably, the importance of sewerage connectivity
density does not purely reflect general economic development, since the relationship remains
positive even after controlling for GDP per capita and population density (solid red line).
There are certain outliers in the plot, such as the case of India (largest circle at the lower
bottom of the figure), which has a relatively high average sewerage density (almost 4 house-
holds connected to sewerage per square km) and yet a relatively low average height-for-age
z-score (-2 standard deviations). Most Latin American countries are placed exactly on the
linear prediction, with the Dominican Republic (furthest top-right circle) and Guatemala
(furthest bottom-right circle) as outliers.
To formally show the association between average child height and country-level sewer-
age connectivity density, I estimate the following basic linear specification:
Hc = βSc + θXc + σr + εc (4.1)
where Hc is the average height-for-age z-score for children under five years old in country
c and Sc is the country-level sewerage connectivity density based on the country’s popula-
tion density. Xc denotes a set of indicators that I include in a step-wise fashion: GDP per
capita to capture economic development, population density to capture dense-settlement ef-
fects and the share of women with a height below 145 cm to capture the effect of maternal
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height. Moreover, the specification includes global-region fixed effects denoted by σr to con-
trol for any global-regional-specific height determinant and the standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity.
Table 4.1 presents the results of the linear regression of the average height-for-age z-score
of children on the log of the share of houses connected to sewerage per square kilometre.
Column (1) shows that a 10 per cent increase in a country’s sewerage connectivity density is
associated with an increase of 1.4 standard deviation units in the average child height-for-age
z-score. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Given that
the average country height-for-age is -1.4 for those with no sewerage connectivity density,
a 10 per cent increase in a country’s sewerage density could offset the deviation from the
WHO’s reference group, ceterisparibus, in these countries.
The estimated association remains robust to the inclusion of global-regional fixed effects
(column 2). The association decreases slightly in magnitude, but remains positive and statis-
tically significant at the 5 per cent level, when controlling for GDP, population density and
the share of short women. The results are consistent with Deaton (2007)’s thesis that envi-
ronmental risks play a key role when analysing the variation in mean height across countries.
4.4 Evidence from Latin America
I now focus the analysis on Latin American countries, which lag behind in their connectivity
to sewerage, compared to other similar countries in terms of economic development. The
average height-for-age z-score in Latin America is –1.08, indicating that the average child
has a lower height-for-age than the reference population. Figure 4.2 shows the WHO height-
for-age z-score for the sample of Latin American children by age in months and split by
gender. It can be seen that the children are already slightly short for their age just after birth
and that the z-score reduces, particularly in the first two years of life, after which children
seem to catch up slightly again, but stay far the standard population. The drop in boys is
greater than in girls, but the reverse is also greater for boys. The observed pattern is similar
to the evidence in other LMICs like India (Augsburg and Rodríguez-Lesmes, 2018; Spears,
2020).
Figure 4.3 plots the individual-level data for nine Latin American countries to permit
a visual analysis of the relationship between sewerage connectivity density (based on PSU
sewerage connectivity and country-level population density) and child height. The many
small dots plot the data non-parametrically by splitting the sample into 68 bins along the
horizontal axis of connectivity density and computing the average height for each bin and
the lines denote the linear fit for each Latin American country. The figure has four main
take-aways. First, as the upward trend shows, children that are exposed to more and nearer
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sewerage connectivity are taller on average. Second, there is great variation in both the sew-
erage connectivity density and the average height-for-age, across and within countries. For
instance, a small country like Guyana has a connectivity density comparable to a larger coun-
try like Bolivia, ranging between 0 and 1.5 per square kilometre. Central American countries
like Guatemala and Haiti have a connectivity density, ranging between 0 and almost 5 per
square kilometre and their height trends are similar. Yet, Guatemala has an average height
lower than that of Haiti, although the former is richer than the latter. Third, the relation-
ship between connectivity and height differs across countries. For instance, two comparable
countries in Latin America in terms of economic development, such as Colombia and Peru,
exhibit different trends. While the relationship is steeper in Peru than the general Latin
American trend, the relationship in Colombia is flatter than the general trend (crossing paths
when connectivity density is around two per square km). Finally, the between country dif-
ferences in child height are far larger than the within-country differences. Although positive,
the within-country slopes are not very steep. This observation complements the thesis of
Deaton (2007) that there is a large genetic component to heights within populations, while
the mean height across countries is predicted mostly by the disease environment.
To estimate the association between child height and local sewerage connectivity density,
I use the following specification:
Hipc = β1Spc + β2Shpc + θXi + σr + εipc (4.2)
where Hipc is the height-for-age z-score of children i in PSU p and country c. Spc is the
sewerage connectivity in PSU per square kilometre based on country-level population den-
sity and Shpc is an indicator equal to 1 if the household of the child is connected to sewerage.
Xi denotes a set of child- and household-level controls, drawing closely on Spears (2020),
including child’s birth order, sex-by-age dummies, year-of-birth dummies, mother’s height
and educational attainment, household wealth, and an indicator of whether the household
has access to piped water. Additionally, I control for country-level population density. σr
denotes subnational-regional fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the PSU level to
correct for intra-cluster correlation. The coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the as-
sociation between child height and sewerage connectivity density, even after controlling for
own household connectivity.
Table 4.2 presents the estimated association between sewerage connectivity density and
child height. Column 1 includes all children in the sample, while columns (2), (3) and (4)
restrict the sample of analysis to the age group 0-5 months, 6-24 months and 25-59 months,
respectively.
I find that, on average, a 10 per cent increase in connectivity density is associated with
an increase in heigh-for-age of 0.4 standard deviation units at a 1 per cent significance level
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(Panel A, column 1). Because the average height of children exposed to a sewerage connec-
tivity density equal to zero is -1.37, this association translates into a 30 per cent increase.
Notably, the magnitude of the association within-countries is half that across countries, as
shown in Table 4.1. Thus, this observation suggests that the role of environmental quality is
stronger when identifying cross-country differences in height, as opposed to within-country
ones. The coefficients are slightly higher and are estimated with a greater statistical sig-
nificance for children aged 6 months old or above. We cannot rule out, however, that the
estimates lack statistical power for the age group 0-5 months old. The estimated coefficients
are similar across birth order and gender.
Notably, the positive association is present even after controlling for the child’s household
connectivity to sewerage, possibly reflecting an externality. The estimated association is
similar in magnitude to those found in the literature estimating the impact of eradicating open
defecation (though with the opposite sign, as expected). The systematic review presented by
Spears (2020) shows that the coefficients of the local area fraction of households defecating
in the open predicting child height-for-age range between 0.3 and 0.55 standard deviation
units. The negative association between household connectivity to sewerage and child height
could be due to substitution effects. In their theory, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) posit that
adopting piped water and sewerage can crowd-out parental investment in the child’s human
capital production function.
4.4.1 Quantile treatment effects
The association between sewerage connectivity density and child height is also likely to be
heterogeneous depending on which part of the distribution of the height-for-age sex score
children are in. Child height at the bottom of the height-for-age distribution may be more
elastic with respect to connectivity density —i.e. stunted children have more space to “catch-
up”. I test for heterogeneity by estimating quantile treatment effects (QTE) as follows:
Quantt(Hipc) = βitSpc + ϑtηipc (4.3)
where t corresponds to the quantile of the height-for-age (H) distribution of children i in
PSU p and country c.
Table 4.3 shows that the associations are slightly higher in magnitude for the percentiles
at and below the median compared to the 75th and 90th percentile. The association at the
bottom of the height-for-age distribution is one quarter higher than that at the top. Thus, this
finding confirms the hypothesis that children lagging behind in terms of height benefit most.
When splitting by age group, the linear decreasing pattern is observed in the 0-5 months
age group —i.e. stunted infants seem to benefit more from sewerage connectivity. However,
this is not the case for the 6-24 months age group or the 25-59 months age group, where we
Chapter 4. Running the Last Mile: Sewerage Connectivity Density and Child Height 146
observe a non-linear pattern. In the former, the association is slightly higher in the 25th, 75th
and 90th percentile, while in the latter, it is the highest at the 10th percentile (equivalent to
0.5).
4.4.2 Maternal input
There are two mechanisms through which exposure to open defecation could impact child
height: through the disease and net nutrition experienced by the child (Guerrant et al., 1992;
Humphrey, 2009) and/or through the health of the mother, during and before pregnancy
(Behrman et al., 2009; Prendergast et al., 2014). Besides direct exposure to the disease
environment, children may be stunted due to intra-uterine restrictions imposed by stunted
mothers (Martorell, 2012) and this stunting can be a result of the mother’s own exposure to
poor sanitation conditions previously. The important issue then is to understand whether the
current sanitation conditions are capable of improving child height beyond maternal inputs.
If this conjecture is true, we would expect the child-mother height correlation to be a function
of the current sanitation environment.
This section presents suggestive evidence in support of this possibility, by showing that
sewerage connectivity density predicts the mother-child height correlation. Figure 4.4 plots
the mother-child height correlation as a function of sewerage connectivity density (per sq.
km.). Panel (a) restricts the analysis to first children and Panel (b) to not first children. Three
conclusions emerge from this figures. First, the mother-child height correlation is far be-
low the computed correlation for US children at 0.41 (based on the U.S. from the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979) and in line with other correlations in the LMICs (Livson
et al., 1962). The correlation is higher for older children than younger siblings when sew-
erage density is low. Second, the child-mother height correlation is a function of sewerage
connectivity density. The current sanitation conditions improve child height beyond mater-
nal height. Third, while the correlation is lower in PSU with greater sewerage density for
first children, it is higher for subsequent children. These results mean that in Latin America,
improvements in environmental quality play a greater role in predicting height than maternal
input for eldest children, while the opposite is the case for children higher up the birth order.
When splitting by age group, I find the same positive relationship between sewerage con-
nectivity density and mother-child height correlation for younger siblings (not first child).
This last finding is consistent with older-child favouritism (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017).
Sanitation improvements and changes in parental investment in health apparently benefit first
children more, to a point that the role of maternal input in height is relatively lower.
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4.5 Evidence from Peru
Finally, I focus on Peru, a country that is classified as upper-middle-income and where still
more than 40 per cent of households lack sewerage connectivity. Furthermore, 40 per cent
of the under-five population are stunted, twice as many as the average of countries classified
as upper-middle-income (World Bank, 2020).
Figure 4.5 shows that there were several improvements in Peru between 2007 and 2015
in terms of child height and sewerage connectivity. The sewerage connectivity density (blue
bars), measured as the log of sewerage connectivity at the PSU level per square kilometre
(based on the district’s population density), sat at around 2.5 between 2007 and 2011 and
increased progressively to up to 3.5 per square kilometre until 2015. During the same period
spanning 2007-2015, the average child height-for-age z-score decreased from -1.5 to almost
-1 standard deviation units (red line).
Figure 4.3 shows a steep height-for-age gradient by sewerage connectivity density for
2015 in Peru. In this section, I use a better measurement of sewerage connectivity density,
computed using district-level population density for every year, as opposed to country-level
population density. To formally evaluate the association between child height and connec-
tivity density in Peru over time, I estimate the following specification:
Hipt = β1Spt + β2Shpt + θXit + σd + εipt, (4.4)
where Hipt is the height-for-age z-score for child i in PSU p and survey year t. Spt is the
sewerage connectivity in PSU per square kilometre based on district-level population density
and Shpt is an indicator equal to1 if the household of the child is connected to sewerage in
survey year t. Xi denotes a set of child- and household-level controls similar to Equation
4.2. I additionally include district fixed effects σd. Standard errors are clustered at the PSU
level to correct for intra-cluster correlation.
Table 4.4 presents the estimated association between sewerage connectivity density and
child height. Similar to Table 4.2, column (1) includes all children in the sample, while
columns (2), (3) and (4) restrict the sample of analysis to the age group 0-5 months, 6-24
months and 25-59 months, respectively. Panels B and C further split the sample of analysis
by parity, for the first child and not the first child, respectively.
I find that, on average, a 10 per cent increase in connectivity density is associated with
an increase in height-for-age of 0.1 standard deviation units at a 1 per cent significance level
(column 1). Because the average height of children exposed to a sewerage connectivity
density equal to zero is -1.44, this association translates into a 7 per cent increase. The
estimated association is lost for the age-group 0-5 months and it is qualitatively similar across
the age groups 6-24 months and 25-59 months (columns 3 and 4) and by parity. We cannot
rule out, however, that this estimated association lacks statistical power for the 0-5 months
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age group. The positive association between connectivity density and child height for the age
group 6-24 months is particularly relevant because impaired growth has adverse functional
consequences during the first 24 months of life (Prendergast et al., 2014).
Interestingly, in the case of Peru, I find that the association between connectivity and
height is twice as much for boys for the age groups 6-24 months and 25-59 months. This
is contrary to the evidence observed in countries like India, where girls are systematically
lagging behind and hence are those that benefit most from improvements in the local en-
vironment and disposable income (Duflo, 2003; Augsburg and Rodríguez-Lesmes, 2018).
In Peru, perhaps the mechanism behind this finding is greater parental investment in nutri-
tion, which tends to favour boys.1 For the 25-59 months age group, another explanation is
that boys are more exposed to outdoor hazards than girls (e.g. they play more outside and
take greater risks) and improvements in environmental quality are more important drivers of
height for them. The next section discusses these mechanisms in detail.
Again, the positive association is present even after controlling for the child’s household
connectivity to sewerage, which is likely to reflect an externality. Notably, for the case
of Peru, the association between household connectivity and child height is positive and
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Perhaps in this context, sanitation investments
complement other parental investments.
4.5.1 Non-linearity
One may expect sewerage connectivity density to have a non-linear relationship with child
height. On the one hand, gains at the lower end of the density distribution may improve
environmental quality dramatically. On the other hand, due to the negative externalities from
even one single household not being connected to sewerage, the gains may be greater at the
upper end of the density distribution.
Table 4.5 presents the estimated association between child height and sewerage connec-
tivity density in a non-linear fashion. I introduce variables that account for each additional
two units of sewerage connectivity density. The associations are slightly non-linear, with
greater magnitude above the middle of the distribution (between 6 and 8 households per
square kilometre) and declining at the end (with 8 to 10 households per square kilometre).
Note that the p-value of the joint significance test is 0, meaning that the hypothesis that the
coefficients of each connectivity density measure are the same and equal to 0 can be rejected.
The predicted power of sewerage connectivity density is again concentrated in the groups
of children between 6 and 24 months and 25 and 59 months old. While the association is
linear for the age group 6-24 months, it is non-linear for the age group 25-59 months. The
effect of connectivity density on child height is concentrated in the 25-59 age group.
1A traditional social norm in Peru is that “boys should eat more”.
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This non-linearity is similar to that observed by Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal (2017) when
examining the association between sewerage connectivity and life expectancy in Paris neigh-
bourhoods during the nineteenth century. The non-linearity may serve as evidence of exter-
nalities, but it might also simply be that important improvements in child height begin once
a minimum adoption rate has been achieved for the whole of the local area.
4.5.2 Mechanisms
It is widely understood that height is a function of net nutrition: the difference between food
intake and the losses to activities and diseases (Deaton, 2007). Hence, there are at least two
mechanisms by which sewerage connectivity density might reduce average child height.
The first is through better environmental quality and the resulting reduction in disease
burden in the first years of life. It has long been documented that chronic exposure to fae-
cal contamination is the leading cause of water-borne diseases (Prüss-Ustün et al., 2014).
Among these water-borne diseases, diarrhoea has been implicated as the main cause of poor
growth. The medical literature have also documented that perhaps, most importantly, en-
vironmental enteric dysfunction plays a key role (Humphrey, 2009; Mbuya and Humphrey,
2016). This disease, also caused by repeated faecal contamination, increases the small intes-
tine’s permeability to pathogens while reducing nutrient absorption.
The DHS data provides a measure of diarrhoea incidence using the report of main care-
givers on whether the child had an episode during the two weeks preceding the survey. Yet,
the DHS do not measure biological pathways such as enteric dysfunction, or the contamina-
tion of the environment. To proxy for this, I use the standardised z-scores of weight-for-age
and weight-for-height using the WHO’s reference group. Weight-for-height is a measure of
wasting or thinness, which indicates a recent and severe process of weight loss, associated
with acute starvation, a severe disease or a chronic unfavourable condition. Weight-for-
height is another measure of thinness, but it takes into account adiposity or greater lean body
mass (World Health Organisation, 2010).
Table 4.6 shows that while sewerage connectivity density has no effect on the incidence
of diarrhoea, it is positively associated with weight-for-age. On average, a 10 per cent in-
crease in connectivity density is associated with an increase in weight-for-age of 0.1 standard
deviation units at a 1 per cent significance level (column 2). Finding a reduction in wasting
is consistent with the fact that sewerage connectivity improves the quality of the disease en-
vironment where children grow. The fact that diarrhoea is not a mechanism is not surprising.
Humphrey (2009) argues that the effect of diarrhoea on permanent stunting is small because
growth velocity can be faster than average for age between illness episodes, resulting in
catch-up growth.
Another mechanism is parental investments, particularly those that affect nutritional in-
take. Greater sewerage connectivity may affect parental investment in factors, other than
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environmental quality, that affect the child’s human capital production function. There are
two main channels that can affect parental investments. The first channel is through an in-
come effect. If sewerage connectivity increases the marginal health benefit for parents of
spending more on their children’s health, and such spending is a normal good, parents will
spend more (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003). The second channel is through a substitution effect.
Parents may spend more on other goods if the relative price of spending on a child’s health
is higher. Whether the income or substitution effect prevails is an empirical question.
I analyse the effect of sewerage connectivity density on four types of parental investment:
(i) treating water to drink (e.g. boiling it, passing it through cloth, or adding chlorine to it);
(ii) exclusively breastfeeding infants below 6 months of age (effort and time); (iii) dietary
diversity and (iv) feeding sugar (expensive calories). Dietary diversity is measured as the
number of different food groups consumed during the previous day by the child. The first
two indicators are costly to parents (mostly mothers) due to the time and effort required. The
last two require spending more on food.
Table 4.7 shows that the household’s sewerage connectivity, rather than the local con-
nectivity, is positively associated with the likelihood of treating drinking water. The local
sewerage connectivity density, however, is negatively associated with the likelihood of ex-
clusively breastfeeding infants. On average, a 10 per cent increase in connectivity density
is associated with a decrease in exclusive breastfeeding of 0.1 percentage points (column
2). Perhaps lower contamination of the environment, food and water sources reduce the
marginal benefit of exclusive breastfeeding and, hence, how much mothers “spend” on it.
Non-exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of life can increase the risk of infec-
tious diseases and impair linear growth. This finding helps explain why there is no positive
association between sewerage connectivity density and height in the first months of life (as
seen in Table 4.4, column (2)).
Table 4.7 shows evidence that greater nutritional intake is a mechanism behind the pos-
itive association between sewerage and height of children above six months of age. On
average, a 10 per cent increase in connectivity density is associated with an increase in di-
etary diversity of 0.2 food groups (column 3) and a greater likelihood of feeding the child
sugary products of 0.1 (column 4). If the relative price of preventive and curative health
care is higher, parents spend more on food. It seems that children are not only acquiring
more calories through eating more food groups, but parents are also feeding their children
more expensive calories (sugar and sweets). Ritter (2015) shows that the consumption of
sugar-sweetened beverages (i.e. sodas) serves as a protective mechanism against infectious
diseases for children in Peru. Even when sewerage connectivity density is high, only 30 per
cent of wastewater is treated in Peru (Fay et al., 2017) and thus the consumption of liquids
other than contaminated water can contribute to physical growth.
Another possible mechanism is the net nutrition of mothers, which could be influenced
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by near-term exposure to better environmental quality and/or higher caloric intake. While in
the Latin American analysis I find that the mother-child correlation changes with sewerage
density connectivity, this is not the case in Peru. Perhaps this latter result could be due
to the fact that the mother’s nutritional intake is also affected, and hence both mother and
children have a better nutritional status. In this case, a mechanism explaining the positive
association between sewerage and child height is greater intra-uterine space (Behrman et al.,
2009). However, it is not possible to measure accurately whether this mechanism is at play
because the DHS measures mothers’ anthropometrics at the time of the survey, not during
pregnancy or breastfeeding, and we do not observe mothers’ childhood environments.
4.5.3 Extension: Instrumental Variable Strategy
The positive association between sewerage connectivity density and child height cannot be
interpreted as a causal effect given potential endogeneity. For one, richer areas have both
better connectivity and taller children, both of which may be driven by idiosyncratic factors:
the PSU wealth-connectivity and -child height correlations are 0.25 and 0.1, respectively, and
significant at the 1 per cent level. These richer areas are adopting sewers even though they
already enjoy better nutrition and an improved health environment, as evidenced by taller
children. Furthermore, one might worry that the areas that adopt sewers do so because of
omitted unobservables that make sewers more efficient there than elsewhere. In the Peruvian
analysis, such unobservables would need to vary over time within a district, since either
spatial or time invariant factors would be controlled for by our district and year of birth
fixed-effects. Another potential concern is reverse causality because good child health may
create incentives to invest in goods that help sustain it.
The ability to successfully induce an exogenous large increase in sewerage connectivity
is a necessary first stage to infer causality. Field experiments have not managed to gener-
ate large enough first stages to learn from interventions aimed at inducing latrine adoption
and move away from open defecation (Patil et al., 2014; Clasen et al., 2014; Gertler et al.,
2015; Cameron et al., 2019) and few studies have exogenously induced the adoption of sew-
ers (Norman et al., 2014). This limitation could be overcome once we develop strategies
to rapidly increase connectivity, permitting statistically powerful experimental studies to es-
timate the long-term effects on child health. Yet, even then, effects through accumulated
maternal exposure to better environmental quality may require a long duration of changed
exposure to fully reverse. As Spears (2020) states, at least until such strategies are available,
there will be uncertainty about the exact size of the effect of sewerage connectivity on child
height and population-level observational analysis will continue to play a big role.
In order to improve identification, I rely on an instrumental variable strategy to deal with
endogeneity in sewerage connectivity. I use as an instrument the two-year lag of the av-
erage sewerage connectivity density in adjacent districts. By construction, this instrument
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is independent of both time- and district-specific health outcomes, so it addresses the re-
verse causality concern. The exclusion restriction of this instrument is satisfied if sewerage
connectivity in adjoining districts affects child height only through an increase in sewer-
age connectivity in the own district. This spatial correlation may happen through supply-
and/or demand-side channels. Through the supply-side, installing sewerage lines in neigh-
bouring districts may increase the probability of a given district experiencing the same due to
economies of scale, as equipping several adjacent districts with sewerage lines reduces ma-
terials and transaction costs. It also enables the given district to take advantage of treatment
plants constructed to serve neighbouring districts.
The spatial correlation in adoption is hence more likely to come from the demand-side.
As argued by Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal (2017), high sewer connectivity among neigh-
bouring districts causes the district under consideration to adopt more sewer connections via
a “keeping up with the Joneses” effect and learning about the benefits of adopting sewers.
However, one might worry that sewer adoption in a given district is related to changes in
adjacent districts’ health because of contamination fears. In this scenario, neighbouring dis-
tricts adopt more sewers because of a negative health shock, which may spur on the district
under consideration. Contaminated individuals may directly infect their neighbours as they
move in the city or through local sources of water. The second possibility is unlikely given
that very few Peruvian households rely on local ground sources of water for drinking pur-
poses (recall from Table 4.12 that as of 2015, more than 80 per cent of households relied
on piped-water). Unfortunately, I cannot exclude the first possibility as movement between
districts occurs frequently.
Using the two Census rounds of 2005 and 2007, I compute the sewerage connectivity
density as the sewerage connectivity in a given district times the population density of that
district in each year. Relying on the district-level connectivity provides a better measure for
local environmental quality than using PSU connectivity, as in previous analyses, given that
the DHS is not representative at the PSU level. Figure 4.6 shows that there is great variation
in sewerage connectivity density across districts in Peru. The yellow-shaded districts are
those with very low connectivity density, the green-shaded districts are those in the middle
of the density distribution, and the blue-shaded districts are those at the upper end.
I exploit this variation across districts and within provinces to evaluate the effect of con-
nectivity density on child height and infant and under-five mortality. I compute the average
sewerage connectivity density of neighbouring districts in 2005, which I use as an instru-
ment for connectivity density in 2007. I match these dataset to two sources of data for child
health. First, I match the district-level data on sewerage connectivity to the DHS individual-
level data on children surveyed in 2007. I get a cross-sectional dataset of surveyed 4,374
children in 366 districts within 159 provinces for the height outcome. Second, I match the
district-level data on sewerage connectivity to the district-level mortality rate computed from
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vital statistics for the year 2007. I get a dataset of 1,005 districts within 165 provinces for
the mortality outcome.
The results in Table 4.8 confirm the relevance of the instrument. A per cent increase
in the average connectivity density of neighbouring districts (two-years lag) increases the
connectivity density of the district under consideration by 1.1 per cent for the height-for-age
sample and by 1.71 per cent for the mortality rate sample, both at the 1 per cent significance
level. The F-stat of excluded instruments is sufficiently high, demonstrating the relevance of
the instrument.
I first explore the effect of sewerage connectivity on the child height-for-age z-score.
Table 4.9 presents the results from the OLS (Panel A) and a two-stage least square (2SLS)
estimation (Panel B), which are consistent with the main results we presented in the pre-
vious sections. A 10 per cent increase in connectivity density, on average, increases child
height-for-age by 1.4 standard deviation units (column 1) at a 5 per cent significance level.
The effect is concentrated in older children (25-59 month group), as a 10 per cent increase
in connectivity density increases child height-for-age by 2.2 standard deviation units. The
magnitude of the effect is so large that it completely offsets the mean (negative) deviation in
height-for-age of children in areas with zero sewerage connectivity. Therefore, large gains
can result from pushing sewerage connectivity in areas with low connectivity rates, even if
universal adoption is not achieved. I find no heterogenous effects by gender or parity.
Comparing across the OLS and 2SLS specifications we see that the 2SLS estimates are
larger in magnitude. This could be due to the fact that those that comply with the instrumental
variable strategy —i.e. districts that connect only because their neighbours did so— are
different from the average district whose connectivity density is affected by other factors,
say socio-economic ones. For instance, compliers may not adopt other public goods that
affect child health, as always-takers would, and thus the returns from adopting sewerage
may be greater.
I next estimate the effect of sewerage connectivity on the infant and under-five mortality
rates. Table 4.10 presents the results from the OLS (columns 1 and 2) and two-stage least
square (2SLS) estimation (columns 3 and 4). I find that, on average, a 1 per cent increase in
connectivity density decreases the deaths per 1,000 children under the age of five by 4.3. This
is equivalent to an 8 per cent decrease compared to the mortality rate of children living in
districts with zero sewerage connectivity. Interestingly, this decrease is qualitatively similar
to the increase in under-five mortality caused by an additional unfinished sewerage project,
as estimated in Chapter 1. In other words, the social cost created by one additional unfinished
sewerage project is similar to the social benefits generated when a district increases by only
1 per cent its sewerage connectivity density. This confirms the fact that large gains can be
achieved from increasing connectivity, no matter how small the increase is. The results are
stronger on the under-five than the infant mortality rate, perhaps due to the fact that older
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children are those that, in the absence of connectivity, are more exposed to environmental
hazards.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper measured the contribution of adopting public infrastructure to increases in child
height in LMICs. The study was motivated by the fact that the adoption of sewerage systems
is far from universal and that the interaction of local connectivity with population density
moderates the relationship between location and early-life health outcomes. The results
presented in this article improve our understanding of this interaction, while investigating
its external and internal validity. In three separate analyses, representing different points in
a trade-off between external and internal validity, I find that greater sewerage connectivity
density is positively associated with child height.
The first analysis focuses on LMICs as a whole because cities in these countries still
face great challenges to the widespread adoption of public infrastructure. Citizens in LMICs
often find it difficult to finance the investment needed to connect their dwellings to sew-
ers and face information asymmetries that lower their willingness to pay. Furthermore, the
collection of fees for providing sanitation services is extremely difficult in these countries,
particularly in informal settlements, because of the lack of land titles. Although there is ev-
idence that the sewerage revolution played a key role in improving public health in today’s
high-income countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (British Medical Jour-
nal, 2007), these countries had two advantages over LMICs: citizens had access to financing
and greater security of property rights (Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal, 2017), both of which
are the foundation for investing in dwellings and charging citizens for using public services.
The second analysis zooms into the Latin American region, which faces an additional
challenge: stark inequality. Citizens in these countries face an extraordinary range of living
conditions. Latin American countries have lower connectivity levels to public sewers than
other middle- and upper-middle income countries, as well as a greater prevalence of child
stunting. In Latin America, being a poor child means being less likely to achieve your full
height and cognitive potential and being excluded from labour markets as an adult. This des-
tiny is not only due to income inequalities, but also because of inequalities in access to basic
infrastructure. In the extreme version of this inequality, a large fraction of the urban popula-
tion lives in overcrowded informal settlements, where the burden of preventable diseases is
exacerbated and public infrastructure has collapsed beyond capacity. Providing evidence on
improvements in children’s health that can be achieved by local level connectivity improve-
ments is hence of direct policy relevance, especially for the agenda focused on breaking the
inter-generational transmission of poverty.
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Finally, this paper focuses on Peru, a special case in Latin America of a country that has
experienced dramatic economic development in the last decade, accompanied by an increase
in inequality. Peru is now classified as an upper-middle income country and is on its way
to joining the advanced economies club — the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Yet, four out of ten households are still not connected to sewerage,
meaning that they rely on rudimentary sanitation solutions, and at the same time one in every
ten children is physically stunted.
Controlling for income, household characteristics and maternal inputs, sewerage con-
nectivity density is a predictor of child height disparities across all LMICs, and specifically
Latin American countries. My findings are consistent with Deaton (2007)’s claim that en-
vironmental risks play more of a key role when explaining the mean height variation across
countries than that within countries. The estimated association is greater across countries,
suggesting that there is a large genetic component to heights within populations.
My estimated association between sewerage connectivity density and child height is con-
sistent with those of Hathi et al. (2017), Spears (2020) and Dickinson et al. (2015), who find
impacts of an improved sanitation environment on height-for-age of around 0.2–0.4 standard
deviations in rural areas of India. Yet, the instrumental variable estimation (in Table 4.9)
reveals that the impact of sewerage connectivity density on child height can be as high as
three times larger than the one predicted for a reduction in open defecation density, such as
the one estimated by Hathi et al. (2017) in Bangladesh. This result suggests that jumping
from the use of on-site sanitation facilities to sewerage has greater impacts on child health
than jumping from open defecation to on-site sanitation. It also underlines the need to gain
a comprehensive understanding of the potential of sanitation to promote child development
on different rungs of the sanitation ladder.
The mechanisms behind the findings are twofold. First, the local sanitation environ-
ment apparently improved with greater sewerage connectivity density, reducing the burden
of diseases (other than diarrhoea, such as enteric diseases) that affect nutritional status in
the short-run. Second, there was a change in parental investments, particularly those that
affect nutritional intake. While infants below six months of age were less likely to be exclu-
sively breastfed, dietary diversity was greater for those children in communities with greater
connectivity density. In particular, the consumption of sugary products was greater, a mech-
anism consistent with Ritter (2015)’s findings that sugary beverages protect children against
infectious diseases in Peru. These mechanisms explain why the positive association between
sewerage density and child height is concentrated in older children (those that eat food and
are more exposed to outdoors) and those that enjoy parental preference in resource allocation
(boys and elder siblings).
To consider how substantial the gain in child height is from increasing sewerage con-
nectivity density, I estimate a counterfactual scenario: what would child height have been
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if districts in Peru had achieved their 2007 sewer connection rate two years earlier? The
acceleration in connectivity density would have increased it, on average, by 15 per cent —
equivalent to 2 standard deviation units. This acceleration would have propelled the average
height for children in areas with no sewerage connectivity all the way to the level of the
WHO reference group.
My results have four important implications for policymakers. First, as discussed above,
there are large gains to child health when promoting the adoption of sanitation facilities,
and even more so when these facilities are on a higher rung of the sanitation ladder (i.e.
safer technologies). My cross-country estimates reveal that increasing sewerage connectivity
density is associated with half as much improvement in child height as increasing GDP by
the same level —having policymakers greater control over the former factor. Second, for
a given level of connectivity, policymakers should concentrate their efforts on improving
connectivity where population density is high. Including population density as a factor in
allocation decisions can improve targeting compared to restricting the focus to urban areas
or certain levels of the total population. Several areas in the developing world are classified
as rural, despite having greater population density than places classified as urban. Third,
the results of this paper support the case that incentivising connectivity to a public good
with positive health externalities, such as sewerage systems, should be a policy priority in
the development agenda. Different policy approaches are currently being tested to increase
adoption levels, but with mixed results (Guiteras et al., 2015; Pickering at al., 2015), so more
research is needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the policy options. Finally,
sewerage connectivity density seems to be particularly relevant for older children (i.e. 25-59
months old), suggesting that it may be particularly fruitful to target areas with small children
to increase awareness of how important the adoption of sewerage will be for their growing
children in the future.
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Log of sewerage connectivity per sq km
OLS OLS, after GDPpc and Pop dens
Notes: Circles denote country-year observations weighted by population. The dashed blue line denoted a linear fit and the solid red line
denotes a linear fit after controlling for GDP per capita and population density.
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TABLE 4.1: Robust association between sewerage connectivity density and
child height, across LMICs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Connectivity density (ln) 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Population density (ln) -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Women with height below 145 cm -4.00∗∗∗
(1.24)
Regional FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R square 0.18 0.49 0.56 0.55 0.65
Country-year 89 89 89 89 89
Countries 52 52 52 52 52
Notes: Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ population density +1) at the country level. Columns (2) to
(5) include global-region fixed effects. There are 4 global-regions: (1) Sub-Saharan Africa; (2) North-Africa/West-Asia/Europe; (3) South
and South-East Asia and (4) Latin America. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Notes: Local linear polynomials (blue for boys and green for girls) with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Log of sewerage connectivity per sq km
Bolivia Colombia Dominican Rep
Guatemala Guyana Haiti
Honduras Nicaragua Peru
Means of 68 bins
Notes: Circles denote the mean height-for-age and sewerage connectivity density for 68 bins. Each line denotes the local regression for
each country of Latin America in the sample. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ country population
density +1) at the PSU level.
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TABLE 4.3: Quantile regression estimates for connectivity density and child
height in Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percentile 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
Panel A: All children
Connectivity density (ln) 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Children 78,117 78,117 78,117 78,117 78,117
Panel B: 0-5 months
Connectivity density (ln) 0.04*** 0.04** 0.03** 0.02* 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Children 6,945 6,945 6,945 6,945 6,945
Panel C: 6-24 months
Connectivity density (ln) 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Children 25,950 25,950 25,950 25,950 25,950
Panel D: 25-59 months
Connectivity density (ln) 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Children 45,222 45,222 45,222 45,222 45,222
Notes: Dependent variable: height-for-age z-score. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ country pop-
ulation density +1) at the PSU level. All estimates include region fixed effects for the DHS sub-national regions, sex-by-age fixed effects
and year-of-birth fixed effects. Additional controls include: child’s birth order, mother’s height and educational attainment, household
wealth quintile, an indicator of whether household has access to piped-water and country-level population density. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
TABLE 4.2: Sewerage connectivity density predicts child height disparities in
Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 0-5 months 6-24 months 25-59 months
Connectivity density (ln) 0.04*** 0.03* 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Household connectivity -0.06*** -0.05 -0.08*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Mean (initial) -1.37 -0.68 -1.28 -1.54
Children 78,117 6,945 25,950 45,222
PSU 11,613 5,071 9,825 11,114
Notes: Dependent variable: height-for-age z-score. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ country popu-
lation density +1) at the PSU level. All estimates include region fixed effects for the DHS sub-national regions, sex-by-age fixed effects and
year-of-birth fixed effects. Additional controls include: child’s birth order, mother’s height and educational attainment, household wealth
quintile, an indicator of whether household has access to piped-water and country-level population density. Standard errors clustered by
PSU. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Sewerage density
Notes: The upped figure corresponds to women’s first child and the lower map corresponds
to subsequent children. For reference, the U.S. (1979) average mother-child height correla-
tion is 0.4. These figures plot the child-mother height correlation in Peru, estimated as the
marginal effect of the interaction term = PSU sewerage connectivity density (ln) ∗ mother
height on child height. Marginal effects estimated for the whole range of sewerage density,
increasing by 0.05 households connected to sewerage per square km. All estimates include
region fixed effects for the DHS sub-national regions, sex-by-age fixed effects and year-
of-birth fixed effects. Additional controls include: child’s birth order, mother’s height and
educational attainment, household wealth quintile, an indicator of whether household has
access to piped-water and sewerage connectivity and country-level population density.
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
Sewerage density Average height-for-age (stunted)
Notes: The red line connects the annual mean height-for-age in absolute terms, where each level is a negative value. Each bar denotes the
PSU’s sewerage connectivity per square kilometers, based on the district’s population density. Sewerage connectivity density computed as
ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ district population density +1) at the PSU level.
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TABLE 4.4: Sewerage connectivity density predicts child height in Peru
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 0-5 months 6-24 months 25-59 months
Connectivity density (ln) 0.01*** -0.01 0.01** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Connectivity density (ln) × Boys 0.01*** 0.00 0.01** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Boys 0.46*** 0.21** 0.15** -0.12**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
Household connectivity 0.04*** 0.07 -0.01 0.06***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean (initial) -1.44 -0.73 -1.38 -1.62
Children 86,845 7,673 27,061 52,111
PSU 9,376 4,681 8,395 9,179
Notes: Dependent variable: height-for-age z-score. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ district popula-
tion density +1) at the PSU level. Included DHS survey rounds spanning 2007-2015. All estimates include district fixed effects, sex-by-age
fixed effects and year-of-birth fixed effects. Additional controls include: child’s birth order, mother’s height and educational attainment,
household wealth quintile, an indicator of whether household uses piped-water to drink and district-level population density. Standard
errors clustered by PSU. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Chapter 4. Running the Last Mile: Sewerage Connectivity Density and Child Height 165
TABLE 4.5: Sewerage connectivity density predicts child height in non-linear
fashion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 0-5 months 6-24 months 25-59 months
Connectivity density 2-4 0.08*** -0.01 0.06** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Connectivity density 4-6 0.09*** -0.07 0.08** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02)
Connectivity density 6-8 0.10*** 0.01 0.12** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03)
Connectivity density 8-10 0.07* -0.01 0.13* 0.06
(0.04) (0.15) (0.07) (0.05)
Household connectivity 0.04*** 0.07 -0.01 0.06***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Joint test p-value 0.00 0.84 0.04 0.00
Mean (initial) -1.44 -0.73 -1.38 -1.62
Children 86,845 7,673 27,061 52,111
PSU 9,376 4,681 8,395 9,179
Notes: Dependent variable: height-for-age z-score. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ district popula-
tion density +1) at the PSU level. Included DHS survey rounds spanning 2007-2015. All estimates include district fixed effects, sex-by-age
fixed effects and year-of-birth fixed effects. Additional controls include: child’s birth order, mother’s height and educational attainment,
household wealth quintile, an indicator of whether household uses piped-water to drink and district-level population density. Standard
errors clustered by PSU. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 4.6: Child’s health and nutritional status
(1) (2) (3)
Diarrhoea Weight-for-age Weight-for-height
Connectivity density (ln) 0.00 0.01*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Household connectivity -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mean (initial) 0.16 -0.39 0.63
Children 86,793 86,026 85,458
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is an indicator capturing whether the child had diarrhoea in the last 2 weeks, as reported by
the main caregiver; in column (2) is the weight-for-age z-score and in column (3) the weight-for-height z-score. Sewerage connectivity
density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ district population density +1) at the PSU level. Included DHS survey rounds spanning
2007-2015. All estimates include district fixed effects, sex-by-age fixed effects and year-of-birth fixed effects. Additional controls include:
child’s birth order, mother’s height and educational attainment, household wealth quintile, an indicator of whether household uses piped-
water to drink and district-level population density. Standard errors clustered by PSU. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
TABLE 4.7: Parental investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat Exclusively Dietary Fed
water breastfed diversity sugar
Connectivity density (ln) 0.00 -0.01* 0.02** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Household connectivity 0.01* 0.02 -0.03 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Mean (initial) 0.79 0.62 4.26 0.29
Children 86,837 9,097 61,211 61,211
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is an indicator capturing whether the household of the child treats the drinking water; in
column (2) is an indicator capturing if the infant is exclusively breastfed; in column (3) is dietary diversity index and in column (4) an
indicator capturing whether the child was fed sweets and sugar. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity
∗ district population density +1) at the PSU level. Sample in column 2 restricted to infants between 0 and 6 months old (months were
exclusive breastfeeding is recommended by WHO). All estimates include district fixed effects, sex-by-age fixed effects and year-of-birth
fixed effects. Additional controls include: child’s birth order, mother’s height and educational attainment, household wealth quintile, an
indicator of whether household uses piped-water to drink and district-level population density. Standard errors clustered by PSU. Statistical
significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Notes: This map shows the district boundaries of Peru and the distribution across districts of sewerage density per square kilometer. Light-
shaded districts are those with lower sewerage connectivity density and dark-shaded districts are those with higher sewerage connectivity
density. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ population density +1) at the district level. Author’s
calculation using data from the 2007 Census.
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TABLE 4.8: First stage, adjacent predicts district’s connectivity density
(1) (2)
Sample: Height-for-age Mortality rate
Adjacent connectivity






Notes: Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ population density +1) at the district level. Sample restricted
to year 2007, when data on district’s and neighbour’s (t-2) sewerage connectivity are available. All estimates include province fixed effects,
sex-by-age fixed effects and year-of-birth fixed effects. Column 1 includes additional controls: child’s birth order, mother’s height and
educational attainment, household wealth quintile, an indicator of whether household uses piped-water to drink and sewerage connectivity
and district-level population density. Standard errors clustered by district in column (1) and province in column (2). Statistical significance
denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
TABLE 4.9: Sewerage connectivity density increases child height
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 0-5 months 6-24 months 25-59 months
Panel A: OLS
Connectivity density (ln) 0.02 0.16*** -0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Panel B: 2SLS
Connectivity density (ln) 0.14** 0.06 0.00 0.22**
(0.06) (0.17) (0.08) (0.09)
Fstat 15.89 9.65 16.37 11.93
Mean (no sewer) -1.92 -1.27 -1.90 -2.10
Children 4,374 426 1,396 2,552
Districts 366 214 337 359
Provinces 159 125 156 158
Notes: Dependent variable: height-for-age z-score. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage connectivity ∗ population
density +1) at the district level. Sample restricted to year 2007, when data on district’s and neighbour’s (t-2) sewerage connectivity
are available. All estimates include province fixed effects, sex-by-age fixed effects and year-of-birth fixed effects. Additional controls
include: child’s birth order, mother’s height and educational attainment, household wealth quintile, an indicator of whether household is
connected to sewerage and uses piped-water to drink and district-level population density. Standard errors clustered by district to deal with
intra-cluster correlation. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 4.10: Sewerage connectivity density decreases child mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS
Infant Under-5 Infant Under-5
Connectivity density (ln) -0.00 -0.21** -0.00** -0.43**
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.20)
Fstat 89.64 89.64
Mean (no sewer) 0.02 5.14 0.02 5.14
Districts 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005
Provinces 165 165 165 165
Notes: Dependent variable: infant (IMR) and under-five (U5MR) mortality rate. Sewerage connectivity density computed as ln(sewerage
connectivity ∗ population density +1) at the district level. Sample restricted to year 2007, when data on district’s and neighbour’s (t-2)
sewerage connectivity are available. All estimates include province fixed effects, total population and population density. Standard errors
clustered by province to deal with intra-cluster correlation. Statistical significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 4.13: Sample means and standard deviation, by year in Peru
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All years 2007 2011 2015
Child characteristics
Height-for-age z-score -1.08 -1.34 -1.08 -0.89
(1.13) (1.22) (1.09) (1.07)
Male 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Birth order number 2.54 2.82 2.56 2.41
(1.76) (2.03) (1.78) (1.57)
0-5 months 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27)
6-24 months 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.31
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
25-59 months 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.61
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Mother characteristics
Mother’s height 1515.22 1511.53 1514.46 1520.62
(55.65) (56.84) (54.78) (55.82)
Mother’s highest educational attainment 3.17 2.88 3.16 3.48
(1.46) (1.53) (1.49) (1.39)
Household characteristics
Household sewerage 0.53 0.42 0.51 0.63
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48)
Access to piped-water 5.61 6.09 5.64 4.95
(20.92) (22.03) (21.00) (19.43)
Wealth quintile 1 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.23
(0.42) (0.38) (0.43) (0.42)
Wealth quintile 2 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.22
(0.43) (0.44) (0.42) (0.42)
Wealth quintile 3 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.20
(0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.40)
Wealth quintile 4 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
(0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38)
Wealth quintile 5 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.16
(0.34) (0.37) (0.33) (0.37)
District
Sewerage density (ln) 4.04 3.36 3.87 4.69
(3.67) (3.65) (3.66) (3.62)
Pop density (sq. km) 3028.74 2580.08 2923.24 3574.38
(5478.86) (5339.66) (5328.69) (5834.64)
Child-year 86845 4374 8456 22232
Notes: Coefficients denote means and standard deviations in parenthesis. Sampling weights are used in this table, unlike other results in




The provision and adoption of public infrastructure plays a central role in social policy,
particularly in that of LMICs. Crucial advances are being made in areas such as improving
health, making human settlements resilient and promoting inclusive and sustained economic
growth (World Bank, 2020).
This thesis evaluates both the supply and demand around public infrastructure, with a
particular focus on the sanitation market and its contribution to public health and human
capital. SDG 6 introduced the challenge of “Ensuring Availability and Sustainable Manage-
ment of Water and Sanitation for All by 2030”. Poor sanitation has recently been identified
as one of the main causes of early-life mortality and stunted physical growth, leading to the
loss of human capital and productivity in LMICs (Fay et al., 2017; World Bank, 2018).
Each empirical chapter addresses a different, but inter-linked, type of enquiry into public
infrastructure delivery. Chapter 2 focuses on the supply of sanitation infrastructure. This
chapter identifies inefficiencies in public expenditure and their unintended consequences for
early-life mortality. Chapter 3 looks at how to promote demand for sanitation infrastruc-
ture. Finally, Chapter 4 explores the effectiveness of sanitation infrastructure, when supply
and demand meet, in improving early-life human capital. Altogether, this thesis pushes our
frontier of knowledge about the effective delivery of public infrastructure.
In the first section of this chapter I summarise the main findings and contributions of each
of the papers. Next, I discuss the most important implications and policy recommendations
coming out of this thesis. The third section describes the main limitations of my research.
The final section elaborates on future avenues of my research.
5.1 Main Findings and Contributions
Taken together, the three papers in this thesis make three contributions to the literature. First,
this thesis amplifies our empirical knowledge of where infrastructure projects may go wrong,
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by analysing the “forgotten middle” — the implementation phase and its consequences. Sec-
ond, it provides useful, empirically informed guidance for overcoming obstacles to the de-
mand for public infrastructure. Finally, through this detailed analysis of sanitation infrastruc-
ture, I also provide a more nuanced understanding of the human capital production function
in LMICS, where public health is a key factor.
The Forgotten Middle
Chapter 2 addresses a noticeable gap in the public infrastructure literature. Previous
literature has shown how vital effective public infrastructure is to improve living standards,
but only when it is completed and already in use (Dinkelman, 2011; Rud, 2012; Lipscomb
et al., 2013; Donaldson, 2018). In contrast, and in line with Rasul and Rogger (2018) and
Williams (2017), I document how the implementation of public infrastructure projects suffers
from mid-construction abandonment and severe delays. But I show that these inefficiencies
are more than just a waste of public resources. Unfinished infrastructure projects generate
high social costs: they can kill children.
Specifically, I find that unfinished sewerage projects, as opposed to not starting projects,
increase infant and under-five mortality in Peru. The mechanisms behind this result are
threefold. First, water cuts are needed during the installation of sewerage lines, which force
the population to rely on unsafe sources of water and deteriorate their hygiene and sanitation
practices. Second, in order to install public sewers, extensive excavations are required. This
digging creates open ditches that get filled with stagnant water and become pools of infection.
Third, large building sites pose hazards to children who are used to roaming freely and are at
risk of accidents. In line with these mechanisms, my results show that the mortality caused
by water-borne diseases and accidents increases. Supporting the internal validity of these
results, I find no effects on mortality caused by other underlying conditions.
This chapter provides a full picture of the implementation of public infrastructure. In
addition to exploring the health effects of unfinished projects, this chapter also shows that
completed projects decrease early-life mortality, in keeping with findings that sewerage sys-
tems increase the probability of child survival and improved life expectancy in today’s ad-
vanced economies during the previous centuries (Watson, 2006; Alsan and Goldin, 2019;
Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal, 2017). I also show that providing access to public sewers does
not ensure universal connectivity of households to sewerage systems in the short-run, which
may prevent the social benefits of sewerage systems from fully manifesting. This finding is
evidence of the last mile problem — the inability of governments to connect costly infras-
tructure to the final user (Ashraf et al., 2016).
How to Promote Demand
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature exploring how to promote the demand for public
infrastructure in general, and in particular of goods with health benefits (Kremer et al., 2011;
Devoto et al., 2012; Ben Yishay et al., 2017; Guiteras et al., 2015; Gertler et al., 2015;
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Greenstone and Jack, 2015). I study this in the context of slums in India and community
toilets, a type of sanitation where coordination problems are salient. While considered an
important public health solution for the foreseeable future in slums, our data reveals rampant
free-riding and remarkably low valuation for CTs, which are in turn of very bad quality.
Burgess et al. (2020) and Mcrae (2015) have already demonstrated how non-payment and
subsidies distort the supply of public infrastructure. In this chapter, I demonstrate that they
also distort demand.
We find that a marginal improvement in CT quality achieved by the one-off supply push
—a typical public intervention when rehabilitating infrastructure— is not sustained over
time. Surprisingly, externally funding public infrastructure rehabilitation backfires. We find
reductions in willingness to pay, a deterioration in attitudes towards paying a user fee and
greater demand for public intervention in the maintenance of CTs. Altogether, these findings
provide evidence that external funds crowd-out private contributions in our study context.
Importantly, we find that an information campaign increasing awareness of the importance to
pay the fee and externalities from unsafe sanitation behaviour is ineffective in counteracting
any of these effects, despite having left a lasting impression on households.
Sanitation and Human Capital
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on the drivers of international disparities in hu-
man capital (Deaton, 2007; Deaton and Drèze, 2009; Bozzoli et al., 2009; Spears, 2020). I
provide evidence to show that local sewerage connectivity density is a driver of child height
disparities in LMICs. The results remain robust across three separate analyses, representing
different trade-offs between external and internal validity.
The mechanisms behind the findings are twofold. First, the local sanitation environ-
ment apparently improves with greater sewerage connectivity density, reducing the burden
of diseases (other than diarrhoea, such as enteric diseases) that affect nutritional status in the
short-run. Second, parental investments change, particularly those that affect nutritional in-
take. While infants below six months old were less likely to be exclusively breastfed, dietary
diversity was greater for those children in communities with greater connectivity density.
This finding is in line with Ritter (2015)’s study, which shows that the consumption of sugar-
sweetened beverages protects against infectious diseases.
In addition, this paper also advances evidence on the importance of sanitation adoption
at an aggregate level (Augsburg and Rodríguez-Lesmes, 2018; Spears, 2020), at the top rung
of the sanitation ladder (Duflo et al., 2015; Pickering at al., 2015; Dickinson et al., 2015;
Cameron et al., 2019) and when interacted with population density in LMICs (Hathi et al.,
2017). The chapter expands the frontier of knowledge in the literature focused on early-life
human capital accumulation (Maluccio et al., 2009; Cunha et al., 2010; Gertler et al., 2014;
Campbell et al., 2014) by adding sanitation as a determinant in LMICs.
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5.2 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Governments and Multilateral Development Banks invest billions of dollars every year in de-
veloping public infrastructure, with the aim of promoting economic and social development.
The findings in this thesis can inform them on how those funds are spent.
The results in Chapter 2 stress the importance of obtaining a comprehensive understand-
ing of the cost-effectiveness of supplying public infrastructure. This understanding must
extend from the implementation of projects to their delivery to the final user. Moreover,
cost-effectiveness analyses should include social costs in addition to private costs.
The inclusion of social costs will incentivise agents to mitigate these costs in the im-
plementation of public infrastructure projects. For example, project delivery could be com-
plemented by policies that mitigate the negative consequences of the construction works.
Low-hanging fruit, such as stricter health and safety measures, complementary healthcare
and the provision of alternative safe sources of water and sanitation during construction,
could compensate the affected population and prevent child deaths.
Furthermore, any institutional arrangement (public or private) will have to deal with the
lumpy nature of finance and construction of infrastructure. Mid-construction abandonment
and unnecessary delays, which exacerbate health hazards to the population, must move up
the ladder of policy priorities. As a minimum, LMIC governments must improve the mon-
itoring of the physical progression of infrastructure projects. A reform of the contractual
system could help finish projects that are started, such as leaving a large lump of the con-
tractual payment for when projects are finalised and including a penalty for not completing
infrastructure.
The literature provides additional useful insights into the determinants of project non-
completion, which can guide policy actions. Rasul and Rogger (2018) stress the importance
of improving managerial practices in local bureaucrats, including the use of external re-
wards. Williams (2017) highlights the need to impose a rule that districts must finish existing
projects before starting new ones. Robinson and Verdier (2013) reveals that better govern-
ment accountability, particularly during electoral years, can help reduce mid-construction
abandonment when political leaders strategically delay unfinished projects.
The results in Chapter 2 also reveal that, even when public infrastructure is available,
demand is not guaranteed. Chapter 3 adds to this challenge by showing that promoting
demand for shared public infrastructure is not a trivial task. A one-off push to rehabilitate in-
frastructure, coupled with financial rewards to providers, is not enough to achieve sustained
improvements in quality, valuation and usage. The traditional policy approach of supporting
providers to rehabilitate public infrastructure with the aim of stimulating demand, regard-
less of the level of private contribution, backfires. Private contributions and usage decrease,
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while the demand for public intervention to operate and maintain shared infrastructure in-
creases. Furthermore, the results in Chapter 3 show that intense information campaigns, a
typical policy tool, are not effective at inducing payment for and increasing usage of shared
infrastructure.
Exploring other solutions in a similar setting to ours, Coville et al. (2020) shows that hard
threats of disconnection decrease non-payment. Yet, disconnecting/preventing usage of sani-
tation facilities may not be socially desirable in a high disease burden and low environmental
quality setting such as slums, so there is a need to explore policy alternatives. Policies range
from fully subsidising usage to removing explicit subsidies while continuing to support the
poor through ear-marked transfers (Guiteras et al., 2015; Attanasio et al., 2011).
To change the social norm tolerating free-riding, while not deterring safe behaviour, en-
couraging collective action may be an effective avenue. Community Total Sanitation Cam-
paigns (CLTS), which use psychosocial levers of shame and disgust and appoint a local
monitoring committee, have proven to be effective to improve sanitation behaviour in poorer
settings (Abramovsky et al, 2018). Though evidence of CLTS mainly comes from rural ar-
eas, an approach adapted to urban areas could be effective at reducing free-riding in shared
infrastructure in slums.
The results in Chapter 4 provide a silver lining to the effective delivery and adoption of
public infrastructure and its effects on well-being. When infrastructure projects are com-
pleted and their adoption ensured at an aggregate level, they can contribute to human capital
formation. This chapter provides three main policy recommendations. First, there are large
gains to child health when promoting the adoption of sanitation facilities at an aggregate
level, and even more when these facilities are on a high rung of the sanitation ladder (i.e.
safer technologies). Second, for a given level of connectivity, policymakers should concen-
trate their efforts on increasing connectivity where population density is high. Including
population density as a factor in allocation decisions can improve targeting compared to re-
stricting the focus to urban areas or certain levels of the total population. Several areas in
the developing world are classified as rural, despite having greater population density than
places classified as urban.
Third, the results of this paper support the case that incentivising connectivity to a public
good with positive health externalities, such as sewerage systems, should be a policy priority
in the development agenda. Policymakers need to run the last mile, ensuring that users are
connecting to costly public infrastructure. Ashraf et al. (2016), for example, argues that this
could be achieved by finding a “sweet spot” between fines and subsidies for users. Of course,
this is a long-run policy approach, as it depends heavily on the institutional quality of legal
and executive bodies.
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5.3 Limitations
Acknowledging the limitations of the three different chapters is essential to provide a basis
for future research.
Regarding Chapter 2, although one of its great strengths is the collection and assembly
of several novel sources of administrative data, this also poses great limitations. The main
data challenge is measuring physical project completion. The government of Peru does not
keep records of the physical progress of infrastructure projects over time, only financial ones.
Given this limitation, in this paper I use financial progress as a proxy for physical progress.
Of course, financial progress may reveal corruption instead of physical progress. Yet, the
concern lies in my measure of project completion being underestimated —i.e. greater fi-
nancial expenditure than physical progress means that some projects will be categorised as
completed, even when they were not. For monitoring purposes, the Ministry of Economy
and Finance of Peru shared with me that, since 2019, they have started measuring the physi-
cal progress of infrastructure projects. Systematising these data will offer a great opportunity
for future research.
Another limitation of the data is that it is available at an aggregate level, namely district
level. In an ideal world, each infrastructure project would be geo-coded and I would be
able to match them to households in the catchment area. Even more ideal would be to have
access to geo-coded data of the physical progress of sewerage projects over time. I therefore
face a limitation in the analysis of behavioural responses to the development of sewerage
infrastructure projects.
Related to the last limitation, the aggregate nature of the project data means that many
projects are happening at the same time and in different stages in a given district. There are
very few districts in which only one project has taken place, which allows me to identify
the different stages of implementation. It is therefore not possible to disentangle the effects
of a project completed on time vs. one temporarily delayed vs. one abandoned. Focusing
on the effects of all types of unfinished projects in a given district (underway, delayed and
abandoned) is the cleanest way to deal with this limitation.
Finally, due to the high prevalence of unfinished projects, I am underpowered to estimate
the effect of completed projects on connectivity rates, and subsequently on child health. This
is key to disentangling the effects of completed and unfinished projects. Yet, the literature
has already estimated the effects of completed projects, and hence the focus on unfinished
projects is a key strength of this paper.
The main limitations of Chapter 3 are those typically ascribed to randomised controlled
trials (RCTs) (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018). While the main advantage of RCTs is strong
internal validity, this does not come with a “free lunch”. A first limitation is the external
validity of the findings because the study takes place in only two cities of urban India. Yet,
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the findings in this chapter are relevant to all urban slums in India, where 24 per cent of the
total population lived as of 2014, and in other LMICS, particularly in South Asia (where 30
per cent of the population lived in slums as of 2014). India shares many key characteristics
with other countries that face similar challenges of urbanisation and poor sanitation, includ-
ing GDP per capita (close to the South Asian regional average), population growth and life
expectancy at birth (World Bank, 2020). Within India, Lucknow and Kanpur are comparable
to other growing cities within its state (Uttar Pradesh) and in other states, in terms of the
population living in slums, literacy rates and poverty rates (IndianMinistryofHomeAffairs,
2011).
A second limitation is related to scaling-up. The fact that an intervention might work
differently at scale has long been noted in the economics literature (Banerjee and Duflo,
2009). The estimated effects in Chapter 3 come from an intervention implemented in a semi-
controlled environment. Of course providing this intervention at the national level poses
greater challenges. It is not clear ex-ante, for example, if the improvements in quality and
salience of the intervention would be greater or lower. Furthermore, when thinking about
scaling-up, it is important to think about “general equilibrium effects”. For instance, if the
government gives a one-off push to improve the quality of all community toilets in India, the
prices of the factors of production will increase due to the greater demand. If the supply of
community toilets is price elastic, the maintenance costs will increase dramatically and the
quality could instead be deteriorated.
A third limitation is linked to the average treatment effect (ATE). An RCT delivers an
ATE for the trial population but, in general, that average does not apply to everyone. Of
course, the ATE from an RCT is only an estimate, not the infallible truth, and, like other
estimates, it has a standard error.
However, there is no consensus as to how to deal with these limitations. In Chapter
3, I make an attempt to improve the credibility of the results by detailing the mechanisms
through which they operate and conducting heterogenous analysis. Of course, a judicious
use of theory, such as structural models, could improve the credibility and transferability of
the results even further (Attanasio et al., 2011).
Regarding Chapter 4, its main limitation is internal validity. The aim of this paper is to
provide separate analyses representing different points in a trade-off between external and
internal validity. While the former is achieved by using country-level data from 52 LMICs
and within-country data from nine Latin American countries, the latter suffers from weak
identification. A naive ordinary least square (OLS) estimate, even after the inclusion of
fixed effects, is not consistent. Thus, we can only interpret the estimates as associations,
rather than causal effects of sewerage connectivity density on child height. In an attempt
to increase the internal validity of the results, I use an instrumental variable strategy in the
analysis of Peru. Yet, I acknowledge that the instrument may not comply with the exclusion
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restriction. The adjacent connectivity density may not only affect a given district’s child
height through the district’s sewerage connectivity. One might worry that sewer adoption in
a given district was related to changes in adjacent districts’ health because of contamination
fears. With this limitation in mind, the credibility of the results rests on the fact that they
remain robust across different analyses.
Another limitation of Chapter 4 is the availability of population density data only at an
aggregate level. Only in the case of Peru am I able to use population density data from
the lowest jurisdictional level (districts), which allows for getting better insights into the
magnitude of the association. Systematising and harmonising population density data across
different census rounds in several countries could be of great value for future research.
5.4 Future Research
The methodologies, limitations, results and policy implications of this thesis open avenues
for future research.
Chapter 2 stresses the need to investigate the determinants of public expenditure inef-
ficiencies in the development of public infrastructure. The institutional arrangement of the
provision of sewerage systems requires further investigation. The fact that sewerage systems
are provided by a monopolistic government that deters competition may be a key determinant
of inefficiencies in the implementation of infrastructure projects.
Private participation in the provision of public goods has increased in Latin America
and around the world. We must understand if alternative arrangements with greater private
participation, such as outright privatisation or a public-private partnership, can improve the
quality of public infrastructure provision. Galiani et al. (2005), for example, find large gains
in connectivity and performance linked to the privatisation of sewerage services in Argentina,
which ultimately decrease child mortality. Such alternative institutional arrangements could
be a viable solution for the government of Peru to increase sewerage connectivity. Nonethe-
less, Granados and Sánchez (2014) find that municipalities that have privatised sewerage
services exhibit a slower reduction in child mortality rates and lower increases in coverage.
Differences in institutional quality may be behind this mixed evidence. Besley and Ghatak
(2006) predict that privatised solutions are only viable in the presence of strong legal sys-
tems and effective regulation. Whether or not greater private participation can improve the
provision of public infrastructure is therefore an empirical question.
Two other potential determinants of project completion require wider investigation. The
first is the political economy of infrastructure supply. Further research can help us get a
better understanding of the role of political dynamics, including changes to the incumbent
political party and gender, as well as term times and possibilities for re-election. the second
is the role of government capacity. Investigating exogenous shocks to municipal revenue and
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public employment can help us gain insights into the extent to which capabilities are binding
constraints to the efficient supply of public infrastructure.
Chapter 3 stresses the need to continue investigating how to promote demand for public
goods in general, and shared infrastructure with positive health externalities in particular.
The findings, however, raise a key question: how to effectively break the vicious cycle around
non-payment and low-quality infrastructure.
Further research is needed to answer this question and I have identified three key areas.
First, it is important to understand which policy option is cost-effective to achieve sustain-
able improvements in the sanitation environment of urban slums. Alternatives range from
fully subsidising shared infrastructure, to removing explicit subsidies while continuing to
support the poor. That said, there remains a need for more evidence from high free-riding
environments and when coordination problems are salient. Second, we need to understand
how to change social norms that make free-riding acceptable, while not deterring safe be-
haviour. Third, we must explore the effectiveness of different technologies to make shared
infrastructure excludable, making it possible to link payment with supply.
Chapter 4 stresses the need to successfully induce an exogenous large increase in sew-
erage connectivity as a necessary first stage to infer causality. Field experiments have not
managed to generate large enough first stages to learn from interventions aimed at inducing
latrine adoption and move away from open defecation (Patil et al., 2014; Clasen et al., 2014;
Gertler et al., 2015; Cameron et al., 2019) and few studies have exogenously induced the
adoption of sewers at an aggregate level (Norman et al., 2014). Different policy approaches
are currently being tested to increase adoption levels, but with mixed results and on a lower
level of the sanitation ladder (Guiteras et al., 2015; Pickering at al., 2015). Further research
is needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the policy options to induce households
to connect to public sewers.
Moreover, there is a need for statistically powerful experimental studies to estimate the
long-term effects on child height. Yet, even then, the effects from accumulated maternal
exposure to better environmental quality may require a long duration of changed exposure
to fully reverse. Therefore, long-term follow-up studies are required to understand better the
role of the sanitation environment in the human capital production function of LMICs.
5.5 Concluding remarks
I conclude this thesis with a reminder that access to public infrastructure remains out of reach
of the majority of the population in LMICs. Millions of children die every year because of
lack of access to and adoption of (by their house and neighbours) sanitation infrastructure.
This situation will not change as long as we do not identify supply- and demand-side con-
straints and discover effective policy approaches to release them. The aim of this thesis is
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to advance knowledge in this domain and provide practical guidance to policymakers. My
findings open an active research agenda in this topic.
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